

Police Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence in Divided Societies: Evidence from Iraq

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Abstract

How does sectarian integration of the police affect intergroup conflict? Institutions like the police shape the citizen-state relationship by enforcing laws and distributing government services. I argue that in divided societies, the inclusiveness of the rank and file of these institutions affects individual-level incentives to use violence against the government. I test this argument using a survey with an embedded experiment of 800 Baghdad residents. I find that providing members of the Sunni minority with an informational prime that the police are integrated reduces support for anti-government violence. I then test the relationship between police integration and several mechanisms which existing research identifies as motivators of conflict. Sunnis who perceive the police as more integrated are less fearful of future repression, hold fewer grievances over government service provision, and feel less excluded from employment in security institutions.

On August 25th, 2005, officers from the Iraqi National Police kidnapped 36 civilians from their homes in Baghdad, tortured them, executed them, and dumped their bodies near the Iranian border. The victims had one thing in common: they were Sunnis. The officers, like most in Baghdad at the time, were Shias. This incident was not an isolated one. In 2004 and 2005 alone, police units in Baghdad were accused of kidnapping and torturing 1,400 civilians, almost all of them Sunnis (Perito 2011). As Iraq spiraled into sectarian civil war, violence between Sunni and Shia Arabs became ubiquitous, with militias and fighters from both sides attacking one another seemingly indiscriminately. Government institutions,

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including the police and security forces, were also popular targets for Sunni insurgents. All told, violence claimed the lives of more than 170,000 civilians between 2003 and 2016.

One of the many shocking aspects of Iraq's descent into civil war along ethno-religious lines was policymakers' inability to prevent sectarian conflict *even when they anticipated its occurrence*. From the early days of the US invasion, those tasked with designing Iraq's institutions did so explicitly with an eye towards the country's fragmented sectarian landscape. Aside from the Sunni-Shia Arab cleavage, which permeates much of the region, Iraq is also home to significant populations of ethnic Kurds and Turkomen, as well as religious minorities including Christians and Druze. The Iraqi constitution allows for regional federalism for Kurds, a split executive branch to accommodate leaders from multiple groups, and parliamentary elections via proportional representation with low barriers to entry – all structures which should, on paper, promote healthy democratic contestation in a divided setting (Lijphart 2012). Yet, intense and long-lasting sectarian violence ensued. What went wrong? Could a different configuration of institutions have prevented the descent into violence?

This article argues that in divided societies, the design of institutions responsible for policy implementation is critical to the citizen-state relationship. Institutions like the police, public works, and even tax collection implement policies, enforce laws, and distribute government goods. The manner in which they do so significantly influences on the relationship between citizens and the state (Pepinsky et al. 2017). Because employees of these policy-implementing institutions tend to have considerable discretion over the way in which they enforce policies, the rank and file of these institutions become *de facto* policymakers (Lipsky 1980). Bureaucrats' influence over the citizen-state relationship is amplified by repeated direct interactions with ordinary citizens. It follows that where group identity is highly politically salient, the demographic makeup of policy-implementing institutions like the police should matter greatly to citizens. In Iraq, great care was taken to design policy-*making* institutions which could represent the country's diverse population, but little thought was given to the design of policy-*implementing* institutions. I argue that the integration of marginal-

ized groups into the rank and file of policy-implementing institutions can reduce the motives of citizens from those groups to engage in or support violent anti-government conflict.

I test these arguments in the context of the police, a critically important policy-implementing institution. I collect data in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad using a survey of 800 residents. The survey asks about perceptions of the police and the government, as well as willingness to use violence against the government. To gain traction on the causal relationship between integration and support for violence, an experiment primes respondents with varying information about the police's level of integration. Results show that members of the Sunni minority are less likely to consider using violence against the government when they have information that the police are integrated. I then test police integration against several sources of conflict-motives identified in existing research, grievances over current conditions and fears of future mistreatment. I find that police integration is associated with a reduction in each of these conflict-inducing motives.

These findings have three important implications for institutional arrangements in divided societies. First, they demonstrate the importance of service-oriented, policy-implementing institutions in shaping governance, citizen-state relations, and conflict. Thus, institutional solutions to conflict must account not only for institutions that make laws but also those that enforce them. Second, inclusion comes in many forms which yield dramatically different outcomes. For instance, I find that integration is associated in a reduction in grievances and fear, but autonomy is not. Research on institutions should consider not only whether an institution is inclusive but also the way in which it is inclusive. Finally, the finding that police integration reduces support for violence among members of the integrated group speaks to the causes of civil conflict more generally. I argue that integration should reduce violence by reducing *motives* for violence. However, it is equally possible that police integration might increase conflict by empowering previously-excluded groups and making rebellion less costly. If conflict were primarily a function of the costs of rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004), we should see more willingness to use violence when the police are

integrated. Yet, the finding that exposure to police integration actually causes less support for violence among Sunnis implies that, at least in the Iraqi case, individuals' motives for fighting are at least as important as their costs.

Government Inclusiveness in Divided Societies

A rich line of research asks how institutions in divided societies can be designed to manage or reduce intergroup conflict (Fearon 2008; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Horowitz 1985; Laitin 2007; Cederman et al. 2010; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). Much of this research focuses on the way that institutional design affects laws and policies. Power sharing, highlighted by Lijphart (1969, 1984)'s *consociationalism*, focuses on ensuring that minority voices are heard in the policy-making process. Power sharing is often applied in the form of reserved legislative or executive positions for each relevant group (Norris 2008). For example, the Taif Agreement that ended Lebanon's bloody civil war in 1989 mandates a 50/50 ratio of Christian and Muslim members of parliament and divides power between the Sunni-held prime ministerial position and the Christian-held presidency. Similarly, the Transitional Administrative Law implemented in Iraq by the United States and its allies between 2004 and 2005 divided the executive branch into three positions, one for each of Iraq's three largest sects: Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds.

These approaches deal almost exclusively with the institutions at the beginning of the governance process; that is, those that select leaders and make laws. In focusing only on leader selection and policy making, they give little thought to the institutions that implement and enforce laws. Citizens' experiences with policies depend on the way in which they are implemented. Laws are implemented by bureaucrats who have considerable discretion over the way that they affect citizens (Evans 1995). As Lipsky (1980) points out, the government policies citizens observe are not those designed by policy-makers but rather some version that has been filtered through the preferences of bureaucrats. This discretion allows individual bureaucrats to determine policy outcomes (Dincecco and Ravanilla 2016; Pepinsky et al.

2017) and, consequently, citizens' experiences with the state. It follows that in divided societies, or those in which group identity is a significant motivator of political attitudes and behaviors, the demographic makeup of these bureaucrats should matter greatly for the way policies are enforced and, consequently, the relationship between citizens and the state.

I argue that integrating key policy-implementing institutions, and especially the police, should improve the relationship between citizens from previously excluded groups and the state. Integration is the inclusion of non-elites within the rank and file of a policy-implementing institution so that employees from all groups serve citizens from all groups, and so that members of each group are included in sufficient numbers that the functioning of the institution depends on their participation. Integration focuses on inclusiveness within institutions rather than control over them, and on balancing power between members of the institution who come from different groups. Thus, integration differs from other configurations of inclusion like proportionality, which makes no guarantee that particularly small groups will be influential within an institution, or autonomy which separates non-coethnics and prevents members of different groups from monitoring or sanctioning one another within the institution.

A number of existing studies consider the role of bureaucratic inclusiveness in the citizen-state relationship. Looking at courts in Israel, Shayo and Zussman (2011) find that Israeli court claims are more likely to be accepted when the claimant is from the same ethnic group as the judge, while Grossman et al. (2015) show that Arab defendants receive more lenient sentences when there is at least one Arab judge on an appeals panel. While not responsible for direct interactions with citizens in the same way as traditional bureaucracies, research on military integration also provides insight into the effects of rank and file integration in divided settings. Evidence from the militaries in Burundi (Samii 2013) and Malaysia (Ostwald 2013) suggests that increased ethnic representation decreases prejudicial behavior against non-coethnics and increases expressions of civic identity. More broadly, Wilkinson (2015) argues that the process of integrating individuals from all of India's provinces into

the Indian army prevented the army from posing a threat to democratization following independence. Finally, Lyall (2010) finds that military units are more effective at preventing insurgent activity when soldiers come from the same ethnic group as the insurgents. Taken together, we see that altering the demographic makeup of institutions tasked with implementing government policies has far-reaching effects, including altering the way that laws are enforced, reducing prejudicial behavior, increasing attachment to the state, and bolstering institutional effectiveness.

The Police as a Political Institution

The police play an especially important role in the citizen-state relationship. Although researchers rarely describe the police as a “political institution,” the activities of the police are highly political. Their primary role is to provide security for citizens, including both crime prevention and “public safety” activities like traffic enforcement. The provision of security, of course, is a key *raison d’etre* of the state (Olson 1993). The police are also directly responsible for enforcing the laws passed by the government and are authorized to use force in doing so. In divided societies, discrimination in the provision of security can exacerbate social and economic inequalities, causing a cycle in which sectarian behaviors increase due to the expectation of ethnic or racial discrimination in law enforcement. Individuals who expect to be treated poorly by the police because of identity are more likely to view law enforcement as illegitimate and engage in criminal, sectarian, or anti-government behavior as a result (Tyler 1990). Existing social science research on the police as an institution is extensive, covering everything from the effectiveness of various policing tactics (Bayley and Weisburd 2011), to the way that neighborhood design affects crime (Newman 1973; Skogan 1992), to the relationship between police officers and citizens in divided societies (Weitzer and Tuch 2006; Weitzer and Hasisi 2008). However, with a few notable exceptions (Bayley 1971; Weitzer 1995; Levitt 1997; Ungar 2011; Blair et al. 2016), engagement with the police as a *political* institution remains limited.

As noted above, a rich line of research focuses on the integration of the military in divided societies (Enloe 1980; Samii 2013; Lyall 2010; Wilkinson 2015; Horowitz 1985). While the military and the police share the capacity for the use of force, the two institutions differ in ways that are important for their ability to influence the citizen-state relationship. First, the police are in constant contact with civilians, while soldiers are tasked with projecting security outward. Exposure to police officers provides citizens with a constant source of information about the degree to which the police are integrated, in turn shaping their attitudes about the state. Second, while both the police and the military are tasked with distributing security, the version provided by the military is closer to a pure public good in that it is more difficult to target provision to certain segments of the population. National defense is comparatively non-excludable, while the public safety provided by the police can be easily targeted to benefit members of some communities more than others.

Police Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence

This article focuses on an extreme outcome of the citizen-state relationship, support for violence against the government by members of marginalized groups. I argue that integration of the police affects citizens' perceptions of and experiences with the police and, consequently, reduces their motives for supporting or participating in anti-government violence. Existing research identifies a number of motives-based explanations for conflict. I focus on the effects of police integration on two categories of motives: grievances over current conditions and fears over future conditions.

First, individuals may fight against the state if they hold grievances against it (Gurr 1970; Wimmer 2003). Group-based grievances occur when members of a group perceive that their group's position in society is lower than it otherwise would be due to the actions of others. The unequal provision of policing services to different segments of society is likely to lead to conflict-inducing grievances (Weitzer 1995). Police integration may reduce inequalities in service provision in two ways: by altering officers' preferences and by constraining

their behavior. First, integration might improve officers' attitudes towards non-coethnics, reducing their desire to engage in biased service provision. In divided societies, individuals tend to have limited interaction with non-coethnics, and attitudes towards outgroups are formed largely on the basis of stereotypes and received wisdom. Working for an integrated police force provides significant exposure to non-coethnics, first during training and then as colleagues and partners. These interactions provide officers from different groups with shared experiences and allow positive personal experiences to replace stereotypes as the basis for attitudes towards other groups (Allport 1954; Zajonc 1968; Ball and Cantor 1974). In turn, officers who have more positive attitudes towards outgroup members are less likely to harass or withhold service from citizens based on their sectarian identity. Second, integration constrains officers' abilities to engage in biased service provision. In an integrated police department, officers from different groups work side by side to serve citizens of all groups, allowing officers to monitor one another's behavior. When one officer treats a citizen in a way that is inappropriate, other officers can intervene or report the incident to the appropriate authorities. The threat of sanctions may prevent biased behavior from officers who are observed by non-coethnic colleagues.

Another potential source of grievances is exclusion from desirable jobs in the police. Existing research on the relationship between employment and participation in conflict is somewhat mixed (Berman et al. 2011a; Blattman and Annan 2016). Nevertheless, it seems highly plausible that the systematic exclusion of a particular group from gainful employment in the bureaucracy would generate grievances towards the state. This effect is particularly likely in a country like Iraq, where employment in the police is relatively lucrative compared to other options.

Grievances explain how integration reduces support for anti-government violence based on current conditions. Individuals from excluded groups may also decide to participate in conflict due to fears of future conditions. Asymmetric power across groups characterizes relationships between Iraq's dominant Shias and minority Sunnis, as well as between Jews

and Arabs in Israel, Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland, Turks and Kurds in Turkey, and dozens of other ethnic and religious groups in conflicts across the globe. A state dominated by a powerful group cannot commit to the future security of a weaker group living within that state. Knowing this, members of the weaker group may attempt to bolster their security by building up defenses or engaging in preemptive strikes, actions which can lead to conflict (Lake and Rothchild 1996; Posen 1993; de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997). Police integration addresses this commitment problem by making future repression costly. Police integration organizes individuals from previously-excluded groups, aiding coordination and making fighting less costly. It also arms them and provides access to communications equipment, vehicles, and other items that would increase their capacity for fighting back against a repressive state. Because integration increases the costs to the state of repression, members of the weaker group who observe integration have less incentive to engage in anti-government violence as they should be less concerned that the state will attempt to harm them.

In equilibrium, we should not observe police officers from the integrated group taking any of these actions. Rather, the knowledge that members of the weaker group are positioned to impose costs on the state should prevent conflict from occurring in the first place. In practice, for the same reasons why states occasionally fight one another even though war is costly (Fearon 1995), group-based conflict may occur even when the security forces are integrated. The early stages of Syria's civil war is illustrative of an integrated rank-and-file using its position to resist against an oppressive state. At the start of the conflict in 2011, the rank and file of Syria's security forces included many religious and ethnic groups, including large numbers of Sunni Muslims. After fighting broke out, thousands of Sunni police officers and soldiers defected to fight against the Assad regime.¹ Many of those who did not defect found other ways to defend their coethnics. One Sunni soldier describes the tactics he uses to avoid harming the opposition fighters: "I would never do it [shoot to kill]...I'd shoot into the air, shoot everything but the fighters. A lot of people do that – the guys watching don't

¹Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. "Syrian Secret Police Defect, Arab Deadline Passes." *Reuters* 5 December 2011, <http://in.reuters.com/article/syria-idINDEE7B400B20111205>

notice.”²

The conflict-reducing effects described here are the result of citizens’ *reactions* to information about police integration. Thus, integration should only affect support for violence if citizens know about integration or if they perceive the police to be integrated. Perceptions of police integration come from a number of sources, including direct experiences, news media reports, and communication with other civilians about their experiences and perceptions. In fact, given the high visibility of rank and file police officers in everyday life, it is unlikely that perceptions about officer demographics would stray far from reality over the long term, at least where identity is salient.³ Regardless of how perceptions are formed, however, the link between police integration and support for violence depends on citizens’ reactions to *perceptions* about integration, therefore perceptions are the critical variable in this model.

Finally, this link between police integration and overall levels of conflict depends on the reactions of ordinary civilians, not ideological extremists. Hard-line insurgents are unlikely to be swayed by information that the police are integrated, especially when their motives are based in deep-seated ideology rather than the types of concerns or grievances discussed here. Rather, we are concerned with ordinary civilians who support violence for pragmatic reasons. This support may include direct participation in conflict, but it may also take the form of providing shelter for insurgents or simply withholding information from anti-insurgent forces. At the margins, the actions of these ordinary civilians may be the difference between manageable conflict and full-blown civil war (Berman et al. 2011b; Lyall et al. 2013).

²Khazan, Olga. “A Defector’s Tale: Assad’s Reluctant Army.” *Washington Post* 9 January 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/01/09/a-defectors-tale-assads-reluctant-army/?utm_term=.4dc7470f7876

³According to Iraqis interviewed for this project, sect can be determined using cues like an individual’s name, facial hair style, and manner of dress. While it is not possible to determine an individual officer’s sectarian identity with certainty in every case, interviewees reported receiving enough cues like these to form a general impression of the police’s level of inclusiveness.

Alternative Hypothesis: Integration Increases Opportunity for Rebellion

The mechanisms described above assume that conflict is the result of individual-level incentives to use violence against the government. Police integration can thus reduce the likelihood of conflict by reducing peoples' motives for supporting or participating in violence. An alternative explanation for violent conflict is that there are always people who wish to rebel, but they are limited by the costs of doing so (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Thus, conflict is a function not of motives but of opportunity. If this is the case, police integration might actually *increase* the likelihood of conflict by reducing the costs of rebellion for previously-excluded groups, as it arms and organizes them, making them more likely to be successful in fighting against the state.

This question is an empirical one and is directly tested in this article: when integration occurs, are members of the integrated group more or less supportive of anti-government violence? Certain characteristics of sectarian violence suggest that the effects of police integration on motives are likely to outweigh its effects on opportunity. First and foremost, violence is costly for both sides (Fearon 1995). Thus, if members of the weaker group have no reason to fear that the dominant group seeks to force them to fight in the future, they may prefer to avoid fighting altogether. Second, participation in conflict is risky at an individual level, and individuals considering violence face a collective action problem (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Given this riskiness, individuals faced with information that the state is making overtures towards peace may prefer to respond with peace rather than by launching an attack.

Analysis: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence

The above discussion yields several hypotheses about the effects of police integration on citizen support for anti-government violence, as well as attitudes towards the police and the government.

H_1 : Among individuals from vulnerable groups, perceptions that the police are more inte-

grated will cause a decrease in support for anti-government violence.

H₂: Among individuals from vulnerable groups, perceptions that the police are more integrated will cause a decrease in perceptions of unequal police/government service provision.

H₃: Among individuals from vulnerable groups, perceptions that the police are more integrated will cause a decrease in perceived exclusion from employment in the police.

H₄: Among individuals from vulnerable groups, perceptions that the police are more integrated will cause a decrease in fear of police/government repression.

Sectarian Identity in the Iraqi Police

I test these arguments in the context of Iraq, and specifically conflict between the Shia-dominated government and the Sunni Arab minority. Iraq is a useful case study because of the high salience of sectarian identity in its institutions, especially the police. Attempts to design institutions which account for Iraq's sectarian cleavages and prevent extralegal, oftentimes violent conflict along identity lines have proven ineffective. It seems logical to ask how institutional design may yet contribute to a durable peace in Iraq.

Iraq's Arab population is made up of approximately two-thirds Shia Muslims and one-third Sunni Muslims. The Sunni minority dominated the country's political leadership during most of the 20th century (Dawisha 2009), first under Ottoman rule and more recently under the Baathist dictatorship. Saddam Hussein allocated the vast majority of political positions to Sunnis as patronage. It was not until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and implementation of democracy in 2004 that the majority Shias became the politically-dominant group. The dichotomy between Shia and Sunni Arabs is of course an oversimplification of Iraq's ethno-religious landscape. As with any group, there are internal political divisions within these two groups. Additionally, these groups are not all-encompassing. This article does not touch on the Arab-Kurdish cleavage, nor on any of Iraq's smaller religious and ethnic minorities that are nonetheless politically relevant. However, the political fortunes of Sunni Arabs have been sufficiently linked with other Sunni Arabs, and Shia Arabs with

other Shia Arabs, in recent Iraqi history to make the Shia-Sunni distinction a reasonable case study for group-based conflict more generally.

Sectarian identity was rarely a source of conflict in and of itself during the 20th century. There were certainly instances of violence along sectarian lines under Saddam Hussein, most notably following anti-regime uprisings in 1991 and 1999, but violent conflict between sects did not become an everyday occurrence until the fall of the Baath regime in 2003. In the resulting power vacuum, sectarian organizations and their associated militias suddenly represented the best-established institutions, leading to mass political organization along sectarian lines (Robinson 2009). Sectarianism was exacerbated by policies intended to root out former regime loyalists from government jobs. The violence that followed was the result of a sudden and dramatic shift in power, after which the social and political institutions left standing aligned cleavages of political power with those of sectarian identity (Wimmer 2003).

Iraq's domestic security forces are divided into several branches under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Iraqi Police Service, sometimes called the "local police," are responsible for ordinary policing, including traffic enforcement, crime prevention, and criminal investigations. Local police officers are assigned to a specific station and are responsible for the surrounding community. Despite their name, the local police are under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The largest branch of the domestic security forces is the Federal Police, a national police force responsible for everything from ordinary policing to counterinsurgency. The Federal Police are divided into brigades responsible for specific geographic areas. In most of Iraq the Federal Police supplement the local police primarily on security issues or criminal investigations requiring enhanced resources, while in Baghdad they serve as more of a "full service" police force, blurring the lines between the two institutions.⁴ A handful of other law enforcement agencies also operate under the MOI's authority, but this project does not deal directly with these ancillary agencies.

⁴M.D., an Iraqi citizen and researcher who has conducted extensive research on the political attitudes of Iraqis. Author interview 21 February 2016

The role and importance of sectarian identity in the police varies both over time and from one part of the country to another. Between 2004 and 2007, the vast majority of police officers were Shia (Hashim 2005). De-baathification and the subsequent domination of the 2005 elections by Shia parties allowed for heavy recruitment from party strongholds (Cole 2007). At the peak of sectarian violence in 2006-2007, the police were viewed largely as a Shia militia (Perito 2011). Despite isolated examples of Sunni or Kurdish participation,⁵ within months of the new Iraqi regime taking power the state security apparatus was largely co-opted by Shia sectarian interests (Hashim 2005).

Through a combination of US pressure and Iraqi political reform, anti-Sunni policing practices were reined in and participation by Sunnis gradually increased (Robinson 2009). Since the election of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi's government in the second half of 2014, the Iraqi government – still dominated at the upper levels by Shias – has made a conscious effort to reconcile with Sunnis and to increase their participation within the day to day operations of the government.⁶ In December 2014, President Fuad Massoum made a public statement calling for government action “to achieve national reconciliation,”⁷ and Vice President Iyad Allawi held a series of meetings with tribal leaders in pursuit of this goal. Today, mixed Sunni Arab and Kurdish police units have taken on a high-profile role in operating against the Islamic State (IS) in Nineveh province.⁸ In nearby Kirkuk, one report from 2014 describes the city's police force as ethnically-mixed, citing 40% Kurds, 27% Arabs, 25% Turkmen, and the rest from other minority groups among the city's 5,000 officers.⁹ While the police and security forces remain plagued by their sectarian past, progress

⁵The 202nd Battalion in Falluja, for example, was made up primarily of Sunni Arabs (Hashim 2005, 311), and security forces in Tal Afar were primarily Kurdish.

⁶Mustafa, Hamza (2014), “Iraqi President Announces Step Towards National Reconciliation.” *Asharq al-Awsat* 17 December. <http://english.aawsat.com/2014/12/article55339569/iraqi-president-announces-steps-towards-national-reconciliation>

⁷Mustafa, Hamza (2014)

⁸Morris, Loveday. 2015. “Iraqi Police at Nineveh Liberation Camp Aim to Help Free Mosul but Lack Food and Guns.” *Washington Post*, 15 January. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/these-iraqis-are-preparing-to-liberate-mosul--as-soon-as-they-have-guns-and-food/2015/01/14/297efc30-95be-11e4-8385-866293322c2f_story.html

⁹Author Unknown. “Kirkuk Police Can't Escape from Iraqi Politics.” *Washington Post*, 14 June. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A40219-2004Jun14_2.html?sections=http:

towards inclusion and improved service provision is occurring.

The precise distribution of sectarian affiliations within the police is unclear. The US government claimed not to keep track of the sectarian makeup of the Iraqi security forces while it was involved in their reconstruction (Biddle 2006; Sharp 2005). According to Gerald Burke, a former Massachusetts State Police officer who was involved in training the Iraqi police from 2003 to 2006, the US initially tried to implement a policy of sectarian integration in 2003-04 to ensure some degree of representation for all communities.¹⁰ However, the Iraqi MOI told the US that it did not have the necessary information about recruits to engage in any sort of sectarian integration. Today, the police leadership at the station or regional levels almost certainly has an idea of the sectarian makeup of the officers under their control, but there is no indication that the MOI aggregates this information in any centralized database.

Data and Tests

I test the above hypotheses using data from a survey carried out in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad in spring, 2016. The survey provides individual-level measures of the outcomes of interest, namely support for anti-government violence and fear of repression. The survey also measures Iraqis' perceptions about police integration. Survey measures of this key predictor were employed for two reasons. First, the effect of integration on support for violence is explicitly theorized to work via *information* about integration and the way individuals react to that information. Second, reliable data on officer demographics is not available for the Iraqi police. Thus, the survey provides a unique opportunity to illuminate the degree of sectarianism in the Iraqi police, including the way in which officers of different identities are distributed across Baghdad.

[//www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/world). It is not clear how the article arrived at these figures.

¹⁰Author interview, 22 January 2016.

Survey Design and Sampling

The sample includes 800 Baghdad residents. All ethnic Arabs at least 18 years old were eligible to participate.¹¹ The sample was limited to Baghdad for several reasons. First, ongoing conflict against the Islamic State would have made surveying in most Sunni areas of Iraq impossible, meaning that the majority of Sunni respondents would have had to come from Baghdad anyway. Limiting Shia respondents to Baghdad allows for more valid comparisons between the two groups. Second, limiting enumerator travel time and exposure while traveling between sites reduced risks to their safety. Finally, whereas in most of Iraq there is a significant distinction between the federal and local police forces, within Baghdad these forces operate interchangeably, simplifying both citizen perceptions and the questions needed to accurately measure those perceptions. A blocked design yielded 400 Sunni-Arabs and 400 Shia-Arabs, which roughly matches Baghdad's Sunni-Shia makeup.¹² Respondents were selected from 22 different neighborhoods using a stratified design, resulting in a representative sample of Arab adults living in Baghdad. Appendix A details the sampling procedures.

As in all survey-based research, social desirability bias presents a challenge to validity. Respondents may not answer sensitive items truthfully if they do not want to reveal their preferences to the interviewer. While it is impossible to rule out social desirability bias entirely, several factors guard against it here. First, Adida et al. (2016) note that bias may be exacerbated when respondents and enumerators come from groups in conflict with one another. While interviewers in Baghdad were not assigned explicitly on the basis of sectarian affiliation, every effort was made to assign interviewers to their home neighborhoods. This means that in the most segregated neighborhoods, i.e. where sectarianism is likely to

¹¹In addition to the 800 successfully-completed interviews, enumerators attempted but failed to complete 132 interviews, for a completion rate of 85.8%.

¹²Sectarian affiliation was not asked of respondents due to potential sensitivity. Instead, enumerators coded whether they believed the respondent to be Sunni or Shia based on factors like neighborhood, manner of dress, and other visible items around the home. Enumerators were then asked to list how confident they were in their coding. 85.5% of codings were labeled "completely certain," 14.25% were "fairly certain," 0.25% were "more likely than not," and none were "unsure."

be highest, interviewers most likely shared the same sectarian identity as the respondents. Second, the most sensitive questions about support for anti-government violence were asked using a technique that shields respondents' answers from the interviewer. Finally, interviews were conducted in respondents' homes in an effort to place them at ease and ensure a low-pressure environment.

Sample Characteristics

Fifty-two percent of respondents in the sample are male. The youngest respondents were 18 (by design), while the oldest was 72, with an average age of 35.5. In terms of education, just over half had at least 11 years of formal schooling. More than 82% of respondents report living in the same neighborhood now as they did ten years ago.¹³ Finally, as an objective measure of government service provision and a general indicator of neighborhood characteristics, respondents were asked how many hours of electricity their household receives each day. Respondents reported receiving between 10 and 22 hours of electricity per day, with a median of 16 hours. Forty-four percent of respondents either work or have worked in the public sector, or have someone else in their household who does. Of those, 100 (out of 800 total respondents) work or have worked for the police. The high number of households with a current or former police officer – one in eight – speaks directly to the information Iraqis have about the makeup of the police, information which no doubt shapes their perceptions of the institution.

Measuring Police Integration

The primary independent variable, police integration, is measured at both the national and local levels.

National Integration:

¹³This figure is likely inflated by the fact that many Iraqis who were forced to flee their neighborhood due to security may have left Baghdad entirely, removing them from the sampling frame.


“Throughout Iraq in general, would you say that the police fairly include members of all different ethnic and religious groups? Please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being not at all fairly and 5 being completely fairly.”

Local Integration:

“Would you say that the security forces in your area are mostly people like you, mostly people from other groups, or a mix of the two?”

Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to questions about perceived police integration. An illustration of neighborhood-level averages of perceived local police integration is located in Appendix B.

Figure 1: Iraq: Perceived Integration



To gain traction on the causal relationship between perceived police integration and support for anti-government violence, I embedded an experiment within the survey to prime respondents to varying levels of police integration. I randomly assigned respondents to treatment or control groups. The enumerator then read what they claimed to be an excerpt from a recent news report. The report, constructed by the author, describes the recent success in crime fighting by a police unit in Kirkuk, an ethnically- and religiously-mixed city in Northern Iraq.¹⁴ In the treatment group, the success of the unit is attributed to the

¹⁴A “successful policing” prime was used to avoid ethical challenges associated with providing a negative framing of the security forces, which in the Iraqi context could contribute to violence. Since both the treatment and control primes describe the police as effective, this aspect of the prime should not contribute to observed differences between the treatment and control groups.

mixed ethnic and religious identities of its officers. In the control group, the unit's success is attributed to new technology that allows them to track crime and allocate resources more efficiently. The full text of both vignettes is available in Appendix C. Balance tables are presented in Appendix D; there is no significant difference between the treatment and control groups on any of the observed variables.

Several characteristics of Iraqi institutions suggest that this prime should have an especially large effect on our outcomes of interest. First, given the rapidly changing nature of Iraq's institutions, Iraqis' perceptions of those institutions should be particularly susceptible to new information. The Iraqi Police Services have existed only since 2004 and have undergone several major structural changes over the last decade. Additionally, the 2003 invasion and subsequent implementation of democracy completely uprooted the power structures between Iraq's sects after decades of Sunni dominance. Iraq's weak institutions, along with the instability of intergroup power structures, suggest that Iraqis' perceptions about state institutions and sectarian identity will be more susceptible to new information than is typical. In turn, the informational prime described above should have unusually large effects on outcomes like support for violence because it causes unusually large changes in perceptions about the police.

Measuring Support for Violence

The primary test is whether individuals from vulnerable groups who perceive the police as more integrated are less likely to support anti-government violence. It was not possible to ask respondents directly whether they would support the use of violence against the state due to concerns about respondent safety in the event that confidentiality were breached. Asking about this sensitive topic directly also would have made respondents exceedingly uncomfortable, likely leading to high rates of item non-response and dropouts, and raising concerns about untruthful responses. Instead, I employed a list experiment to estimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of violence. I randomly

Table 1: Iraq: Support for Anti-Government Violence

Control Mean	Treatment Mean	Difference	95% CI
2.155 (.056) 400	2.455 (.067) 400	.300*** (.087)	[-.470, -.129]

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

assigned subjects to either a “short list” or “long list” group. Both groups were asked the same question:

“I am going to read you a list of [4 or 5] strategies that citizens sometimes use when the government does not seem to be listening to them. Please tell me how many of these strategies you would consider using if you felt the government was ignoring your needs. Remember, I don’t need to know which ones you would use, only how many of these [4 or 5] you would consider.”

Subjects in the “short list” group received a list of four non-controversial items: voting against the government, writing letters to the government, writing letters to an international organization, and protesting peacefully. The “long list” group received the same four items, as well as an additional item, “using non-peaceful methods.” The proportion of respondents who would consider using violence is the difference in mean responses between the short list and long list groups. Table 1 shows that the mean for the long list group is .300 higher than the mean for the short list group, and this difference is significant at the $p < .01$ level, indicating that on average about 30% of Iraqis would consider using non-peaceful methods against the government. Disaggregating by sect, an estimated 24% of Shias and 36% of Sunnis would consider using violence. Both estimates are significant at the $p < .01$ level. Appendix E discusses several issues related to the mechanics and interpretation of the list experiment.

Table 2: Integration and Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis)

	4 item	5 item	<i>Difference</i>
Vignette Control	1.92 (.10) 100	2.58 (.14) 100	.66 (.17)***
Vignette Treatment	2.09 (.10) 100	2.15 (.13) 100	.06 (.17)

Standard errors in parentheses.


* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Results

To test whether increasing information about police integration reduces support for anti-government violence among minorities, the list experiment groups were randomized within the vignette treatment and control groups to create four versions of the survey: long-treatment, long-control, short-treatment, and short-control, with equal probability of selection into each. This cross-randomization between the two experiments solves two problems simultaneously. Randomization of the vignette allows measurement of the causal effect of information about police integration, while the list experiment measuring support for violence provides a reliable estimate of a difficult-to-measure outcome. Table 2 estimates the proportion of Sunni Arab respondents who would support violence for the treatment and control groups. Among Sunnis who received the control vignette, 66% would consider using violence against the government, whereas the proportion who would consider using violence among those who received the integration treatment vignette is about 6% (and is not significantly different from 0). The difference between the two estimates is significant at the $p < .01$ level using a difference-in-differences estimator with standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit. In other words, being primed that the police are integrated reduces support for violence from about two-thirds of respondents to practically zero. This finding strongly supports the hypothesis that individuals from vulnerable minority groups are less likely to engage in anti-government violence if they believe that the police are integrated.

How can a simple informational cue cause such a large change in support for vio-

Figure 2: Support for Anti-Government Violence (Sunnis)



lence? Several characteristics of the Iraqi case likely increase the magnitude of this effect. First, extreme levels of violence in Baghdad over the past decade and a half almost certainly make Iraqis more willing than most to express willingness to use violence. In other words, the upper bound here is likely to be higher than we might observe in a less violent setting, allowing greater room for variation. The observed shift is likely amplified by Iraq's young, relatively weak institutions and the highly-malleable perceptions that citizens hold about those institutions. The Iraqi Police Services, and indeed all of Iraq's democratic institutions, are creations of post-Saddam Iraq. These institutions have evolved considerably over the past decade, as has the role of sectarian identity in the Iraqi government and security forces. As a result, citizens' attitudes about these institutions should be less entrenched in Iraq

than they are elsewhere, and perceptions about them should be more susceptible to new information. Thus, the large reduction in support for violence due to an informational cue is plausible in this context, but we should expect a much smaller effect where institutions are more developed. Lastly, we might expect this effect to dissipate over time. The observed effect is measured within about ten minutes of providing respondents with the prime. As temporal distance from this cue increases, individuals have more time to weigh the information against their existing perceptions of the police, and to integrate new information into their perceptions. Any contradictory information will mitigate the effect of this informational prime on support for violence. Despite these caveats, however, the clear causal relationship between information about police integration and support for anti-government violence leaves little doubt that police integration is a substantial factor for Iraqi Sunnis in determining willingness to use violence.

Mechanisms: Grievances of the Present, Fear of the Future

I now turn to direct tests of perceived integration's effects on two categories of conflict-inducing motives identified in existing scholarship: grievances over current conditions and fear of future safety. Evidence for these mechanisms comes primarily from observational survey responses. If police officers are assigned to a location non-randomly based on both officer sect and civilians' relationships with the police, the observed links between perceived integration and attitudinal outcomes of interest may be spurious. For example, if the Iraqi Police systematically assign minority police officers to areas where citizens already have a better relationship with the police, then an observed relationship between perceived integration and grievances would tell us very little about the effects of integration on conflict motives.

Two items should mitigate such concerns. First, there is little evidence that officers are assigned based on these criteria. According to Gerald Burke, advisor to the Baghdad police chief from 2003 to 2004 and to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior from 2005 to 2006, officers'

first assignments tend to be dictated exclusively by where they are needed most. Subsequent transfers account for officers' preferences, with most favoring an assignment close to their home town.¹⁵ This preference aligns with the police's priorities as well, since living at home decreases the time officers spend commuting, a costly and often dangerous activity.¹⁶ These criteria may well be correlated with officer sect, but they have little to do with the conflict motives discussed in this article. Furthermore, the lack of systematic data collection on officer sect by the Ministry of Interior suggests that even if the police wanted to use sect as a criteria for assignment, they would have difficulty in doing so.

Second, the results below hold even when asking about perceptions of police integration at the *national* level. No doubt citizens' perceptions of police integration are influenced by their observations of the local police, but they are also influenced by media reports and conversations with friends and family. Among the Baghdad residents surveyed for this project, the correlation between perceptions of police integration at the local and national levels is only .273. Non-random officer distribution therefore cannot explain the observed relationships between perceptions of national-level police integration and the outcomes of interest.

Results: Grievances and Fear

The first way police integration affects grievances, and consequently support for violence, is by decreasing identity-based inequalities in service provision. These inequalities may lead to grievances which, according to existing research (Gurr 1970; Wimmer 2013), motivate violent conflict. Police integration may address an important source of grievances, unequal or inadequate provision of policing services, if it reduces biases in police officer behavior. Table 3 tests the hypothesis that police and government service provision will be perceived as more fair with regard to identity when the police are perceived as integrated. On police

¹⁵Author interview, 22 January 2016

¹⁶Sam Juett, an administrator at the Jordan International Police Training Center where tens of thousands of Iraqi officers were trained, notes that aside from need, assigning officers close to home was probably the most common criteria. Officer interview, 22 February 2016.

service provision, the survey asks “Do you think the Iraqi Police treat citizens fairly regardless of their religious or ethnic identity? Please answer from 1 to 5, with 1 being the least fair and 5 being the most fair.” With regard to government service provision, the question is “Do you think that the government distributes goods and services fairly to members of your community?” Of course, these tests do not speak to actual levels of bias or inequality in service provision, but whether citizens *perceive* service provision to be biased. Since an individual’s decision to fight is ultimately based on his or her view of the world and not on reality, perceptions are the correct measure when we are concerned with motives. Models control for respondent sect, gender, age, highest educational degree attained, whether the respondent or a member of his or her household works in the public sector, and the number of hours per day of electricity the respondent’s household receives. A question about economic satisfaction serves as a control for baseline positivity. Finally, dummy variables control for whether the respondent’s district is primarily Sunni or primarily Shia (versus a mix between the two).

Table 3 shows that respondents who see the police as more integrated at the national level are more likely to believe that the police (Column 1) and the government (Column 4) provide services fairly with regard to sectarian identity. Interestingly, there is no significant difference in this effect between Sunnis and Shias. Perceived integration at the local level also affects beliefs about the fairness of police service provision (Column 2), but not about government service provision (Column 4). Respondents who say that the police in their neighborhood are mixed between officers from their group and officers from other groups are more likely to believe that the Iraqi police treat citizens fairly, regardless of identity.

The news story experiment largely fails to move attitudes about the fairness of service provision. There is no statistically-significant effect on police service provision, while the treatment story’s effect on beliefs about government service provision is significant only at the $p < .10$ level. It seems, then, that while perceptions of police integration do influence beliefs about the fairness of police service provision, we cannot attribute the experimental

Table 3: Perceived Integration and Fairness of Service Provision

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	1.582*** (0.181)			1.263*** (0.302)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	-0.0489 (0.211)			-0.640 (0.444)		
Police Mix		1.079*** (0.321)			0.499 (0.403)	
Police Same		-0.0396 (0.324)			-0.442 (0.496)	
Vignette Treatment			0.198 (0.199)			0.488* (0.278)
Sunni*Vignette			-0.287 (0.324)			-0.348 (0.507)
Sunni	-1.026 (0.708)	-2.390*** (0.254)	-2.159*** (0.245)	1.367 (1.405)	-1.873*** (0.406)	-1.347*** (0.501)
Male	-0.0687 (0.126)	-0.0878 (0.125)	-0.107 (0.119)	0.252 (0.318)	0.0912 (0.312)	0.182 (0.305)
Age	-1.293 (6.056)	0.543 (6.715)	2.890 (5.496)	13.82 (10.73)	23.68** (11.15)	23.13** (10.04)
Degree	-0.170* (0.0901)	-0.352*** (0.0963)	-0.351*** (0.0876)	-0.470** (0.204)	-0.528*** (0.183)	-0.530*** (0.178)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.535*** (0.0916)	0.825*** (0.108)	0.908*** (0.104)	0.322 (0.217)	0.545*** (0.182)	0.594*** (0.167)
Work Public	0.474** (0.192)	0.577*** (0.190)	0.577*** (0.180)	0.309 (0.299)	0.330 (0.319)	0.453 (0.292)
Electricity	-1.019 (3.280)	1.784 (3.976)	0.973 (3.121)	0.224 (4.781)	4.807 (5.633)	1.735 (4.850)
District Sunni	0.758*** (0.257)	0.704*** (0.226)	0.767*** (0.211)	-0.197 (0.388)	-0.170 (0.374)	-0.145 (0.370)
District Shia	0.345 (0.225)	0.260 (0.231)	0.237 (0.205)	0.134 (0.506)	0.0827 (0.439)	0.0795 (0.446)
Observations	742	700	778	626	599	657
Pseudo R^2	0.316	0.226	0.205	0.313	0.282	0.255

Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street. Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

prime's reduction in support for anti-government violence to this mechanism.

Grievances may also be caused by exclusion from desirable employment opportunities within the police. The police provide jobs that are lucrative, stable, and influential compared to other opportunities for employment in Iraq. Existing research is divided on whether employment matters for conflict, and if so, why it matters (Berman et al. 2011a; Blattman and Annan 2016; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Cederman et al. 2010). For instance, employment may reduce participation in conflict by improving one's welfare (and eliminating a source of grievance) or by increasing the opportunity costs of rebelling (since an employed individual would likely have to give up their job to join a rebellion). These micro-level questions about employment and conflict are beyond the scope of this study. The question to be answered here is simply whether integration of the police reduces conflict motives. The survey asks respondents, "Do you think that if someone from your family applied for a job with the Iraqi Police, his or her application would be considered fairly?" Table 4 tests perceptions about police integration against responses to this question. Once again, models are logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street, a full set of control variables, and enumerator fixed effects.

Results show that greater perceived police integration increases citizens' beliefs that they or a family member would have their application fairly considered. At the national level, the effect is consistent for both Sunnis and Shias. At the local level, mixed-group policing is associated with an increase in the belief that job applications will be considered fairly, while same-group policing (meaning local officers are primarily from the same group as the respondent) is actually associated with a *decrease* in the extent to which the respondent believes job applications are considered fairly. Finally, there is no significant relationship between the experimental prime and beliefs about job prospects in the police, meaning that while integration may well influence employment opportunities, this increase in employment opportunities is unlikely to explain the conflict-reducing effects of integration observed in this project.

Table 4: Ability to Get a Job with the Iraqi Police

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Job	Job	Job
Integration (Nat'l)	0.933*** (0.194)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	0.317 (0.409)		
Police Mix		1.013** (0.442)	
Police Same		-0.849* (0.498)	
Vignette Treatment			-0.00404 (0.238)
Sunni*Vignette			-0.236 (0.445)
Sunni	-2.130* (1.207)	-2.339*** (0.579)	-1.870*** (0.529)
Male	-0.325 (0.241)	-0.290 (0.246)	-0.258 (0.196)
Age	12.66 (8.911)	10.02 (9.207)	11.81 (7.767)
Degree	-0.284* (0.152)	-0.461*** (0.165)	-0.453*** (0.156)
Econ. Satisfaction	0.150 (0.143)	0.366** (0.167)	0.476*** (0.140)
Work Public	0.702** (0.275)	0.729** (0.299)	0.753*** (0.272)
Electricity	-7.682 (4.713)	-4.455 (5.024)	-5.121 (4.286)
District Sunni	0.499 (0.430)	0.695 (0.430)	0.641 (0.390)
District Shia	0.417 (0.370)	0.773** (0.312)	0.461 (0.294)
Observations	628	604	653
Pseudo R^2	0.335	0.333	0.260

Logistic regression with standard errors clustered by street.

Enumerator fixed effects. 28

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

Finally, individuals may be motivated to participate in conflict due to fears about the future. Integration of the police should reduce fears of future repression among Sunni Arabs because it empowers their group to fight back in the event of a conflict, which in turn reduces expectations that the state will initiate a conflict in the first place. Table 5 shows the results from several models testing this argument. All models use ordered logistic regression and report standard errors clustered by street.

Results in Table 5 are consistent with the fear-reducing mechanism. Perceptions that the police are integrated nation-wide are associated with decreased fear of repression by the police (Column 1). Column 2 shows that those who say the police in their neighborhood are mixed between Sunnis and Shias are less afraid of police repression than those who say that the police are “mostly people from other groups.” Columns 4-6 test the same models against fear of repression by the government. Once again, perceptions of integration at the national level are associated with reduced fear of repression by the government. At the local level, mixed policing, but not in-group policing, is associated with reduced fears of government repression (Column 5). Finally, the experimental prime caused a slight increase in fear of the government by Shias, but led to an even larger decline in fear of the government by Sunnis. This last finding is consistent with the results of the experiment showing Sunnis are less willing to consider anti-government violence when they are primed with information about integrated policing. Controls generally have the expected effects. In particular, Sunnis tend to be more afraid of repression than Shias, while economic satisfaction is negatively correlated with fear of repression.

On the whole, results are consistent with the argument that police integration addresses common motives for supporting or participating in conflict. Two somewhat counter-intuitive findings stand out. First, at the local level, respondents who believe that officers in their neighborhood are primarily members of their own group are *not* less fearful of repression, do not hold fewer grievances over service provision, and are not more likely to believe they could get a job in the police compared to those who believe their local officers

Table 5: Perceived Integration and Fear of Repression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Police	Police	Police	Gov.	Gov.	Gov.
Integration (Nat'l)	-0.870*** (0.131)			-0.785*** (0.168)		
Sunni*Int. (Nat'l)	-0.0696 (0.209)			-0.148 (0.343)		
Police Mix		-0.667** (0.288)			-1.204*** (0.294)	
Police Same		0.0510 (0.261)			-0.451 (0.321)	
Vignette Treatment			-0.182 (0.173)			0.434* (0.226)
Sunni*Vignette			0.417* (0.232)			-0.737** (0.361)
Sunni	1.127* (0.581)	1.881*** (0.296)	1.516*** (0.294)	1.662* (0.932)	2.031*** (0.406)	2.428*** (0.337)
Male	-0.648*** (0.156)	-0.571*** (0.163)	-0.499*** (0.152)	0.307 (0.241)	0.431* (0.229)	0.325 (0.207)
Age	0.00241 (5.340)	-2.914 (6.236)	-2.757 (5.239)	9.986 (6.187)	10.90* (6.351)	6.912 (5.879)
Degree	0.0197 (0.0921)	0.147 (0.113)	0.146 (0.0976)	0.221** (0.103)	0.306*** (0.110)	0.309*** (0.102)
Econ. Satisfaction	-0.322*** (0.0900)	-0.505*** (0.0999)	-0.552*** (0.0934)	-0.263** (0.105)	-0.486*** (0.101)	-0.530*** (0.101)
Work Public	0.0398 (0.171)	-0.136 (0.175)	-0.150 (0.161)	-0.210 (0.194)	-0.349 (0.220)	-0.364* (0.214)
Electricity	-3.262 (2.936)	-3.147 (3.490)	-3.441 (3.081)	0.771 (3.814)	-1.365 (4.080)	-0.858 (3.776)
District Sunni	-0.162 (0.177)	-0.268 (0.181)	-0.289* (0.167)	0.439 (0.271)	0.392 (0.301)	0.287 (0.224)
District Shia	-0.204 (0.255)	-0.289 (0.250)	-0.151 (0.252)	-0.112 (0.361)	-0.183 (0.360)	-0.0972 (0.320)
Observations	755	711	800	687	651	726
R^2						

Ordered logistic regression. Standard errors clustered by street. Enumerator fixed effects.

* $p < .10$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < .01$

are mainly from other groups. In other words, integration but not autonomy is associated with a reduction in conflict motives. This finding suggests that the key mechanism is not just inclusion but the particular configuration of inclusion, integration. Conflict attitudes are not addressed by allowing individuals to be governed or served by members of their own group (Wimmer 2012) but by creating balance within the institution. Integration provides previously-excluded groups with means of imposing costs on the dominant group or state that are not provided by autonomy, for instance by withholding policing services from members of the dominant group or monitoring dominant group officers. Autonomy also makes it easier for the state to control the information available to officers from marginalized groups, as they are isolated from other officers. Finally, policing along sectarian lines does not lead to engagement with the state in the same way as integration, as officers from minority groups are easily isolated.

The second unexpected finding is that the effects of perceptions of national integration are largely consistent between Sunnis and Shias. We might have expected Shias to oppose integration given their dominance of the government. Yet, Shias show the same reduction in conflict motives as Sunnis. This finding is likely a function of Iraq's recent history. Despite their status as a demographic minority, Sunnis dominated the government from the Ottoman period until 2003. It was only after significant foreign military intervention that the majority Shias took their current role as the politically-dominant group. Shias, then, may consider the current balance of power to be somewhat fragile, and view integration as a safeguard against future changes in this balance. Furthermore, Sunnis and Shias alike have experienced considerable harm from Iraq's sectarian civil war. Members of both groups likely view sectarianism in government institutions as a negative outcome and prefer a government committed to serving all citizens over one that engages in sectarian politics. The positive reaction of Shias to police integration bodes well for the use of integration to mitigate violent sectarian conflict. Indeed, opposition to integration by the dominant group could undo any positive effects of integration on overall levels of conflict. The finding that perceived

integration reduces conflict motives not just among Sunnis but also among Shias means that, at least in Iraq, such opposition is unlikely occur.

Beyond Baghdad: Police Integration as a Solution to Conflict

To what degree should we expect these results to generalize to other cases? Conflict along group lines occurs in a wide range of settings, from Lebanon to China. What do these findings from Iraq suggest about police integration as a solution to group-based violence in other settings? What conditions make integration more or less likely to succeed? First, the Iraqi case is exceptional in the magnitude of violence, with more than a quarter of a million deaths since 2003. One possibility is that Iraq's high levels of violence lend greater urgency to ending sectarianism, perhaps emphasizing the effects of police integration on attitudes. As noted earlier, violence in Iraq harms members of both the Shia majority and the Sunni minority, perhaps explaining why members of both groups are positively inclined towards police integration. Thus, in a low-level conflict like Xinjiang, China, the lack of urgency suggests that members of the marginalized Uyghur group may prefer to keep fighting rather than accept police integration as a signal of China's benign intentions. Similarly, where levels of violence are comparatively low, the costs experienced by members of the dominant group may be insufficient to convince them that integration is a necessary step. Thus, Spanish citizens might oppose integration of Basque separatists into the police if they believe that the potential costs of doing so outweigh the costliness of the existing conflict.

The effectiveness of integration also likely depends on some minimal level of perceived state legitimacy. It seems unlikely that Palestinians who do not recognize the existence of the state of Israel would be satisfied by being integrated into the police. Quite the contrary, there is evidence that many Arabs who do not recognize the legitimacy of the state view Arab police officers as collaborators, not representatives of their group (Hasisi and Weitzer 2007). If citizens do not view the state as legitimate to begin with, police integration is unlikely to decrease motives for conflict.

Third, these arguments assume that a society is “divided,” meaning that group identity significantly motivates political attitudes and behaviors. For the theory of integration to hold, group identities must also be somewhat sticky. If an individual can change groups between marginalized and dominant relatively costlessly, then the identity of police officers should matter less for the distribution of services or the treatment of citizens.

Northern Ireland presents perhaps the best example of police integration as a conflict-reducing measure. Police reforms, including increased recruitment of officers from Catholic neighborhoods, were an important part of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (Bayley 2008). During the “Troubles,” the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had very few Catholic officers and was perceived by many Catholics as a tool of Protestant oppression (Weitzer 1995; McGarry 2000). The 1998 agreement called for a dramatic increase in the number of Catholic officers via a combination of recruitment in Catholic neighborhoods and generous retirement incentives for Protestant officers. In 2015, the renamed Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI) had about 30% Catholics, up from only 10% in the mid-1990’s. Perhaps not coincidentally, Northern Ireland has experienced drastically lower levels of violence over the past two decades. Importantly, neither the police reforms nor the larger political agreement presented a permanent solution to Northern Ireland’s political fate. There remains considerable support for Northern Irish independence from Great Britain.¹⁷ However, peaceful political contestation has replaced violent insurgency as the preferred method of those pursuing independence. Consistent with the findings in this study, it seems that integrating the police convinced those wishing to secede that the political process presents an adequate venue for pursuing their goals.

¹⁷Belfast Telegram, 29 September 2014. <http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/northern-ireland/northern-ireland-says-yes-to-a-border-poll-but-a-firm-no-to-united-ireland-30622987.html>

Discussion and Conclusion

This article presents evidence that police integration diminishes support for anti-government violence in divided societies. I find that providing members of the Sunni minority with information that the police are integrated reduces their willingness to use violence against the Shia-dominated state. I argue that the conflict-reducing effect of perceived police integration is likely caused by a general reduction in citizens' motives for using anti-government violence, and I present evidence linking perceptions about integration with grievances over current conditions as well as fear of future repression, two mechanisms that existing research links with participation in violent conflict.

Several key takeaways emerge for the study of institutions in divided societies. First, policy-implementing institutions like the police have an extremely important influence on political outcomes. These institutions are the main point of contact between citizens and the state, and their rank and file employees have broad discretion over the way that government policies affect citizens in real terms. Where group identity is already highly politically salient, it stands to reason that the demographic makeup of these institutions should matter a great deal for governance, conflict, and the citizen-state relationship. Thus, institutional solutions to group based conflict, and discussions of institutions in divided societies in general, must follow the chain of governance all the way through from leadership selection, to policy-making, to policy-implementation.

Second, different configurations of inclusiveness yield different results. I find that integration is consistently associated with a reduction in conflict motives, while autonomy has no such effect. I speculate that this difference is due to minority-group officers' abilities to monitor non-coethnics and impose costs on the dominant group by withholding services under integration, but not autonomy. From a policy perspective, recruiting more minority police officers to serve in minority-dominated neighborhoods may not reduce support for anti-government violence. Rather, citizens look for information that the institution is integrated, making service provision dependent upon members of their group in all parts of

the country, and consequently allowing them to impose costs on other groups in the event of a conflict. More generally, this difference reminds us that representation comes in many forms. Proportionality, autonomy, and integration are all configurations of representation that likely yield dramatically different results. Future research on representation and inclusiveness should consider not just the degree to which an institution is inclusive but also the configuration by which it achieves inclusiveness.

This article also speaks to the causes of civil conflict more broadly. Police integration decreases the motives of marginalized group members to participate in conflict, but it simultaneously decreases the costs of participating in violence. Integration makes fighting easier by arming, organizing, and providing information to members of these groups. Opportunity-based explanations for conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) imply that police integration should lead individuals from marginalized groups to be more, not less, willing to engage in conflict. Yet, we observe a conflict-reducing effect of perceived integration. Attempts at reconciliation which increase opportunity are not doomed to fail if they sufficiently reduce motives for rebellion. This insight has important implications for institutional design, as tradeoffs must frequently be made between appeasing marginalized groups and maintaining physical security. At least in the Iraqi context, institutions which reduce motives for conflict may be worth the risk.

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
A Survey Sampling Procedures

The survey was carried out using a multi-stage proportional probability sample. Baghdad Governorate is divided into nine administrative districts, which are further divided into subdistricts and census blocks. A 2010-11 household census served as the sampling frame. Subdistricts were chosen proportionally based on population, and then blocks were chosen within each subdistrict again proportionally based on population. Within each subdistrict, streets were selected using a simple random sample from a list maintained by the survey team. Interviews were conducted on 67 different streets. Enumerator teams were provided with the sample at the street level, and then the team leader selected households randomly based on a map of occupied households. Within each household, the interview was conducted with the adult who had the next birthday.

If enumerators failed to reach a resident at a selected location after several attempts, or if the resident declined to participate, another household was selected from the remaining occupied households on the street. Among respondents who completed the survey, item non-response rates were low. Response rates were at least 85% all of the questions used in this analysis. Enumerators were primarily part-time employees of the survey company, and most have worked as enumerators on previous projects for this company. Enumerators worked in teams of 5 to 8, with each team overseen by a supervisor. An effort was made to assign enumerators to their home neighborhoods. Female enumerators were present in every team so that female respondents could be interviewed by a woman. Each interview was conducted by a single enumerator, sometimes overseen by a field supervisor, to minimize conspicuousness.

B Measurement of Perceived Police Integration

Figure 3: Local Police Integration and Population Demographics



C Vignettes

Treatment:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, “Police Break Sectarian Barriers to Serve Citizens.”

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit’s success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers’ diversity:

“Of the 140 officers in my unit, we have individuals from all different religious and ethnic groups of Iraq. We are Shias, Kurds, Sunnis, Turkmen, and we all work together to serve the community.”

“When citizens see us patrolling together, they trust us. They see Kurds and Arabs, Shia and Sunni working side by side and they know that we are not a force belonging to once community or another. We are the Iraqi Police, and we serve Iraqi citizens.”

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the diversity of police recruits from each of Iraq’s sects in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

Control:

I would like to read you a few paragraphs from a news story that was in a newspaper just the other day. The story is about a police unit in Kirkuk. The title of the article is, “Police Use Technology to Serve Citizens.”

Unit 218 of the Iraqi Police Service has been receiving attention lately thanks to its successes in maintaining order in the Arrapha neighborhood of Kirkuk. The secret to the unit’s success, according to one Lieutenant, lies in its officers’ use of technology:

“We have adopted a computerized reporting system. The system allows us to record crimes and incidents in a centralized database. We can use all of the information to find patterns and decide where to send resources.”

“Instead of waiting for citizens to call us after a problem has already happened,

this new technology helps us know where to go to prevent incidents from happening in the first place.”

According to a high-level official in Baghdad, unit 218 is serving as a new model for policing across the country. The Ministry of the Interior has announced an initiative to increase the police’s use of technology in the coming months in an effort to improve the quality of service.

This is the end of the news story.

D Balance Tables

Table 6: Iraq: Vignette Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.50	.51	.322
Age	35.97	34.99	.258
Degree	.87	.79	.167
Economic Satisfaction	2.85	2.76	.281
Electricity (hours/day)	15.75	15.72	.907
n	400	400	

Table 7: Iraq: List Experiment Balance Table

Variable	Control Mean	Treatment Mean	$Pr T > t $
Male	.55	.50	.157
Age	35.61	35.35	.757
Degree	.82	.84	.665
Economic Satisfaction	2.79	2.82	.675
Electricity (hours/day)	15.74	15.73	.963
n	400	400	

E List Experiment: Mechanics and Interpretation

Table 8: Item Count Technique (Iraq)

Number of Items	Control	Treatment	Total
0	4	3	7
1	135	128	263
2	134	95	229
3	49	57	106
4	78	92	170
5		25	25
Total	400	400	800

Table 8 shows the frequency of responses by group for the item count technique in Iraq and Israel, respectively. The logic behind a list experiment is that subjects do not reveal their individual response – it is possible for the researcher to determine only how many items on the list a respondent would choose, but not which one(s) he or she would choose. Of course, anonymity breaks down if respondents select all of the items on the treatment list. Such a “ceiling effect” makes it obvious that the respondent has selected the controversial item. Table 8 shows that 25 subjects in the treatment group said they would consider using all 5 of the methods listed if they felt the government was ignoring their needs.

One possibility is that these 25 subjects were being honest, and either did not understand that answering this way revealed their response or simply did not care. If this is the case, it is also likely to be true that other subjects also would have considered all five but did not say so for fear of revealing their answer on the controversial item. This scenario would cause us to underestimate the proportion of respondents who support the use of non-peaceful methods. A second possibility is that these 25 subjects, or some subset of them, either were not paying careful attention to the survey question or did not understand the question and simply picked an answer. As long as these subjects arrived at the answer of “5” randomly, then we are simply observing noise in the data. Finally, the proportion calculated in Table 1 should be considered a conservative estimate. It may under-count the proportion of respondents who would consider using violence if some would have answered “5” but declined to do so for fear of revealing their support for violence. While this ceiling effect decreases the confidence with which we can estimate the proportion of respondents would use non-peaceful methods, it should not affect our ability to draw inferences about the difference between the vignette treatment and control groups (news article primes about integration), since these were randomly assigned.