

**Religion and Public Goods Provision: Experimental and Interview Evidence from  
Catholicism and Islam**

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**DRAFT.** 10.03.2013

Comments welcome, especially those with an eye towards helping us improve the paper for publication.

This paper is a revised version of the 2013 Sage Award of the American Political Science Association Qualitative and Multi-method Research Section for best paper developing or applying qualitative methods presented at the preceding APSA conference.

Paper for presentation at the AALIMS-Princeton workshop, October 18-19 2013

## Abstract

Religions such as Catholicism and Islam are generators of substantial amounts of charitable donations and volunteer work, and they sustain themselves as organizations. How do they produce charitable public goods and their own religious club goods when they are open to extensive free-riding? We argue that mainstream religions facilitate club and public goods provision by using their community structures and their theological belief systems to activate the pro-social, generous tendencies of their members. The study is based on in-field essay-prime experiments with over 800 Catholics and Muslims in Dublin and Istanbul and on case study-based interviews with over 200 Catholics and Muslims in Dublin, Istanbul, Milan and Paris. Our findings highlight the role of the religious concepts of duty to God, God's grace, and deservingness on adherents of the two religions, as well as religious community, though not in the way typically expected by rational choice theory. The evidence shows support for understanding individuals as being pro-social, not just strictly self-interested utility maximizers. Our argument about the role of beliefs and community help explain why mainstream religions can produce club and public goods despite their lack of strong monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. The paper also demonstrates the advantages of using a methodology that combines field experiments with case study-based interviews.

## Introduction<sup>1</sup>

From Indonesian tsunami relief efforts to health clinics in the Gaza Strip to promoting civic culture in America, organized religions have been credited with providing public goods (Davis and Robinson 2012; Dhingra and Becker 2001; Loveland, et al. 2005; Caputo 2009; Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Trejo 2009, 323; Wiktorowicz 2004). How they do so is far less understood than the fact that they do. Public choice approaches have made progress in understanding why and how strict religious sects and terrorist groups, as well as ethno-religious groups, provide public goods (Alexander and Christia 2011; Berman 2009; Berman and Laitin 2008 Cammet and Issar 2010). This literature has emphasized the collective action dilemma of free-riding and focused on how groups monitor and sanction their members (Tsai 2007). Another literature has focused on religious community affiliation and values, exploring whether different denominations or whether the religious versus the secular are more or less likely to be charitable or socially engaged (Sarkissian 2012). Some have found that the religious are “better neighbors” than the non-religious because of their involvement in a religious community (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 471).

In both streams of scholarship, the causal mechanisms leading mainstream religious believers to provide public goods are unclear. Because mainstream religions often lack effective monitoring and sanctioning structures, the expectation is that they would do a poor job of creating collective goods (Makowsky 2011; Iannaccone 1994). Yet evidence suggests otherwise. Religions such as Catholicism and Islam are generators of substantial amounts of charitable donations and volunteer work, and they sustain themselves as organizations. How do they produce charitable public goods and their own religious “club” goods when they are open to extensive free-riding? Given the prevalence of religion in human society, and that Islam and Catholicism claim over 2.5 billion followers combined, the question is important to study. We re-frame this question to ask whether there are spiritual mechanisms that enable religious communities to produce club and public goods. Mainstream religions may facilitate club and public goods provision by using their theological belief systems and communities to activate the pro-social tendencies of their members. We test this possibility with data collected from experiments and interviews with Muslims and Catholics in Europe.

We focus on Italy, France, Ireland and Turkey. Italy, France and Ireland have been and remain crucial to the history and life of the Catholic Church and Catholicism; Turkey is a major Islamic country, with a significant role in Islam’s history. Ireland, Italy and France are predominantly Catholic, and each has Muslim populations in their major cities (Maréchal et al. 2003; Sakaranaho 2006, 270-314). Turkey is predominantly Muslim and has a small Catholic minority (Bailey and Bailey 2003, 196-7; Frazee 1983, 223-238; Le Coz 1995, 381; Tcholakian 1998, 387-412). To limit confounding variables, we are restricting our project to stable democratic countries in Europe. With most of Europe’s populations living in urban areas, we

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<sup>1</sup> We thank Sevde Arpacı, Matthew E. Bergman, Angela Pirlott, Scott Swagerty, Chloe Westlund, Jenna Mudrick, Dimitri Sementchoukov, and Sherman Duckworth for research assistance, and Lenka Bustikova, Bernhard Reinsberg, Larry Iannaccone, Jared Rubin, David Siroky for comments and suggestions. We thank the University of Notre Dame Science of Generosity Program, and the Institute for Social Science Research at Arizona State University for their financial support of this research and the Arizona State University Center for the Study of Religion and Conflict for logistical support. We are very grateful for the assistance and cooperation of the religious officials who allowed access to their religious communities. Professors David Farrell and Christopher Whelan at University College Dublin and Professors Ali Tekcan and Kutlu Ülgen at Boğaziçi University, Istanbul provided invaluable help in facilitating the conduct of experiments with students at their universities. We especially thank the interviewees and experiment participants for their willingness to take part in this project.

located our research in large urban centers of Paris, Milan, Dublin and Istanbul, studying a Catholic parish and Muslim organization in each.<sup>2</sup> These four cities enable us to study public goods production of Catholicism when in majority and minority status, and of Islam when in minority and majority status.

We use data collected from experiments conducted with over 800 students and community members in Dublin, Ireland and in Istanbul, Turkey and from over 200 interviews with Catholic parishioners, Muslim association members and religious officials in Dublin, Istanbul, Milan and Paris.<sup>3</sup> This multi-methods approach combines the advantages of experiments and in-depth interviews and case studies. Experiments randomly manipulate treatments across subjects and allow for quantitatively measurable differences across treatment groups. In-depth interviews within case studies enable us to probe understandings of concepts and motives, observe behaviors, and learn directly about organizational structures (Gerring 2007; Wuthnow 2011). This mitigates the disadvantages of either approach separately: experiments are open to the charge of being artificial, lacking external validity, and hampered by hard to anticipate design problems (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). Interviews and case studies might not be “clean” enough to establish causality because subjects are not randomly selected, treatments are not manipulated (though they are compared across groups), and interviews only tell us what people think motivated them, not what “really” motivated them (Chaves 2010). Using data from both methods to cross-check findings from each method should generate more confidence in our conclusions.

Our results suggest that several religious beliefs and community dynamics influence the propensities of individuals to engage in the production of club and public goods, and these effects vary across the two religions. This coheres with findings from psychology and behavioral economics that humans are motivated by pro-social orientations and not just by avoidance of harm (Johnson, Li, Cohen, & Okun, 2013). Yet the results, intriguingly, were also somewhat different between the experiments and the interview-based case studies, and we will discuss likely reasons why in a later section. In the experiments, Catholics were much more likely than Muslims to exhibit generous behavior in response to a prompt of God’s grace, duty to God, or teachings of the religion about deservedness of those in need. Our interviews told a somewhat different story. Catholics overwhelmingly denied having a “duty to God” to be helpful or generous; Muslims overwhelmingly said they did have such a duty. Catholics and Muslims indicated they are influenced by their religious communities, though less in the way rational choice theories of public goods expect and more in the way theories of pro-sociality expect. Catholics and Muslims helped members of their respective in- and out-groups, usually by donating to and volunteering in one of their in-group organizations. In the experiments Catholics were more likely to give to an out-group than an in-group, and Muslims more likely to do the reverse. The interviews revealed that both religions are oriented towards helping others, of in- and out-groups, often through organizations of the in-group. We comment on this discrepancy in the discussion. The dual methodology of experiments and case study-based interviews shows the

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<sup>2</sup> We did not choose the capital cities of Italy or Turkey because of the need to have an adequate population of the religious minority in question. There are very few Turkish Muslims in Rome, and very few Roman Catholics in Ankara. Milan and Istanbul had requisite minority populations. We opted for democratic countries in order to be able to study religious groups that could be active in civil society.

<sup>3</sup> Throughout the paper, when we mean the local institutions, we use Gülen “association”. When we mean the entire organization at the local, national and international levels, we use Gülen “movement.” This is in keeping with how we use “parish” and “church” for the local level study of Catholics, and “Catholic Church” for the entire organization of the Catholic Church.

advantages of applying both approaches to our study. Each helps check the findings of the other, and enables us to avoid reaching erroneous conclusions in light of apparent non-findings from one or the other method, and finally, enables us to refine the methods and questions for future research.

First, we present the current state of the literature assessing the relationship between religious organizations and the production of club and public goods. We suggest that previous studies have paid insufficient attention to the micro-level mechanisms through which religions prompt individuals to contribute to both. We then discuss our theoretical framework. It builds on a multidisciplinary body of literature arguing that rational calculations of utility fail to recognize that individuals have pro-social orientations as well as self-interested ones. We suggest that religious beliefs and communities influence the degree and form that pro-social orientations take in individuals. We then present our research design, findings from the experiments and interviews, and a discussion of results. We conclude with a restatement of the main themes and findings of the study.

### ***Background Literature***

One stream of literature in political science has pointed to religion's role in producing "social networks, shared solidarities, and leadership structures" that facilitate collective action (Tarrow 1994, 11). Other work relies on factors influencing religious elite cost/benefit calculations that prompt religious leaders to support particular social movements (Gill 1998; Trejo 2009). Neither has addressed the question of how an organized religion or set of religious beliefs might prompt adherents to participate in the production of collective goods despite having an incentive to free-ride off the efforts of others.<sup>4</sup>

A related literature on ethnicity and public goods provision points towards incentives and sanctions, and the mobilizational capacities of group structures (e.g., Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007). Within political science, this perspective has not been widely applied to the study of *religious* groups and collective goods provision. Economists have turned their attention to this issue, developing a theory of religious clubs. The club goods approach reasons that clubs provide their members with jointly produced excludable goods that are subject to overcrowding and congestion if the size of the group becomes too large. Clubs accordingly enact mechanisms to restrict membership and exclude others from the consumption of the goods provided by the club (Samuelson 1954; Buchanan 1965; Cornes and Sandler 1996). Applied to religious organizations, religious clubs use sacrifice and commitment requirements to exclude free-riders and restrict the provision of religious goods to committed members (Iannaccone 1992). Religions that enact strict membership requirements are more efficient and effective "club" good providers. This framework has been expanded and empirically evaluated in a variety of settings (McBride 2007; Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2009; Chen 2010; Orman 2011; Makowsky 2011), and has most notably been used to explain the seeming comparative advantage of religious sects in perpetrating terrorist acts (Berman 2009; Berman and Laitin 2008; Iannaccone and Berman 2006).

Club and public goods differ on the matter of excludability. Non-participation in the production of a club good can be sanctioned by withholding various club-goods from non-

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<sup>4</sup>Collective goods are goods provided by multiple individuals, of which public goods and public goods are both subsets. Public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous; club goods (within a club) are excludable and non-rivalrous, though there may be a "menu" of club levels and excludability (McBride 2007).

contributors. Public goods, on the other hand, have no such possibility of exclusion. This exclusionary principle has important ramifications. Exclusion to weed out non-contributors explains why individuals would contribute to the production of "club" goods in a religious context. A religious club could exclude members from access to a variety of desired club goods if members shirk from their productive responsibilities. Exclusion from the club does not explain why religion would cause individuals to contribute to the production of "public" goods, whose benefits do not accrue to the particular organization, and whose enjoyment cannot be restricted to contributing members.<sup>5</sup>

In the religious economics framework, collective outcomes result only from the "self-interested decisions of strictly rational actors" (Iannaccone 1994, 1185). While the framework provides leverage in explaining how and why strict sects efficiently provide club goods to their members, it is less successful in explaining how and why mainstream institutions, with substantially lower sacrifice and commitment requirements, provide club or public goods. Religious groups also provide public goods (e.g. Cammett and Issar 2010). The question of why some within the group give and volunteer to provide club and public goods, and allow others to free-ride, is unanswered.<sup>6</sup>

There is a sustained empirical challenge to conventional rational choice analysis concerning whether individuals consistently work on behalf of advancing their own material self-interest. Experimental evidence suggests individuals are socially oriented and have preferences to engage in pro-social behavior. Sanctions and incentives are not the only or necessary factors to bring about generous, cooperative behavior in individuals (Andreoni and Rao 2011; Warneken et al 2006; Warneken and Tomasello 2008; Warneken and Tomasello 2009). The distribution of these considerations is not uniformly distributed across the population (e.g., Andreoni 1990; Andreoni and Miller 2002; Bowles and Gintis 2004; Casari and Plott 2003; Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr 2001; Kurzban and Houser 2005; Simpson and Willer 2008). The literature has turned to relying upon some level of altruism or "warm glow" rewards of volunteering and giving to explain the existence of public goods in moderate religions (Hungerman 2009). There is little theorizing about the conditions under which individuals might be more or less inclined to display altruistic social preferences. Instead, the distribution of these altruistic tendencies is theorized as exogenous and idiosyncratic individual-level traits. We propose that religious beliefs and community attachment may help explain the distribution of altruistic behaviors in some of the population.

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<sup>5</sup>Previous work on the relationship between religious sects and public goods is particularly challenged by this point (Iannaccone and Berman 2006; Berman and Laitin 2008). The positive strategic and political externalities derived from terrorist attacks cannot be confined simply to terrorist or religious groups, but instead accrue to the surrounding society at large. Terrorist groups such as Hamas, for example, often do not restrict social welfare programs to their members, but instead make them broadly available to society (Levitt and Ross 2006, 108-109). Even if the terrorist group has an interest in providing these services in the interest of generating support for the organization from the local population, it is not at all clear from a micro-level perspective why adherents to the sect are devoting time and energy to produce public goods they can presumably receive whether or not they devote the time and money necessary for their production.

<sup>6</sup> Makowsky, using an agent based model, attempts to explain individuals' contributions by their wage-based opportunity costs (Makowsky 2011a). To our knowledge, Makowsky's argument has not been tested empirically. In strict rational choice theory, Makowsky's argument might work, but it requires that each congregant have a significant amount of accurate information about each other congregant's income and work/retirement status. This world of complete information does not obtain empirically.

Because religious teachings typically encourage the faithful to subordinate their own desires to help others, religion could increase pro-social tendencies (Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007; cf. McBrien 1980, 977). In Christianity, New Testament texts “suggest strongly the centrality of giving and service to the religious life,” as do other Catholic Church teachings (Queen 1996, 27; Catechism 1999, 461) Islam has several explicitly described institutions that call for charity; the most well-known is the obligatory *zakat* (alms-giving), one of the five pillars of Islam (Clark 2004, 8; Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 7-44; Kozlowski 1998; Al-Ghazzali 1966). Thus, organized religions could have a big role in turning “on” and channeling the pro-social nature of individuals. In this paper, we test the possibility that religions can systematically elicit the pro-social tendencies of individuals through their theologies and community practices.

### ***Theory and Hypotheses:***

We postulate that variations in theological distinctions and community practices impact the weight of pro-social orientations on an individual's behavioral considerations, as expressed through their contributions to the production of either a club or public good.<sup>7</sup> We use the giving of one's time and other resources to others, often termed “generosity”, as a proxy for club and public goods (see below). Religion is a multi-faceted phenomenon with different social effects, depending on what the construct of interest is (Preston, Ritter and Hernandez 2010). We distill several major features of religions to assess the impact of specific beliefs on religious individuals' propensity to donate to club or public goods. We further differentiate expectations for Catholicism and Islam.

A variety of disciplines converge on the argument that humans, as social beings, are attuned to what their co-equals think of them and adjust their behavior accordingly. Groups affect individual behavior partly through norms and expectations. Applied to the concept of pro-social helping behavior, this perspective interprets generous acts as those required and rewarded by the group. Pro-sociality is generalized group cooperation: the individual contributes because of group expectations and fear of group sanctions if the expectations are not met (Mauss 1954/1967; Peterson 1993; Sahlin 1972; Tsai 2007). Religions create groups, those groups have a set of expectations about what is moral, or proper, behavior (Graham and Haidt 2010, 143-5; Durkheim 1915, 44). As do other religions, Catholicism and Islam both create religious communities, and while each religion has a large world-wide community, each also has a local and small community in which most adherents practice their faith and interact with others of their faith. Islam and Catholicism consider integration into and cooperation with a community to be an inherently valued way of serving God. Because both Catholicism and Islam are theorized to be religiously collectivist, and to promote charity within the community (Cohen et al. 2005; Cohen and Hill, 2007; Cohen and Rozin 2001; Cohen, Siegel, and Rozin 2003; Kniss and Numrich 2007, 56-7), beliefs about the normative expectations of the religion should lead to pro-social, cooperative behavior for the group. These are religious beliefs about how people should act.

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<sup>7</sup> There is an extensive debate in social psychology on whether altruism or pro-social orientations that are not ultimately self-serving exist (Cialdini et al 1997; Batson 2011). We recognize the debate, and here suggest that rather than invoking a randomly distributed “warm glow” effect, as behavioral economists have done, to explain the unexpected helping behavior of some individuals, we can see if particular aspects of religions systematically trigger such behavior.

*Hypothesis 1: Beliefs about the normative expectations of the religious community lead Catholics and Muslims to contribute to club goods.*

Religions might heighten self-other identification, making individuals empathetic and more likely to aid others. Individuals are then charitable to others, because they can see themselves in the other's situation. The most basic element of social identity theory is that people's self-definitions are affected by their membership in social groups along with the value they place on and emotional significance of those memberships (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Abrams et al. 1990). They more easily recognize themselves in others (empathy) who are in the in-group rather than in the out-group (Cialdini et al. 1997). Identification in their religious group would lead Catholics and Muslims to prioritize helping their in-group. However, because both religions emphasize a universality of humankind, Catholics and Muslims should not prioritize their in-group. Instead they would be empathetic with others, no matter what their group affiliation. Therefore, we expect the following:

*Hypothesis 2: Self-other identification fostered by their religion makes Catholics and Muslims more likely to contribute to the production of public goods. The effect on the production of club goods will be less pronounced.*

Religious discourse may emphasize additional other-regarding attitudes and behaviors such as deservedness of someone in need. Previous research has found that adherents of different religions vary in their view of whether a needy person is deserving, and the more they view the target as deserving, the more helpful they are (Will and Cochran 1995). Catholicism and Islam both have as key tenets of their religions that the poor and needy are deserving of help regardless of the circumstances, character and behavior of the needy individual (Queen 1996; Tropman 2002). From the perspective of the potential impact of their religious beliefs, we would therefore expect Catholics and Muslims to exhibit more helpful behavior when their thinking about someone in need is couched in terms of that person's deservingness, and that it would not be subject to an in-group bias.<sup>8</sup>

*Hypothesis 3: The concept of deservedness promoted by their respective religions should lead Catholics and Muslims to be more generous towards others, no matter the others' religion.*

Many religions emphasize obedience to a divine being, and Catholicism and Islam would seem to be no exception. What constitutes obedience may vary across religions. In Catholicism and Islam, obedience might be a duty to obey God's will and commandments. As Pope Benedict XVI writes, "Each person finds his good by adherence to God's plan for him, in order to realize it fully" (2009, 1). The word "Islam" means "voluntary submission to God," sometimes also translated as "submission to the will of God." We operationalize the concept of obedience to God's will as "duty to God"--an obligation to obey God. If God's commandment is that the individual be other-regarding, then religiosity affects helping behavior by increasing Catholics and Muslims' sense of an obligation to God. Both religions emphasize helping others, though there may be differences in whether the helping is an obligation. Islam requires, through *zakat* and *fitr*, giving resources to others.<sup>9</sup> While Catholicism speaks of tithing, tithing is not mentioned as an obligation, nor is it a formal ritual of the theology.

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<sup>8</sup> In the absence of religious commandments to help the poor, one might instead expect the in-group to be favored (Hewstone, Rubin and Willis 2002)

<sup>9</sup> Islam also emphasizes non-obligatory giving, or *sadaqah* (Queen 1996, 49-50).

*Hypothesis 4: The concept of duty to God should make Catholics and Muslims more generous towards others, contributing to the production of both club and public goods. This effect will be more pronounced for Muslims than for Catholics.*

Helping others could also be affected by the divine inspiration to live a life filled with love in Catholicism (Benedict XVI 2009, 1), or a life lived as the prophet Mohammed lived in Islam. A spirit of generosity may be born from that faith in God brings freedom to give abundantly. Religion may engender generosity through spirituality and a sense of grace, a commitment to and faith in God, God working “through, with, and in us” (Himes 2006, 18, 19; Benedict XVI 2009; Kozlowski 1998, 282; Queen 1996, 27, 50). Catholicism specifically expects “faith, hope and charity” to be the expression of God dwelling within the person (McBrien 1980, 991). Pope Benedict XVI makes the connection explicit, writing, “Charity is love received and given. It is ‘grace’ (cháris)” (2009, 3). In Islam, giving stems from being a “righteous man” or woman. It is “for the love of God” that one gives to others (Qur’an, Sura 2:177). Both religions have an understanding of God’s grace, that it is through His grace and mercy that one enters heaven/paradise, and that one loves others. God’s grace may be a mechanism for prompting pro-social behavior.

*Hypothesis 5: The inspiration of God’s grace that is fostered by their religion makes Catholics and Muslims more likely to contribute to the production of both club and public goods.*

Conventional wisdom in social sciences holds that religion generally may prompt pro-social behavior. While our view is that specific beliefs and social norms within a religion prompt such behavior, and that “religion” is such a multi-faceted concept that it is not clear what construct “religion” would be priming, we acknowledge the extensive body of research (which gives conflicting results) showing that religion prompts generosity.<sup>10</sup> We refine the hypothesis in keeping with some studies of prejudice and religion arguing that religion heightens in-group identification at the expense of out-group identification.

*Hypothesis 6: The concept of religion will prompt both Catholics and Muslims to contribute to collective goods. They both are more likely to contribute to club than to public goods.*

## **Methods and Data**

To test our hypotheses, experiments were conducted in both Ireland and Turkey in two waves, one in the fall of 2010, and the second in the summer of 2011 and interview-based case studies were conducted in various months from May 2010 to May 2011, with one researcher spending approximately four weeks with a religious group.<sup>11</sup>

## **Experiments**

The experiments were designed to assess the ways in which our hypothesized mechanisms impact the propensity of experimental subjects to make a charitable donation to either their

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<sup>10</sup> Preston and Ritter (2013 in press) argue that religion is understood as a principle that defines a group, and that people distinguish it from cognitive beliefs about supernatural being(s) or edicts of that religion. Their research is based on experiments with US university students priming “religion” and “God”.

<sup>11</sup> Kilinc conducted the research on the Gülen movement associations in Istanbul, Paris, Milan and Dublin, and on the Catholic parish in Istanbul; Warner conducted the research on the Catholic parishes in Paris, Milan and Dublin, and Cohen conducted experiments on university students and community members in Istanbul and Dublin.

religious in-group (conceptualized as a club goods donation), or to make a donation to a secular group charity (conceptualized as a public goods donation). The experiments used primes of the focal constructs. They were not structured to see how chronically salient ideas of duty to God, or community, etc., relate to generosity, but whether priming these resulted in generosity. Four separate experimental samples were taken in the first wave. Within Ireland, adult Catholic parish members were recruited to take part in the experiment in Dublin, while undergraduate university students were recruited to participate in the experiments at University College Dublin. In Turkey, adult Muslim Gülen Association members were recruited to take part in the experiment in Istanbul, while undergraduate university students were recruited to take part in the experiment at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul.<sup>12</sup> In the second wave, two separate samples were taken. One sample involved adult Catholic parish members in Dublin, while the other involved adult Muslim Gülen association members in Istanbul. We refer to the adult Catholic parish and Muslim association members as “community members.” They were offered 25 Euros, or 25 Turkish Lira, respectively, to participate in the study, while university students were offered 10 Euros or 10 Turkish Lira, respectively, to participate.<sup>13</sup> With university students, we control a number of confounds such as education level and socioeconomic status (Cohen 2009). But, university students may mute religious differences and life cycle effects because they are more educated and secularized than the general population, and less experienced (Rozin 2003; Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). To gain a better representation of the population at large, we also recruited general community participants.<sup>14</sup>

Experiment participants were recruited through religious organizations (Catholic churches in the Dublin area in Ireland, Gülen centers in and around Istanbul) and University College Dublin (Dublin) and Boğaziçi University (Istanbul) and run in small groups ( $n$ 's of about 15-30) at their religious centers and university classrooms, respectively. Participants were seated with room between them so as to preserve anonymity.

In the experiments, Muslims and Catholics were randomly assigned to one of six treatments to prime theoretically derived causes of religiously motivated giving to others, or were assigned to one control group (cf. Nickerson 2005, 235). Generally speaking, our approach made salient to participants, via experimental priming manipulations, one of six theoretically derived causes of generosity. Priming experiments make a certain concept or psychological process salient (Bargh and Chartrand 2000), here a theorized specific causal mechanism of other-regarding behavior. Certain experimentally validated ways of priming religion are already in the

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<sup>12</sup> It is not possible to identify an Islamic movement that all Muslims and scholars would agree is representative and typical of Islam. However, Islam's basic message of charity is constant across the religion, and the Gülen Movement has several advantages for our study: it is a relatively mainstream transnational organization within Islam and it is relatively transparent and open about its activities, it is present throughout Turkey, and we have good contacts with the organization (Yavuz 2003, 133-206; Kilinc 2007; Kuru 2003; Kuru 2005). To accommodate the fact that in some Muslim dominant countries, mosques are used only for prayer and are state run (Turkey) or state supported, our study of Turkey focuses on a Gülen organization rather than on a mosque.

<sup>13</sup> These amounts were based on 1) the exchange rate of 1 euro=1.97 TRY (Turkish lira) in July 2010; 2) purchasing power parity measured by the Economist Big Mac Index 2010 at <http://bigmacindex.org/2010-big-mac-index.html>. This showed 5.95 TRY = 1 Big Mac and 3.3 Euro = 1 Big Mac (that, though, is for the entire eurozone); and 3) discussions with faculty in Dublin and Istanbul who had conducted psychology experiments with university students, and on those faculty members' assessments of appropriate sums for community members.

<sup>14</sup> Inchicore Parish; St. Bridged's Church in Cabinteely; Knocklyon Parish; and St. Josephine at River Valley in Swords; the Ihsander community associations in Istanbul. The groups recruited from did not contain those who were interviewed.

psychology literature. For example, Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) subtly primed religion via sentence completion tasks and documented that this promoted more generous behavior in experimental economics tasks. However, because of the general nature of this prime it is impossible to know what precise aspect of religion drove the increase in other-regarding behavior. A recent paper by Preston and Ritter (2011) finds that there are differences when one primes subjects with “God” versus “religion”. Here we attempt to isolate specific causal mechanism by priming duty to God, community expectations, self-other overlap, deservedness, or religion. In this experimental work, we measure club and public goods provision in a behavioral way, by gauging actual donations to charities (club or public). By doing this, priming experiments can test the specific concepts or processes that are causally connected. Priming was done by asking participants to write essays about the specific concept, such as duty to God.

The experiment was entirely questionnaire based. First, participants read a page describing their rights as research participants. Then they were asked to write an essay, which was our priming condition. Participants were primed by 1 of 7 levels: writing about their desk and chair—our control condition; religion in general—a general religious control condition; duty to God; God’s grace; religious community; religious teachings regarding self-other overlap, or similarity to others; and religious teachings regarding others deserving help. Participants were asked to write or list their thoughts and feelings about the topic. In order to better isolate the effects of the hypothesized focal constructs, we did not set participants in strategic game contexts.

Next, participants were asked to allocate their experimental payment (25 TRY or 25 Euro for community members; 10 TRY or 10 Euro for university students) between keeping it for themselves, donating some or all to a charity affiliated with their religion (a club good; Catholic Children’s Fund or Islamic Children’s fund depending on whether the experiment was in Dublin or Istanbul) or donating some or all to a secular charity (a public good; United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF). Participants were told they could divide the payment any way they wished. This was our major dependent variable, a behavioral measure of collective goods provision. To make these choices as anonymous and demand free as possible, participants were paid individually by a second experimenter in a separate room. Finally, participants completed self-report scales of intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, and demographics (sex, marital status, educational attainment, age, occupation, social class). The experiment took about 20-30 minutes for most participants. At the end, participants were given their entire payment to keep and debriefed.

The contribution to either the Catholic or Islamic charity is conceptualized as a contribution to a club good. While respondents are assured that these charities do not discriminate in the provision of charity on the basis of religion, the implication is that the charity is administered by fellow members of the religious club, or in-group. Any reputational benefits received by administering the charity is confined to the in-group, as are proselytizing opportunities. UNICEF, on the other hand, represents a pure public good. The benefits of making a contribution to the charity cannot be confined to the club, or in-group, population.

The control condition had nothing to do with religion. Comparing any of the conditions with the control will tell us if the prime influences generosity. The dependent variable is conceptualized dichotomously, and in three distinct forms, assessing 1) whether individuals made any donation at all, regardless of whether to the in-group or the out-group; 2) whether

individuals made a donation to the religious in-group; and 3) whether individuals made a donation to the religious out-group.<sup>15</sup>

## Results

Table 1a indicates the total number of donations made across the experimental population, and 28.4% of participants made a donation.<sup>16</sup> Overall, participants were more likely to have given to the public good than to the club good: 15.0% of respondents gave to the charity of their religion while 22.3% of respondents gave to the secular charity.

Table 1b point out some interesting differences between the Catholic and Muslim samples. The first is that Catholics were more likely to make a donation than Muslims: 39.2% of the Catholic participants made some form of donation, compared to 19.8% of Muslim participants. Catholics were less likely to have made a donation to the club good (16.6%), and more likely to have made a donation to the public good (31.5%). The Muslim sample, on the other hand, was more likely to have made a donation to the club good (16.8%) than to the public good (10.8%).<sup>17</sup>

[Tables 1a and 1b about here, see p. 26]

The experimental conditions (Community, SelfOther, Deservedness, Duty, Grace, General Religion, General Control) are included as categorical variables. The general control variable, which is the “chair” essay prompt condition, has been excluded from the regression equation, and thus odds ratios for each of the experimental conditions are interpreted in comparison to the control condition. “Sample” is a dichotomous variable indicating whether an individual was part of the community or student sample. Separate analyses are run for the Catholic and Muslim populations.<sup>18</sup> The community and student samples are pooled into each of the Catholic and Muslim analyses. Logit analysis was used to analyze experimental data given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable and given the ability of maximum likelihood estimation to control for the potential differences across sampled groups.

Table 2 presents results from the logit regression assessing whether Catholic or Muslim participants made any donation, be it to the club or public good.

[Table 2 about here, see p. 27]

For Irish Catholics, Duty to God exhibits statistically significant effects. Irish Catholics who received this prime are 2.6 times more likely to give than individuals in the control group. For Turkish Muslims, none of the primes exhibit statistically significant effects. The sampled

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<sup>15</sup> Most of the participants kept their entire participant payment or did not donate to one of the specified donations groups (n=547). A sizeable minority (n=172) donated their entire participant payment. Ninety donated only a portion of their participant payment, while keeping the rest for themselves. This characterized 11.1% of the experimental population, and 39.1% of the individuals who gave a donation. If conceptualized continuously, the resultant U-Shaped distribution violates the assumption of normality and is not amenable to OLS analysis. Running data in an ordinal logistic regression, while coding the donation variables with categories of no donations, partial donations, or full donations, does not have a marked impact on model results.

<sup>16</sup> Figures are rounded to first decimal point. In tables they are presented to second.

<sup>17</sup> All of the above simple differences are statistically significant at least at the 95% confidence interval.

<sup>18</sup> Those in the Irish pool indicating they were not Catholic were not included in the analyses of Catholics; those in the Turkish pool indicating they were not Muslim were not included in the analyses of Muslims. See tables 7&8 for basic demographics.

group has statistically significant effects in both analyses. In the Irish Catholic analysis, students are 70% less likely to have made a donation than community members, while students in the Turkish Muslim sample are in fact nearly 3 times more likely to make a donation than individuals in the community sample.

[Table 3 about here, see p. 28]

Table 3 presents results for whether Catholic and Muslim participants made donations specifically to the religious club. There are no statistically significant effects by the primes in either the Irish Catholic or Turkish Muslim groups. The Sample group exhibits similar effects on the propensity to contribute to club good as it did to the inclination to give generally. Irish Catholic students are 66% less likely to make a donation than their community counterparts, while Turkish Muslim students are 2.6 times more likely to make a donation to the religious club group than community members.

[Table 4 about here, see p. 29]

Table 4 presents the results of the odds that individuals in the Catholic and Muslim samples gave to the public good. The odds individuals who received the Deservedness, Duty to God, and Grace primes gave to the public group were increased by factors of 2.7, 2.9, and 3.2 respectively over the control group. Like the rest of the analyses, the primes had no effect on the Muslim population. Irish Students are 61% less likely to give than community members, while Muslim students are 5.9 times more likely to give than Muslim community members.

### ***Discussion of the Experiment Results***

A clear result of this analysis is that the primes had differential effects across the Catholic and Muslim samples. While Catholics tended to respond to the Duty to God, Grace, and Deservedness primes, priming these belief constructs did not have any effect on Muslims' inclinations to give.

Regarding Hypothesis 1, we find little evidence of religious Community Expectations having an effect on believers. Within both populations, Community Expectations was not found to make individuals more likely to contribute to the production of club or public goods.

Hypothesis 2, that Self-other Overlap identification fostered by the religion's teachings makes individuals more likely to contribute to the production of club goods, but not public goods for Muslims finds no support in our analysis. It also had no effect on Catholics.

For Hypothesis 3, the results from our analysis on the effect of the deservedness prime suggest that it had a conclusive impact on out-group donations amongst Catholics. Catholics did not find their own to be more deserving. There was no impact on Muslims.

Hypothesis 4, that religious organizations foster a sense of a "Duty to God" which then prompts donations to both club and public goods, found strong support with regard to the Catholic sample and no support among the Muslim sample. The Duty to God prime was the single most influential prime amongst the Catholic population, with statistically significant impacts in the tendency to make any donation and out-group donations. It generally had one of the largest effect sizes among the Catholic population in the various analyses. In contrast, the prime seems to have no effect in the Muslim population in any of the analyses.

Hypothesis 5, that the inspiration of God's Grace prompts both club goods and public goods donations, finds strong support in the Catholic sample and no support in the Muslim sample. God's Grace displays a strong effect, an odds ratio of 3.18, with regard to whether out-group donations are made in the Catholic population. It has no statistically significant impact on whether or not Catholics made a donation to the club good.

The analyses show no impact of our five specific religious triggers nor of the general religion prime on Muslims. There are several possible reasons for this that invite further investigation. First, the literature on experimental primes cautions that if participants already have a very strong sense of the construct one hopes to manipulate, it may not be possible for the prime to further activate that, leaving the researchers with statistically insignificant results. The interviews lend some plausibility to this interpretation, in that Muslim interviewees indicated that duty to God and community have strong roles in their giving behaviors.

Second, the experiment design had to make some compromises. One was that, in order to keep the options as similar as possible between the two religions to facilitate comparisons and equality of treatments, we constrained the list of charity organizations in the experiments. Recall that the non-student participants were recruited from the Gülen movement. In the experiment, there was no option for giving to a charity organization specific to the Gülen movement. Some participants kept their participant payment in order to donate it to their organization later. If a familiar, Gülen community-affiliated organization had been in the list, the number of people who donated might have been greater. Given the strong identification, voiced in the interviews, that Gülen members have with their group, it may have been overwhelming and thus washed out subtleties of the primes. That the Muslim university students gave more than Muslim community members could also be an indication of this problem. Normally, we expect the reverse (students to donate less). The university students included in the analyses are Muslims but not necessarily Gülen members. In fact, if we code our donation measure to include individuals who wrote in that they would prefer that their donation go to a different organization or that they would keep the money and donate it later themselves, we find that there are substantially more Muslim donations, and that community members were more likely to have made a donation than students, though the individual primes have no statistically significant effect.<sup>19</sup>

In addition, Catholics were also constrained to donate to a charity that was not specific to their parish, even though it was a club charity (Catholic). Rather than write in a preference, as a number of Muslims did, some Catholics may have shifted their donations to the public charity. It is possible that Catholics in our sample did not feel the same closeness of community that the Gülen association members did, or that their own concerns with the on-going pedophile scandal of the Church led them to donate to the secular public group. In other words, the experiment results may have been biased due to the way the donation propensities were captured in the protocol.<sup>20</sup>

A third consideration is whether the fact of writing an essay was a technique appropriate for the Catholic samples but not for the Muslim samples, the concern being that perhaps Turkish Muslims are less oriented towards writing. To test this, we assessed whether the two populations

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<sup>19</sup> However, coding our donation measure in this manner is problematic for two reasons. The first, alluded to earlier, is that it is impossible to verify whether individuals who mentioned they would take their donations and make donations later ever had any intention of doing so. Second, because the experimental prompts did not provide an explicit option for making donations to other religious groups, it is impossible to know whether there were individuals who simply marked to keep their money who did not in fact then make a donation to a separate group.

<sup>20</sup> The essays show that a number of Catholic participants were concerned about pedophile scandal and the institutional church's handling of it. We have not yet systematically analyzed the data on this factor.

differed in length of the essays, including number of sentences. The data rule out this interpretation. There is no statistically significant difference in the number of sentences written by Catholics and Muslims.

The experiment essays enable us to examine whether specific primes did prompt feelings or thoughts of generosity and pro-social behavior even though participants were constrained in their choice of what to give to. As previously described, the subjects provided written responses to randomly assigned essay primes. These essays were qualitatively coded by research assistants to examine the impact of the primes on the propensity of subjects to mention charity. Any sentence that mentioned volunteering, giving of money or offering, or a variety of other charitable behaviors was coded as one mention of charity.<sup>21</sup> See Appendix \_\_\_ for the complete codebook regarding the qualitative coding of charity.<sup>22</sup>

We can use these data to see if the primes prompted thoughts of being pro-social (“charity” in our coding), even if not matched by actual donations. This would lend some albeit weak support to the related hypotheses. As in the experimental analysis above, the primes are included in regression analysis as categorical variables. Coefficients for each of the experimental conditions are interpreted in comparison to the general control condition. The community and student samples are pooled into each of the Catholic and Muslim populations, and “Sample” is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual was part of the community or student populations. Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to analyze the content of the essays given the continuous nature of the number of mentions of charity in the essays.<sup>23</sup>

[Table 5 about here, see p. 30]

Table 5 demonstrates the total number of charitable mentions made within the separate Catholic and Muslim samples. There is remarkable similarity between the Catholic and Muslim respondents’ propensity to mention charity within their essay responses. The vast majority of respondents, about 76% of the Catholic respondents and 74% of the Muslim respondents, did not mention charity. About 13% of Catholics and 14% of Muslims mentioned charity once, 7% of Catholics and 6% of Muslims mentioned it twice, and close to 5% of Catholic and Muslim respondents mentioned charity three or more times.

Table 6 presents the results of the OLS regression assessing the relationship between the experimental primes and the number of mentions of charity in respondents’ written essay responses.

[Table 6 about here, see p. 31]

For Catholics, exposure to the Grace and Deservedness primes had statistically significant impacts on the mentions of charity in the essays. Individuals who received the Grace prompt were associated with a 0.41 increase in the number of mentions over individuals who received the Control prompt, while individuals who received the Deservedness prompt were associated with a 1.87 increase in the number of mentions of charity over the control prompt. Among Muslims, the Community, Deservedness, Duty, and Grace primes each had statistically

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<sup>21</sup> Individuals who did not leave a written essay response were coded as having made no mentions of charity.

<sup>22</sup> 108 Irish and Turkish essays were randomly selected and recoded for checks of inter-coder reliability. These checks resulted in a Krippendorff’s alpha ratio value of 0.853.

<sup>23</sup> The categorical predictor variables, combined with the relatively small sample, precluded the possibility of using negative binomial regression.

significant impacts on the number of mentions of charity. Individuals who received the Community prime were associated with a 0.35 increase in the number of mentions of charity, while individuals who received the Deservedness prime were associated with a 1.54 increase in the number of mentions of charity. Individuals receiving the Duty prime were associated with a 0.33 increase in the number of mentions of charity, while individuals who received the Grace prime were associated with a 0.45 increase in the number of mentions of charity.

The deservingness prime had the strongest effect on both Catholics and Muslims; one interpretation of the results is that both religions emphasize that those in need are deserving of help. Another is that the experiment tapped a strong emotional reaction, and that the religion's connection to it is spurious. A third is that because this prime explicitly asked about help ("Think about people in need who deserve help," it of course prompted more frequent mentions of factors we coded as "charity").

The results do not tell us whether the participant was thinking of the in- or the out-group as the target of his/her charity. They enable us to see that Muslims were prompted by the community expectations, God's grace, duty to God and deservedness primes to think of charity, even if they did not go on to donate in a way that was statistically significant. We can only speculate that under different donation options in the experiment, those primes would have elicited donations in the expected directions.

The fact that duty to God did not prompt Catholics to write about charity suggests that that the prime was triggering a different concept that was linked to donating behavior. A reading of the Catholic "duty to God" essays shows that most community participants responded that their duty to God is to "love your neighbor" (id # 284).<sup>24</sup> Some said it is to keep the sacraments, or to obey. One interpretation of this is that the duty to God triggers thoughts of love of others, which may be what triggers the pro-social behavior observed in the Catholic sample (responding to that prime).

### *interviews*

The second methodological prong of this paper is a set of semi-structured interviews with religious adherents in their respective parishes and associations. Parishes were chosen on the basis of referrals and the process of gaining access varied by diocese.<sup>25</sup> Associations were chosen on the basis of referrals from leading figures of the Gülen movement in Europe.<sup>26</sup> Estimates of

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<sup>24</sup> The first sentence of another Catholic essay is "What you do for the poor you do for me [i.e. Jesus] therefore it is a good thing to help the many charities" (# 335).

<sup>25</sup> Access to Santa Maria alla Fontana was by direct referral from a scholar of Catholicism in Italy; access to Our Lady of Divine Grace Ballygal was by referral from the Moderator of the Curia of the Dublin diocese after we had been granted permission by the Dublin Archbishop to conduct the research in the diocese; access to Saint Pierre de Montrouge was by direct appeal to the head priest; access to Basilique-Cathédrale Saint Esprit was by direct appeal to the head priest. We had explained in our contact letters what kind of parish we hoped to conduct the study in: not exceptional, not in an extremely wealthy or poor neighborhood, and not in a tourist zone. With only two Latin rite parishes, there was little choice in Istanbul. Saint Esprit was willing to grant access. Appendix B has more information on the parishes and on the Muslim associations.

<sup>26</sup> Şerafettin Pektaş, the President of Intercultural Dialogue Foundation in Brussels, put us in contact with the associations in Paris, Milan and Dublin. We chose the Yunus Emre Cultural Association in Paris since it was the largest among the six Gülen community centers in Paris. The association is located in the northwest suburbs of Paris. For Milan and Dublin we had only one association available in each city. We conducted our fieldwork at the Alba Intercultural Association in Milan and at the Turkish Irish Educational and Cultural Society in Dublin. The cultural centers in Milan and Paris are both located at the city center. Muharrem Atlığ of Journalists and Writers

mass attendance in the parishes ranged from about 8% of 50,000 in Saint Pierre de Montrouge, Paris, 15% of 14,000 in Santa Maria alla Fontana, Milan, 25% of 6,000 in Ballygal, Dublin, and 12 % of 2000 parishioners in Saint Esprit, Istanbul. Although we do not have exact numbers for Turks living in France, Ireland and Italy and we do not know what percentage of them are practicing Muslims, the following data might be helpful to see the size of our associations. Ihsander in Istanbul has about 350 active members and the association serves about 20000 people. There are about 450,000 Turks living in Paris and Yunus Emre Cultural Association offers religious services to about 500-600 people. There are about 4,000 Turks living in Milan and the Alba Intercultural Association serves about 200 people who are affiliated with the association. There are about 5,000 Turks living in Ireland, most of whom live in Dublin. The Turkish-Irish Educational and Cultural Society serves to the Turkish community with about 100-125 people affiliated with the association. The interviewees comprise convenience samples drawn from referrals from religious officials, referrals from volunteers to whom a religious official referred us, and some ad hoc button-holing of religious service participants. We had explained the project and the range of individuals we sought to interview to those who referred us but were unable to control whether the individuals were from some ideal range. Many of our interviewees are more involved in their religious organizations and more frequent practitioners of the formal rites of the religions, but not all. To facilitate participation, the interviews were conducted at locations of the interviewees' choosing. This was typically a room in a building owned by the parish or association, in the interviewee's home, or in a café or restaurant. Some interviews were held at the interviewee's place of business.

The semi-structured interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours, and included questions about the interviewee's connections to the parish or association, forms of participation in parish and other volunteer activities, what the teachings of the religion are on generosity, if they remembered sermons that spoke to a theme of helping others or being generous, what kinds of appeals motivated them to give funds or time, and, directly, why they were generous, whether they thought they had a responsibility to God to help others, what happened if they weren't helpful, what kinds of responsibility, if any, individuals, the religious organization and the state had to help those in need, what was inspiring them or motivating them when they were helping others, giving of themselves. We invited them to comment on anything we should have asked them about but didn't. With the exception of some Catholics in Istanbul, each interview was conducted in the mother tongue of the interviewee.<sup>27</sup> Participants were asked to fill out a survey asking demographic information and assessing religiosity.

We also conducted interviews with leaders of each religious organization (priest, bishop, imam, association leader) to learn how they think and reason about generosity and to enable us to document the broader context and considerations of the giving and voluntarism in the religious organizations. We gathered information on funding structures, as well as volunteer programs, and engaged in participant observations of weekly religious services and charitable activities.

## **Catholics and Duty to God:**

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Foundation, a leading Gulen affiliated civil society organization, put us in contact with Ihsander in Istanbul. Ihsander is located in the northwestern suburbs of Istanbul.

<sup>27</sup> Some Catholics in the Istanbul parish were immigrants from countries of which the interviewer did not speak the home country language. In those cases, the interviews were conducted in Turkish or English, depending on the preference of the interviewee.

What we find for Catholics, and what we find in some of the experiment essays, is that when Catholics are asked if they have a duty to God to help others, they say “no”, and instead turn the duty to a duty to help others and a *choice* to live as God tells them to live: that is, following Jesus’ example. A number of the experiment essays by Catholics show that they literally made that move when asked to think about their duty to God. These facts together may explain why “duty to God” could have a strong effect in the experiments but not be a phrase or concept Catholics recognize as applying to them in regard to helping others. The faith does not rely on a sense of duty or obligation to God. As a male Italian interviewee in his 30s stated (# 13), “Jesus didn’t say ‘you have to do this.’ Jesus said ‘this is the path, you choose.’” An Irish parishioner echoes this view: “God gives me a choice. God prompts me and he allows me to say yes or no and I know if I say yes he’s going to be there with me all the time. There’s nothing he won’t help me with” (#79). The religion relies on love, on love of Jesus, on love of the other. It needs to be stated that priests and many interviewees see this love as a source of charity towards others, but that they indicate (expressly or implicitly) that is not the point or goal of such love. The love is an end in itself, that also and inevitably leads to generous behavior by believers. Several interviewees cited the Gospel (Matthew 25:40), “Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me.” An Irish parishioner stressed that helping and giving is “not a duty, there have been opportunities. I was drifting a bit, the door opened” (# 28). Another responded, “you’re not morally bound, I suppose, to give... It’s part of Catholic teaching to be charitable, part of your religion and belief that you must help the deprived.” He used the phrase “must help” but he rejected the idea that helping others was a duty or obligation to God (# 82). It was a general “you should” and not one mandated by God. Because Jesus’ and God’s love does not have to be earned, earning it through giving to others (or to God via donations to the church) is irrelevant. It doesn’t make sense in the religion. A parishioner from Istanbul (# 13) said “God loves those who followed what Jesus did” but she did not put this as a requirement to gain God’s approval. Parishioners who linked their giving with specific scriptures often noted, as one flatly stated, “there are only two commandments that matter: love God and love your neighbor” (# 80-1). For our Catholic interviewees, that was the source of all generosity, and hence collective goods provision.

### **Muslims and Duty to God**

Islam emphasizes obedience to God’s will. If God’s will is that the individual be generous, then religiosity affects generosity by raising Muslims’ sense of an obligation to God. [...] It is “for the love of Allah” that one gives to others (Quran 2:177). This belief is a significant factor for Muslims’ pro-social, cooperative and generous behavior. Though not enforced by humans, it acts as a strong incentive and sanctioning mechanism. The vast majority of Muslim interviewees indicated that they gave for the sake of God. Almost all the Gülen association interviewees understood their giving as due to their religious conviction that giving is a duty to God. Most respondents had the belief that what they own on the world is temporary; resources are given to them by God to test the believers. To them, how they use these temporary resources here will have a big impact on their situation in the afterlife. They think that when they give, they give from God’s property. (e.g. Istanbul 2, Istanbul 20, Paris 7). A quotation from an interviewee from Istanbul (#7) illustrates this point: “We do not see money and our belongings as our real property. We see them as God’s deposit on us. We can fulfill our responsibility to that deposit if we use it properly. Giving for the sake of God is one way of fulfilling that responsibility.” Some respondents quoted the following verse: “Behold, God has bought of the believers their lives and their possessions, promising them paradise in return” (Quran 9/111) (e.g.

Paris 25). A businessman echoes this point with the following words: “When we give to others, we actually invest in ourselves. At first sight, it looks like we did something for someone else. But in reality, we discharge a big responsibility by transferring God’s property to those in need” (Istanbul 18).

A significant percentage of interviewees argued that if they do not give, they lose the resource one way or another anyway. For example, one of the interviewees said that whenever he refuses to help to his association, he is caught by a traffic policeman and has to pay a fine that is the amount of money he otherwise should have given his association (Paris 3). The same view was echoed by an Istanbul Gülen association member (#13), “If you do not give to the places that you are required to give, that [amount] will be taken from you eventually. You will have a problem and lose it anyway. The purpose of helping others is to gain the contentment and love of God.” These respondents see these incidents as reflections of God’s compassion as God warns them about their misbehaviors (e.g. PM3).

### **Catholics and Community**

The interviews provide insight into the failure of community expectations to lead Catholics to be more generous. Catholicism does not have group imposed expectations. It instead encourages and provides an outlet for individuals’ pro-social orientations. The church has no sanctioning structures for those who do not give of their resources. Individuals who volunteered often voiced that they liked to be with people, to be focused on something, to be collaborating. Community is an important means of fostering their provision of public goods. Yet the means depend on attitudes towards the (religious) group, not sanctions or incentives. People are attached to the parishes they were interviewed at, they feel loyal to them, and they like working in the groups they are in or have volunteered with before.<sup>28</sup> This attitude of attachment (“affect”) may have influenced their willingness to be involved and contribute, without them being aware of it. The head of the St. Pierre de Montrouge parish Economic Council explained that the diocese of Paris imposes a tax of about 16% on the parish in order to redistribute its wealth, and to use its wealth for some of the diocese’s operating expenses. He said that a number of parishioners have come up to him and said “I hope that what I give doesn’t go to the diocese.”<sup>29</sup> Some Irish parishioners expressed concern over the clustering of parishes (as did the priest at Ballygall), anticipating that the community spirit of the parish would be diminished, and that people might not be as willing to volunteer or give if their efforts went to a bigger entity less known to them. One parishioner there noted that “the first collection [at mass] is for the priests (and even some of that goes into the archbishop’s house which people don’t know and I think they should). I have a little bit of difficulty with the two baskets, especially the second one, which is for share. It’s for building churches in Dublin. There’s no churches that have been built. So I don’t know where the money goes. I really don’t know where the money goes. It goes into the Archbishop’s House but I don’t know what they do with it” (# 79). Many parishioners expressed satisfaction with their experiences of working with other parishioners in the various organizations they volunteered in, and positive affect towards the priest, sister (nun) or friend who invited them to get involved. Some saw volunteering within the parish or with a Catholic charity as furthering the work of Jesus or of the Church in the world. This was also very evident among the congregants of the St. Esprit church in Istanbul. While the older and Levantine

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<sup>28</sup> This is not exclusive to Catholicism or religious groups. There are a number of findings converging in the social sciences on the positive role attitudes towards the group, towards the task and affect/emotion towards the group play in motivating pro-social, cooperative behavior (Tyler 2011).

<sup>29</sup> Yves Jouen, Feb. 24, 2011

volunteers mostly referred to their loyalty to the church (Istanbul Catholics 5, 6, 20), the younger and immigrant members mostly addressed the friendships fostered within the church (Istanbul Catholics 10, 23, 24). In the words of a Filipino woman who migrated to Turkey in the 1990s, “when I first came to Turkey, a friend brought me to this church. I felt at home and since then I contribute either financially or volunteering in the church” (Istanbul 3). For most of the immigrants the local church is seen as a place where their problems are addressed within small friendship groups. But not contributing or volunteering had no negative community-level consequences.

While the religious community might facilitate Catholics being able to volunteer and give in certain ways, it would be a stretch to say it directly creates, as an incentive, one of the key factors interviewees mentioned when asked why they give or volunteer. Most said they got back more than they gave, that they thought it was more rewarding for them than for the people they helped, that they learned from those they helped. “I get repaid abundantly” (Italian woman in late 50s, #11). A number of interviewees, especially the Irish, emphasized they “feel fortunate”, and by helping are “giving thanks for what you got” and that because of this they want to “help the people who aren’t” healthy or otherwise “ok” (#30). A retired Frenchwoman said she feels she’s been “spoiled by life” and got involved because she wanted to “give back” some of what she had received (#42/43). An Irish woman who for a long time had the sense she’s been blessed, and was fortunate, stated that there are people “for whom life is a lot harder and if I could help people, I’d like to” (#28). A retired woman in Istanbul noted her happiness when she saw “the needs of the poor immigrants are met” within their volunteer group (Istanbul Catholic 16). In addition, many Italian and French interviewees mentioned that the interaction between “giver” and “recipient” itself was critical. For them it was a fundamental point of generosity—not just to give but to interact with the recipient.<sup>30</sup> It is possible that these orientations account for the tendency of Catholics to respond to the deservingness prime in the experiments even though they did not respond to the community prime.

Those who volunteered in activities that sustained the religious life of the church, such as the children’s ministry, reading the liturgy, being on the baptism or funeral team, often noted that doing so enabled them to attain a greater understanding of their faith, and noted that was important and rewarding to them (e.g. 28, 50s Irish woman). Some also felt they had a responsibility toward the community: it needed the aid of each to run (30, 30s male): “everyone should play a part, not just one guy doing five jobs”. Similar responses were given by the Catholic minority in Istanbul. The participants of a volunteer group (the Legion of Mary) within the church indicated how they deepen their friendship within the group and convert that friendship into good works (Istanbul Catholics 3, 10, 25). The women in this group (there was only one male member) were mostly immigrants and they were both contributing to the activities

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<sup>30</sup> In most cases, at the time of our study, the structures necessary for public goods provision were already in place in the parishes and dioceses. We are not able to address, in this study, the conditions under which Catholicism, as an organized religion, provides the basic structures. Clearly, the cost of being a volunteer is lower if the structures are already in place. Yet we do have a few instances, and these cohere with the general tenor of our findings: either a priest decides to launch a program, and asks for volunteers, or one or more parishioners suggest a project to the priest, and he agrees, gives them some resources from general parish funds, and then they work on developing it, and asking for more volunteers.

organized by the church and their newcomer immigrant friends. Yet there are no mechanisms to sanction (or identify) the free-riders.

It was clear from the interviews that Catholics both supported their community financially and through volunteering, and supported those who were not part of the community, either by direct donation to a non-Catholic charity or through a Catholic-affiliated charity (or by helping their neighbor, regardless). These findings contrast with the experiment results, that showed a distinct Catholic tendency to donate to the secular public good (though not with the community expectations prime). The interviews and the experiment essays again provide some insight on these unexpected findings. Our field research coincided with a horrific pedophile scandal by the Catholic Church in Ireland. Interviewees, including the priests and the moderator of the Curia, brought up the scandal. Interviewees and experiment participants who mentioned it (the latter in their essays) said they were ashamed of their Church. They had good feelings about their own parishes, but not the institutional church. Because the experiment prime was for a donation to a Church organization, and not to the local parish, participants may have steered their donations away from the Catholic charity.

The interviews also revealed that Catholicism relies extensively on the faith, and/or upbringing or other life situations, to give Catholics a disposition to be generous, rather than mostly on a set of incentives and sanctions based on material factors. All the priests interviewed spoke of an emphasis on faith and on having parishioners understand their faith as being the means of promoting generosity. Many parishioners spoke of their family background and upbringing, or schooling (granted, it was in Catholic run-schools—older Irish generations remembered being told they had to help “babies in Africa” even if, as schoolchildren, they didn’t know why) as being the source of their generous dispositions, their sense that they wanted to help others in need. While noting her parents were very devout Catholics, an older Irishwoman notes: “I was brought up in a very caring and giving family ... some families give and some don’t. A huge amount of it goes down to my mom and dad, and my aunts and uncles” (# 79). A French interviewee, a devout Catholic raised in the Church and who frequently attended mass and led some volunteer groups in the parish, credited his participation in Boy Scouts as giving him his sense of wanting to help others (# 55).

### **Muslims and Community**

As exemplified by the Gülen adherents, religious community ties are important to Muslims. The importance is both in belonging -- Gülen members see themselves as part of the global initiatives of the movement-- and in the expectations they perceive within the community. We turn first to the sense of belonging. For example, even though the Istanbul community assists non-Gülen charities, they, like Catholic parishes with their organizations, do this through the movement’s own charitable agency (*Kimse Yok Mu* Solidarity and Aid Association, or KYM). They also have a feeling of ownership in many of the institutions that the movement has opened elsewhere. The most frequently cited global endeavors of the movement were schools established in poorer regions of the world (especially Africa), the intercultural activities of the organization, and the sacrifices of the younger recruits of the movement (especially graduates of prestigious universities in Turkey who goes to very poor countries of the world as teachers). Most interviewees felt their relationship with the movement special, and their membership to the movement emotionally influenced them. The contributions they make feel them the builders of many global institutions of the movement. When they talked about charity, the movement-led educational institutions were the first things that came to the interviewees’ minds. Even when they think of poverty, they refer to the movement’s charitable organization, KYM, and note how

it works to relieve poverty. This was especially evident in Istanbul and Paris, probably because the contributions in these cities are used to support global projects of the movement. The contributions in Italy and Ireland hardly support within-country costs of the movement due to the small number of supporters living in these countries.

The interviews revealed that two things strengthen Muslims' sense of community. First, the movement always informs its followers about their activities. Most subjects (almost 80 %) stated that to see the movement's local and global activities motivated them the most. Most subjects in Istanbul and Paris (where the movement is large and have relatively richer followers) stated that they had foreign trips to see the activities of the movement abroad. Being informed increases the bonds of the followers to the movement (e.g. Istanbul 21, 29; Paris 1, 5, 7). A respondent from Paris (# 7) mentioned how his trip to Pakistan organized by the association to help the victims of Pakistani flood deepened his relationship with the movement. Second, the lack of strong hierarchical structures increases group identity and awareness. Since each local setting is autonomous and self-funding. Adherents make the investment decisions in their own local setting and they try to finance it with the local sources. They have a feeling of ownership on what is being done in a certain place. This, in the end, strengthens their attachment to the association.

In addition to this, members also have close relationships among one another. These friendships might also have a role in their sense of community and giving. Most of the interviewees indicated that their involvement in the associations created a social environment for them. Most interviewees see other members of the association at least once weekly and they work on various projects together, thus developing social bonds. A furniture storeowner from Istanbul (# 17) mentions friendship and giving equally: "Being involved in this movement made giving part of our personality. It is because you become part of a new social environment. Here, we compete for good things [...] The place that I like the most is my village. I would love to live there. Sometimes, I think about going back to my village and living there happily. I have money and do not need to work more to earn my living. However, when I go to my village just for a visit, within two weeks I miss my friends. Also, I keep working here to give more. I cannot stop working in the face of the needs of so many people."

The interviews reveal that community expectations *are* at work in prompting Muslims' club and public goods contributions. In contrast to the Catholic parishes, most of the giving in the Muslim associations is public. The annual pledges, that constitute the major source of income for the associations, are entirely voluntary. Each contributor stands and announces publicly at the fundraising even what his or her pledge is, so that all the attendees in the room know how much others say they will contribute. This gives Islam (or at least the Gülen movement)<sup>31</sup> a relatively powerful peer pressure sanctioning (and incentivizing) mechanism—one has an incentive to gain community approval by giving, and one is concerned about the sanction of community disapproval if one doesn't give. Statements from two interviewees in Istanbul (# 14 and 17) illustrate the point. One, a middle-aged man (# 14), when explaining his giving during the pledges explained that he compares his giving with others: "I see other people who have circumstances similar to mine giving more than I do. This encourages me to give more." An

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<sup>31</sup> Kilinc observed that other Islamic associations/mosque also have a similar practice. He observed that the mosques in Tempe, AZ, East Lansing, MI and Omaha, NE pursue a similar strategy in the month of Ramadan. When asked about the origins of these pledges, we were told that this practice originated in the time of Prophet Mohammad. When there was a need, the public fundraising was organized and the companions of Mohammad competed with one another for the good (Istanbul 24, Paris 30).

association member in Istanbul (17) stated, “We compete for good things,” and emphasized the social dimension of giving. He used a Turkish proverb when explaining the impact of peers on giving: “*Üzüm üzüme baka baka kararır*”: “Grapes will darken by looking at each other.” Other interviewees mentioned the hadith, (a saying of the Prophet Mohammad): “Compete for the good.” Yet it was not evident that individuals who did not give much or who gave nothing at all were given a cold shoulder at community functions or otherwise looked down upon. When talking about the pledges, the respondents referred to them as “incentives,” rather than “sanctions,” (Istanbul 18) and noted the practice’s origins in Islamic history origins (Paris 7). In the words of a respondent from Istanbul, (# 18) “Organized programs by the movement of course influence our giving. If we were alone, we would not give this much. We should remind each other of our religious duties to each other. This is what the movement does in a systematic way.” The collection of the pledges is monitored through weekly meetings throughout the year. A religious association official explained that when followers pledge “they also state how the payments will be made. It may be an advance full payment or paid monthly or paid in the form of a few installments throughout the year. [...] We kindly remind the contributors if it is not paid on the promised time. If they are not able to pay, of course, there is nothing to do” (Paris 24). The statements of a respondent from Istanbul (# 22) show that “duty to God” comes into play in fulfilling the pledges as well: “When we pledge an amount, we feel that we promise God to give that amount. When we make the payment, we feel we are fulfilling our promise to God.” It is through the community that the link to duty to God is made.

As with the Catholic parishes, the tangible benefits provided by the Islamic association are not exclusionary. They are basically public goods, not club goods.<sup>32</sup> In Istanbul and Paris, the association has private schools. These are tuition-based schools, and those sending their children pay the same tuition whether they contribute and belong to the movement or not. For example, the school in Paris was new. They were looking for students to keep the school financially strong so had no need to exclude any on any grounds. The concern was not on children being excluded from attending the schools, but on what would happen to the children if the schools didn’t exist. Interviewees sometimes voiced a concern that if they did not donate funds, their children in the words of one, “would not have proper facilities and would be in danger of losing their identity” (Interviewee # Paris 28). The Gülen associations not only allow others to attend the activities of the association and send their children to the school, they also expend considerable effort to have as many people attending, including children at the weekend school, as possible. As with the Catholic parishes (including on religious education where not provided by the public schools), there is no difference between contributors and non-contributors in benefiting from the activities of the associations.

After reviewing the interview findings in light of the experiments, what should be noted is that Catholicism and Islam are each religions that emphasize the community and the beliefs—the community is there to sustain the believer, many of the religious rituals are to be done jointly with other believers, the community is a spiritual community, the religion inheres in a religious

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<sup>32</sup> For the Muslim schools in Paris and Istanbul (there was no school in Milan or Dublin), one does not have to be Muslim to attend. The school in Paris had non-Muslim students as well. The Gülen association was working to sign a contract with the French state to get some financial support. However for the weekend school of the associations, this is not the case. The weekend schools in all four cities were solely for religious instruction. There was not a set rule that only Muslims could attend. In practice, it is highly unlikely that a Christian would send their children to such a weekend school. However, in Milan, children sometimes bring their Italian friends to the cultural center (Milan 21).

community. The social and spiritual experiences of the faithful are tightly linked for most, and not easily separated into distinct categories.

### ***Conclusion***

We have suggested and demonstrated that religious beliefs and community structures affect the club and public goods provision, and more generally, pro-social tendencies, of individuals through specific mechanisms. While we are in agreement with rationalist theories that individuals make cost/benefit decisions that determine their level of engagement with regard to the production of both club and public goods, we also accept the challenges from a multidisciplinary body of literature suggesting that individuals have pro-social tendencies, and we suggest that religions, through their beliefs and communities, can trigger these in ways that are systematic and observable. Rather than viewing these pro-social behaviors as exogenously or randomly distributed across the population, we contend that religions can play a role in systematically influencing the form of other-regarding preferences, and that religions could produce varying patterns in how other-regarding preferences are expressed. We find that there are differences in the impact of similar belief concepts on Catholics and Muslims. But we also find that religious beliefs seem to override expected socio-psychological proclivities to engage in the production of club and not public goods. Instead, both religions produce public goods through activation of religious beliefs and experiences such as duty to God, God's grace, and deservingness. While the experiments showed that there were effects for these factors on Catholics, and none on Muslims, the interviews show that duty to God is a strong factor in Muslims' pro-social behavior, and that it is not understood as a duty to God by Catholics. We have some tentative hypotheses about the reasons for these discrepancies, having to do with the specifics of the experiments and the specific populations they were conducted on. The interviews also showed that community affect is a strong factor for adherents of both religions.

The two methodologies revealed some differences in outcomes from the same variable. We have discussed possible reasons for this. In the experiments, the various religion primes did not affect Muslims in a statistically significant way at all. That said, statistical analysis of the essays indicated that several primes, duty to God, community expectations, God's grace, and deservingness, tended to generate thoughts of charity. The same analysis of the Catholic essays showed that the latter two primes prompted thoughts of charity, and that duty to God did not. This is consistent with Catholic's understandings and theology about the sources of generosity that we argue underlies public goods provision. In the interviews, it was striking how the vast majority of Muslim interviewees described their motivations for helping and giving funds as stemming from a duty to God and expectations of the community. They also, like Catholic, indicated the importance of community affect: positive feelings towards the group and pleasure in being active in it. Finally, the interviews showed that both religious communities are weak on external monitoring and sanctioning devices. The Gülen association's is limited to publicly announced annual pledges and to some sense of being compared to other members in level of donations and in extent of volunteering; the Catholic parishes had no such public statements or sense of competition among parishioners. Muslims vocalized a sense of God monitoring and sanctioning them; Catholics did not, even though the experiment prime of duty to God induced generosity (while the essays they wrote showed that they turned duty to God into duty to neighbor).

We see in the results evidence that the rational choice approach to public goods provision needs to take into account the inherent pro-social tendencies of individuals, and to pay more

attention to how belief systems and the communities organized around those beliefs can systematically affect collective action and cooperative, helping behaviors. By focusing on two religions that are not strict or extreme, we have been able to see that monitoring and sanctioning, and material incentives, do not have to be the primary means by which religions, or perhaps other organizations, get their adherents to be cooperative and helpful, indeed generous. Instead, beliefs and positive community affect can be important factors in engaging and channeling the inherent pro-social tendencies of individuals. While there has been a drive in some of the scholarly literature to argue that what drives the pro-social behavior of the religious is their involvement in a [strict] religious community, and not their religious beliefs, we find that our subjects do not make such distinctions. As Durkheim stated, and others have elaborated on (Lincoln 2003), religious beliefs are closely linked to the communities—the one inheres in the other.

Religions do not have an oligopoly on explaining the non-governmental production of public goods or cooperation between individuals. They are one set of likely producers. However, because they are nearly ubiquitous in the organization of human life, understanding the mechanisms by which organized religions potentially contribute to the production of public goods provides us with important insights into a significant part of human behavior.

**Table 1a:** Proportion of Those Making a Donation

<b>Donation Type</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Any Donation	809	230	28.43
Club Donation	809	121	14.96
Public Donation	809	172	21.26

**Table 1b:** Proportion of Those Making a Donation – Catholic and Muslim Samples

<b>Donation Type</b>	<b>Catholic Sample</b>			<b>Muslim Sample</b>		
	<b>N</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
Any Donation	337	132	39.17	352	69	19.77
Club Donation	337	56	16.62	352	59	16.76
Public Donation	337	106	31.45	352	38	10.8

[recall that some participants split their donations between the club and public good]

**Table 2:** Logit Analysis: Whether Any Donation was Made

<b>Prime</b>	<b>Catholic Sample</b>		<b>Muslim Sample</b>	
	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>
Sample	0.30***	0.08	2.97***	0.82
Community	1.49	0.67	0.87	0.45
Self/Other	1.19	0.54	0.90	0.47
Deservedness	1.98	0.86	1.29	0.64
Duty	2.62**	1.19	0.64	0.35
Grace	2.27*	0.97	1.15	0.57
Gen. Religion	1.48	0.68	1.22	0.63

coefficients reported as odds ratios

Catholic N = 337; Muslim N = 352

\*p < 0.10; \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 3:** Logit Analysis: Whether Club Donations Were Made

<b>Prime</b>	<b>Catholic Sample</b>		<b>Muslim Sample</b>	
	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>
Sample	0.34***	0.13	2.58***	0.76
Community	0.85	0.48	1.00	0.55
Self/Other	0.75	0.44	0.88	0.50
Deservedness	1.11	0.60	1.34	0.71
Duty	1.48	0.80	0.57	0.35
Grace	0.76	0.43	1.36	0.71
Gen. Religion	1.35	0.73	1.62	0.87

coefficients reported as odds ratios

Catholic N = 337; Muslim N = 352

\*p < 0.10; \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 4:** Logit Analysis: Whether Public Donations Were Made

<b>Prime</b>	<b>Catholic Sample</b>		<b>Muslim Sample</b>	
	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>	<b>Odds Ratio</b>	<b>Standard Error</b>
Sample	0.39***	0.11	5.85***	2.28
Community	1.83	0.90	0.97	0.69
Self/Other	1.94	0.96	0.79	0.57
Deservedness	2.72**	1.29	1.48	0.96
Duty	2.88**	1.42	0.75	0.54
Grace	3.18**	1.49	1.32	0.85
Gen. Religion	1.51	0.78	1.48	0.99

coefficients reported as odds ratios

Catholic N = 337; Muslim N = 352

\*p < 0.10; \*\* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01

**Table 5: Mentions of Charity by Sample**

<b>Mentions of Charity</b>	<b>Irish Catholic</b>		<b>Turkish Muslim</b>	
	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Freq.</b>	<b>%</b>
0	254	75.82	260	74.07
1	44	13.13	50	14.25
2	22	6.57	21	5.98
3	8	2.39	12	3.42
4	2	0.6	4	1.14
5	3	0.9	4	1.14
6	1	0.3	0	0
7	1	0.3	0	0

**Table 6: Primes and Mentions of Charity**

VARIABLES	Catholic Sample	Muslim Sample
Sample	-0.0176 (0.0913)	0.0666 (0.0944)
Community	0.260 (0.160)	0.352** (0.168)
Self/Other	0.127 (0.159)	0.101 (0.169)
Deservedness	1.865*** (0.155)	1.539*** (0.169)
Duty	0.193 (0.165)	0.332** (0.168)
Grace	0.407*** (0.154)	0.450*** (0.166)
Gen. Religion	0.0670 (0.161)	0.210 (0.175)
Constant	0.00633 (0.115)	0.0154 (0.123)
Observations	335	351
R-squared	0.394	0.243

Standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**PROFILE OF THE INTERVIEWEES for the semi-structured interviews**

**Table 7: Basic Demographics of Muslim Interviewees**

	<i>Muslims in Istanbul</i>	<i>Muslims in Paris</i>	<i>Muslims in Milan</i>	<i>Muslims in Dublin</i>
<b>Total Number</b>	31	31	32	30
<b>Female</b>	12	10	8	6
<b>Male</b>	19	21	24	24
<b>Age</b>	18-24: 1 25-36: 20 37-55: 9 56-70: 1 71-: 0	18-24: 1 25-36: 15 37-55: 14 56-70: 1 71-: 0	18-24: 4 25-36: 18 37-55: 7 56-70: 0 71-: 0	18-24: 3 25-36: 18 37-55: 7 56-70: 0 71-: 0
<b>Socio-economic Status*</b>	1: 0 2: 14 3: 10 4: 1 5: 2 No Ans: 4	1: 3 2: 10 3: 8 4: 5 5: 0 No Ans: 5	1: 0 2: 13 3: 8 4: 7 5: 0 No Ans: 4	1: 1 2: 6 3: 3 4: 9 5: 1 No Ans: 10

**Table 8: Basic Demographics of Catholic Interviewees**

	<i>Catholics in Istanbul</i>	<i>Catholics in Paris</i>	<i>Catholics in Milan</i>	<i>Catholics in Dublin</i>
<b>Total Number</b>	28	21	21	24
<b>Female</b>	9	13	12	16
<b>Male</b>	19	8	9	8
<b>Age</b>	18-24: 0 25-36: 9 37-55: 10 56-70: 8 71-: 1	18-24: 1 25-36: 1 37-55: 6 56-70: 6 71-: 1	18-24: 1 25-36: 3 37-55: 9 56-70: 7 71-: 1	18-24: 0 25-36: 1 37-55: 9 56-70: 10 71-: 4
<b>Socio-economic Status*</b>	1: 0 2: 11 3: 10 4: 7 5: 0 No Ans: 0	1: 3 2: 9 3: 3 4: 1 5: 0 No Ans: 5	1: 0 2: 6 3: 9 4: 0 5: 0 No Ans: 7	1: 0 2: 22 3: 1 4: 0 5: 0 No Ans: 1

\* self-reported socio-economic status

- 1: Lower class
- 2: Lower middle class
- 3: Middle class
- 4: Upper middle class
- 5: Upper class

## **Appendix A: Demographic statistics on experiment participations in Ireland and Turkey**

In Ireland, 62.5% of the population was female, while 37.5% of the Sample was male - that skewed a bit female. In Turkey, the sample was more balanced, with 52.22% female and 47.78% male.

In Ireland, age breaks down as follows:

18-24: 45.74%  
25-36: 5.6%  
37-55: 19.95%  
56-70: 21.9%  
71+: 6.81%

In Turkey, age breaks down as follows:

18-24: 46.65%  
25-36: 31.96%  
37-55: 19.85%  
56-70: 1.55%  
71 + : 0.77%

Social economic status, Ireland:

Lower Class: 3.9%  
Lower Middle Class: 16.83%  
Middle Class: 59.76%  
Upper Middle Class: 18.54%  
Upper Class: 0.98%

Social economic status, Turkey:

Lower Class: 2.05%  
Lower Middle Class: 7.6%  
Middle Class: 61.11%  
Upper Middle Class: 19.59%  
Upper Class: 9.65%

Marital Status, Ireland:

Single: 58.29%  
Married: 34.88%  
Other: 6.83%

Marital Status, Turkey:

Single: 49.21%  
Married: 48.94%  
Other: 1.85%

## Appendix B: The Catholic parishes and Islamic associations

### CATHOLIC PARISHES

#### *Santa Maria alla Fontana, Milan, Italy.*

This is the parish in which Silvio Berlusconi was baptized (he was not a billionaire at the time). The neighborhood, hemmed in by the Zara, Isola and Corso Como areas outside the tourist zones of Milan, is modest, comfortable, and a vibrant mix of Italians and immigrants. The parish has 14,000 parishioners, 2000 attend mass weekly. It has four priests, including one who is retired but who helps with functions. The volunteer groups include: Saint Vincent de Paul (SVdP, San Vincenzo di Paolo), l'Oasi (retired peoples' group), the Oratorio (youth center), the Pastoral Council, and catechism school. Others volunteer (and there is overlap between groups) in the parish office, and with the liturgy, and with various celebrations that take place at the church (annual saint day, Christmas sale, etc). In the parish but not run by it is a Food Bank, staffed by many volunteers who attend the church. The church is largely sustained by funds collecting during offerings and by pledges. For some restoration work (the basic work), the church has gotten funds from the Italian state, due to the church's status as an historic site. The church also has special collections during the major religious holidays (particularly Christmas and Easter) that go to particular causes, such as the poor in the parish, or for a school run by missionaries in Africa. Parishioners are notified in various ways of funding requests and needs: mostly the monthly bulletin that can be picked up at the church, and the posting of the monthly budget revenues and expenses on a bulletin board at the main entrance to the church.

#### *St Pierre de Montrouge, Paris, France.*

Located in the non-touristy 14<sup>th</sup> arrondissement, it has about twelve paid staff and between 500-600 volunteers just to run the church office and its main organizations. There are 50,000 people in the parish, about 4,000 attend mass weekly (with about 2100 coming on weekends, excluding the major holidays). The parish is largely middle-class, upper middle-class, with an immigrant community as well. It has six priests and one deacon. There are lots of volunteer groups, many very active. As in Santa Maria alla Fontana, many parishioners volunteer with other Catholic charities in the parish, that are not run by the parish (Secours Catholique, Saint Vincent de Paul or SVdP, Comité Catholique contre le Faim et pour le Développement or CCFD). They are given some support by the parish, depending on the preferences of the priest and advice of the parish Economic Council. Some 80% of its expenses have to be met by tithing and other collections.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Our Mother of Divine Grace Ballygall parish, Dublin Ireland.*

Ballygall is outside the city center, within Dublin (Dublin 11), in a hilly middleclass neighborhood. It has about 6,200 parishioners (90% Catholic), about 25% (1,300) of the Catholics attend mass weekly. In contrast to those in Milan, Paris and Istanbul, Dublin parishes are known by the name of the parish, not by the name of the local parish church. Two priests, a sister, one sacristan. Parish secretary (paid). Lots of volunteers in a variety of organizations, and the laity is quite involved in religious services (the liturgy, the children's mass), in baptism teams, in funeral team. They are beginning to get trained to do healing services in response to the paucity of priests. As are all parishes in the Dublin diocese, Ballygall is being clustered with four others, with the aim of sharing resources. Again, this is due largely to the dearth of priests. The

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<sup>33</sup> Curé letter & interview with Economic Council head.

parishes have had concerns about getting volunteers for activities, and there are worries about whether the next generations will be as engaged. The Ballygall parish was not one in which any of the child abuse/pedophile cases were in, but many of the interviewees and the priest voluntarily brought up the scandal and discussed how hard it has been on the victims, on them, and how it has led many Catholics to quit coming to mass. The Moderator of the Curia also brought it up.<sup>34</sup> The interviewees who broached the subject always distinguished between the local parish church, toward which they retained favorable attitudes, and the institutional (or diocesan) Church, toward which they were critical.<sup>35</sup>

*Basilique-Cathédrale Saint Esprit, Istanbul, Turkey.* There are about 2000 Catholics living in Istanbul. The Basilique Cathédrale Saint Esprit has about 200-250 congregants. The church has three priests. We were told that a fourth priest had just retired before we arrived. The Head Vicar also resides in this Church as this is the center of the Vicarate. The church attendees are from three different groups of people: Levantines (the French and Italian immigrants inherited from the Ottoman Empire); immigrants from the Philippines, most of whom are nannies; and immigrants from African countries, especially from Congo. The church also receives many Catholic tourists because it is an historically important church, and it provides religious services to the tourists as well. In the summers, there is a service everyday at 6:00 p.m. in the church. The immigrants, some of whom are in Turkey illegally, live under difficult conditions. Most of the personal charities go to these immigrants' needs.

## MUSLIM ASSOCIATIONS

*Ihsander, Istanbul, Turkey.* Ihsander is a benevolent businessman's association, affiliated with the Gülen movement, offering religious services to its followers unofficially. It also runs several charitable activities. Because organizing around religion is legally not allowed in Turkey, Ihsander cannot have official status as a religious association or organization. The association has about 350 active members; however, it offers religious and charitable services to thousands of other people. When the interviews were being conducted, the most pressing agenda was construction of a dormitory that would house more than one thousand high school students. The members were trying to gather donations from the people around them to facilitate the construction.

*Yunus Emre Cultural Association, Paris, France.* The Turkish population in France is about 600,000. Almost three quarters of them live in Paris. Gulen community has 6 associations in Paris. The Yunus Emre Cultural Association offers religious and cultural services to its members. It serves about 500-600 people. Some of the activities that the association organizes are: weekly religious education courses, weekend school for the Turkish schoolchildren in which they are taught about Islam and Turkish culture. The association also organizes charitable activities to help people around the world. When we were there, they organized a program in which they collected help for Pakistani flood victims. The organization is also affiliated with a private Turkish school. Finally, it organizes interfaith and intercultural activities to inform the

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<sup>34</sup> We have some data derived from the experiments that may enable us to gage the impact of the scandal on Irish Catholics' generosity and on their attitudes towards their faith and the Church. We have not had time to code and analyze all that data yet.

<sup>35</sup> CITES to Martin report, Cloyne report, and Enda Kenny's parliamentary speech.

French people about Islam and Turkish community. Our interviews were just before the Eid al-Adha, a major Muslim festival, in which poor are provided with meat. The community was busy with gathering money to get meat for the Pakistani flood victims.

*Alba Intercultural Association, Milan, Italy.* The Turkish community in Italy is very small (not more than 15,000). There are about 4,000 Turks living in Milan, Italy. There is only one Gülen community association in Milan, Alba Intercultural Association. There are about 200 people who are somehow affiliated with the association. As in Paris, the association offers weekly religious education lectures, weekend school for the Turkish immigrant schoolchildren, and intercultural/interfaith activities. In Milan, the association focuses more on intercultural activities than on religious education for Muslims. The main target of the association is the Italian people. In doing so, they aim to inform them about Islam and Turkish culture. Unlike other cities, weekly Friday prayers are performed in the association. Like Paris, our interviews were just before the Eid al-Adha, a major Muslim festival, in which poor are provided with meat. The community was busy with gathering support for the Pakistani flood victims.

*Turkish-Irish Educational and Cultural Society, Dublin, Ireland.* The Turkish immigrant community in Ireland is the smallest among all the four cities. An officer from the the Turkish embassy said that there is about 5,000 Turks living in Ireland, most of which live in Dublin. The Gülen community has only one association in Dublin, TIECS (Turkish-Irish Educational and Cultural Society). The association is the smallest of all. There are about 100-125 people somehow affiliated with the association. They have unorganized weekend classes for the Turkish schoolchildren. Like Italy, their major concentration is interfaith/intercultural dialogue. The major concentration during my stay in Dublin was rental of a bigger place for the association, preferably in the city center. The Gülen community in Ireland also had campaigns for Pakistani flood victims during the Eid al-Adha festival. right before we conducted our interviews.

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