Do Good Intentions Matter? Experimental Evidence on how Citizens Respond to Promises of Government Service Delivery*

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Abstract

Can government programs that fail to deliver still influence citizen behavior? Large literatures in political science and economics study the effect of various government programs on how citizens engage with the state. A tacit assumption in many of these papers is that citizens value government programs proportionally to the amount of money spent. Yet there is tremendous heterogeneity in the mapping between spending and how much value citizens actually get from a program. And even programs that do not work may still reflect substantial government investments, thereby informing citizens' beliefs about how much weight the government places on their welfare. Using a large-scale randomized evaluation of a vocational training program in southern Punjab we provide evidence that good intentions might matter; citizens offered a program that almost no one used voted for the ruling party at higher rates in subsequent elections if offered multiple training vouchers than if only offered one. Men who received the training offer became more socially engaged and used government services at higher rates. Women had the opposite reaction. These results have implications for theories of civic engagement.

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Introduction

Can government programs that fail to deliver value still influence citizen behavior? Large literatures in political science and economics study the effect of various government programs on how citizens engage with the state.[1] A tacit assumption in many of these papers is that citizens value government programs proportionally to the amount of money spent.[2] Yet there is tremendous heterogeneity in the mapping between spending and how much value citizens actually get from a program.And even programs that do not work may still reflect substantial government investments, and thereby inform citizens' beliefs about how much weight the government places on their welfare. From a policy perspective evidence that citizens reward effort even when it does not yield tangible benefits would imply that government officials should be willing to take risks and innovate as even well-intentioned failures could win votes.

The theoretical literature is ambiguous on whether good intentions should matter. Classic arguments about retrospective voting and turnout suggest that citizens incentivize politicians by rewarding good performance or honesty and turnout to vote when they believe they can influence the ultimate election outcome (Downs, 1957; Ferejohn, 1986; Fearon, 1999). For these mechanisms to work a number of supporting conditions must be in place: there must be meaningful competition among politicians; citizens' judgments must not be too badly clouded by irrelevant factors (Healy, Malhotra and Mo, 2010); and people must be able to learn about politician's competence by observing them in office.[3]

Much of this work presumes that citizens learn about government competence through observing policies and prefer more competent candidates over less, but still does not resolve the paradox of voting. Myatt (2012) provides a potential solution to the paradox in a model where turnout emerges in equilibrium due to aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate plus citizens' beliefs about the long-run value of having their preferred candidate elected. In a setting like Pakistan where making good policy is hard and opportunities for corruption manifest, the

[1] Recent contributions which include good literature reviews include Healy, Malhotra and Mo (2010); Finan and Schechter (2012); Gallego (2012).

[2] In papers which include a linear term in the value of spending this assumption is explicit (see e.g. Levitt and Snyder, 1997). In papers exploiting discontinuities in spending the implied functional form assumption is much weaker (see e.g. Litschig and Morrison, 2011).

[3] On this last point Meirowitz and Tucker (2013) show that when citizens learn about both government competence and the nature of the problem environment by observing past performance then repeated poor performance may reduce participation as citizens realize that no government can help much in their environment.

lifetime value to citizens of any given politician has to be a function of both their competence at responding to shocks (the parameter that varies over agent types in most principal-agent models of voting) and the value they put on citizens' welfare when making policy decisions. In such settings it seems possible that policies which fail but reveal good intentions would influence beliefs about how much politicians value serving their constituents, and therefore move voting behavior.

To understand whether good intentions can matter in a developing country context we exploit a large-scale field experiment offering vouchers for vocational training to a representative sample of households in four of the poorest districts of Punjab, Pakistan. The experiment was part of the Skills for Employability (SFE) program run by the Punjab Skills Development Fund (PSDF). After a large-scale baseline household survey vouchers for vocational training were offered to 973 individuals living in households that had expressed previously expressed interest in having a household member acquire greater skills; a standard encouragement design. Households were randomly assigned to slightly different voucher offers. Some received a voucher for a male trainee, some for a female trainee, and some received two vouchers (one male and one female). The vouchers were flexible, they could be transferred between household members within a gender, allowed them to enroll in any of the courses being offered by PSDF , and came with a stipend of that varied by course and training provider, but that averaged around 900 rs/month, about 33% of the mean monthly household expenditures per capita in our sample.

Even though this population systematically overestimated the returns to acquiring skills almost no one took advantage of the training.[4] Of the 973 individuals offered vouchers only 43% accepted a voucher, 70% of those who accepted a voucher failed to enroll in their chose course, and a fair number of those who did dropped out before the course was finished. Ultimately of 973 people offered a training voucher only 46 completed training.

Despite the exceptionally low uptake for this program, there is some evidence that it had an effect on voting, at least among men. While receiving the voucher offer had little impact on turnout or vote-choice, living in a household offered two-vouchers had a clear impact. Men who lived in households offered two vouchers were 14 percentage points more likely to report voting for the ruling party in Punjab, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N), in the May 2013 National

[4]The 359 women in our baseline sample who wanted to acquire tailoring skills, for example, estimated they would make between 2,775 rs/month and 4,834 rs/month on average if they had better good skills in that area, yet female tailors in our sample made only 1,415 rs/month on average.

Assembly election than control households and 12 percentage points more likely to report voting for the PML-N candidate than those living in households offered only one voucher. Women in dual-voucher households were 10 percentage points more likely to report voting PML-N than those in single-voucher households.

While there was no major difference in attitudinal measures of faith in government across the treatment conditions, the voucher offer does appear to have had gender-specific effects on a range of more behavioral measures of civic engagement, however. Women systematically became less engaged; reporting lower rates of pro-social community behavior, less charitable giving, and less use of government services. Men systematically became more engaged; reporting higher rates of pro-social community behavior, more charitable giving, and more use of government services. We suspect this difference across genders may be related to differences in the value of the offered menu of courses to each gender—the male course menu had a number of relatively high-prestige options while the female course offerings were limited largely to various forms of tailoring and handicrafts—but cannot yet test that hypothesis.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 reviews previous work relevant to this piece. Section 2 provides background on the institutional context. Section 3 describes our research design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 summarizes our results and discusses implications for research.

1 Previous Work

There are three relevant literatures for this research. The first is the theoretical literature on why people turn out to vote at all. The second is the empirical literature on turnout and vote choice. The third is the literature on the impact of vocational training programs.

The question of why people vote at all given the vanishingly small probability any individual has of influencing an election is one of the deep enduring questions in political economy (Downs, 1957; Fiorina, 1989; Good and Meyer, 1975; Edlin, Gelman and Kaplan, 2007). Classic arguments frame the situation as a principal-agent problem in which voters seek to select a principal who can effectively deal with unexpected events (typically modeled as random shocks to which the agent can respond) (see e.g. Ferejohn, 1986; Fearon, 1999). Much of this work presumes that citizens

learn about government competence through observing policies, prefer more competent candidates over less, and find turning out worthwhile when they can get a better candidate by doing so. In more a recent contribution Myatt (2012) provides a model where turnout emerges in equilibrium due to aggregate uncertainty about the popularity of each candidate plus citizens' beliefs about the long-run value of having a given candidate be elected. In his model turnout is higher when citizens expect the long-run value of their preferred candidate to be higher.

The empirical literature on turnout and vote choice has two strands, experiment and observational. On the experimental side most of the work has been on understanding how to get citizens in developed countries to vote at higher rates. A broad range of studies explore the impact of Get-Out-the-Vote (GOTV) campaigns in the United States (Gerber and Green, 2000*b*,*a*; Green, Gerber and Nickerson, 2003). While these studies typically find that face-to-face canvassing stimulates political participation, recent work by Michelson and Nickerson (2011, 234) points out that such experiments might have limited external validity for a number of reasons. Recent work in developing countries has found similar results from canvassing and voter education programs.[5]

On the observational side recent work has provided insights into what drives voting behavior. Fujiwara, Meng and Vogl (2013) use county-level data on U.S. presidential elections from 1952-2012 to show that past shocks to the costs of voting (election day rainfall) reduce future voting. Looking at the relationship between distributive benefits and political participation Chen (2012) shows there is a substantial political response to disaster-related spending in Florida, with aid distributions driving up vote share among voters identifying with the governor's party and providing an incumbency advantage to all politicians. Fair et al. (2013) show that the 2010-11 floods in Pakistan led to a robust and sizable increase in voter turnout as well as changes in citizens' behavior and attitudes which reflect greater civic engagement.

Of course in order to understand the political impact of government programs, a key question is whether it matters if the programs actually work. Since Vocational Training Programs (VTP) are targeted to very specific individuals one might expect participants would reward the government's spending on such programs, particularly if they improve economic outcomes. The evidence on that score, however, is quite mixed.

There is modest evidence that VTP can increase labor skills and employability in the U.S.,

[5]See, for example, Guan and Green (2006) on China and Gine and Mansuri (2010) on Pakistan.

though their impact is modest and may be transient once selection is taken into account.[6] Evaluations in developing countries on VTPs and classroom programs report positive results on employment, wages, and empowerment, but mostly for women. Attanasio, Kugler and Meghir (2011) study the Juvenes en Accion (JA) program in Colombia which provided three months of classroom training and three months of on-the-job training to youths in the two lowest socio-economic strata. They find high impacts for the treated women, 7% increase in probability of employment, hours worked/week increase by 3, and wages go up 20%. None of those outcomes are significantly affected for men, although men and women see big increases in formal employment and in wages conditional on being in formal employment before receiving training. Card et al. (2011) evaluate the Juventud y Empleo (JE) program in the Dominican Republic which focused on low-income youth with less-than-secondary education who were not enrolled in school. In India Maitra and Mani (2012) finds that treated young women are more likely to be employed, have a bigger salary, and gained in the form of increased confidence. In Uganda Bandiera et al. (2012) evaluate the Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program designed to reduce risky behaviors and to provide vocational training in Uganda. They find treated girls' income increased modestly. Finally, Blattman, Fiala and Martinez (Forthcoming) evaluates the Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) in Northern Uganda which delivers vocational training and business start-up support to teams that go through an extensive pre-treatment proposal process. They find large increases in business assets, work hours, and earnings. The program has no significant impact, however, on socio-political attitudes and behavior.

Given the observed effectiveness of VTP within select populations in a range of developing countries that is good reason to think VTPs can deliver value to citizens and thus might be expected to move their voting behavior.

2 Institutional Context

Pakistan is a low-income country, ranking 146 out of 208 countries in per capita GDP, with very low levels of gender empowerment, high levels of inequality, high levels of political conflict, and a tradition of poor government service provision (Human Development Index 2012, Worldwide Governance

[6]For a review see Heckman, Lalonde and Smith (1999). For one of the major studies see Schochet, Burghardt and McConnell (2008).

Indicators 2012). The Punjab Economic Opportunity Program (PEOP) was a vocational training program designed to reduce poverty and increase human capital in four of the poorest districts of Southern Punjab: Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Lodhran, and Muzzaffargarh.[7] A major component of the PEOP program as the Skills for Employability (SFE) program run from [[DATES]].

Evaluating the SFE program provides a unique opportunity to assess the impact of service delivery on civic attitudes and voting patterns for three main reasons. First, there have been no studies assessing the impact of service delivery in developing countries that employ an RCT design with variation in a government-run program as the treatment and voting as the outcome. Second, government service delivery in this region has historically been quite weak. Despite being one of the poorest parts of Punjab only 3.8% of respondents in the region who were not living in areasnaffected by the massive 2010 floods report receiving any government assistance.[8] Third, the factors influencing Pakistan's democratic institutions is a prime concern of the international community and aid organizations including DFID and USAID have spent tens of millions of dollars there since 2001 to support democracy.

Whether or not good-faith efforts by the government can increase citizen engagement thus has major policy implications within Pakistan and beyond.

3 Research Design

This section describes the Skills for Employability (SFE) experiment and why it facilitates a good test of whether citizens will reward governments that try hard even when they do not perform. In this case, the government of Punjab offered a vocational training program to citizens living in historically underserved areas twelve months before a major election. We thus have an offer of valuable services randomized within a well-surveyed population, which people do not use, followed by a historic election, after which we are able to elicit peoples' retrospective voting choices and political behaviors.

[7] In 2011 a standardized wealth index across these districts was 0.73 points below the average for the rest of Punjab, a difference of .7 standard deviations ($p < .001$). (Punjab MICS 2011).

[8] Muzaffargarh was hit very hard by the 2010 floods, 59% of clusters there were affected and roughly 33% of respondents in the district report receiving income assistance (52% in the affected clusters and only 4.2% in the unaffected ones).

3.1 The Skills for Employability (SFE) program

The Skills for Employability (SFE) program is one of several components of the Punjab Economic Opportunities Program (PEOP), the flagship employment-generating program of the Government of Punjab. It has been implemented in partnership with the Department for International Development, Government of United Kingdom (DfID). The aim of the program is to create inclusive growth and alleviate poverty in four of the most economically marginalized districts in Southern Punjab: Bahawalnagar, Bahawalpur, Lodhran and Muzaffargarh. The program was administered by the Punjab Skills Development Fund (PSDF), a not-for-profit company set up by the Government of Punjab in collaboration with DfID.

The SFE program delivered vouchers to households for courses run by established training providers in 15 tehsils, though most of the courses were concentrated in the cities Bahawalnagar, Lodhran, and Muzzafargarh. The program was advertised across the area and anyone who met the age qualifications and had national ID card could apply, though few respondents in our baseline survey had heard of it. The program offered 76 different courses, including embroidery and tailoring, agricultural and farming services, education, vehicle and electric repairers, among others. The courses available for enrollment started over the 4 month period from May 1st to August 13th, 2012, roughly one year before the May 2013 election. The duration of these training courses as well as the stipend allowance given to the trainees varied from one training provider to another. On average, the course duration was approximately three months and the average allowance (stipend plus travel allowance) was approximately 900 Rupees per month.

3.2 Sampling and Treatment Assignment

The Center for Economic Research in Pakistan (CERP) initiated a large-scale Baseline Household Survey activity in the four PEOP districts in the beginning of October 2011. During the baseline survey, each HH was asked to nominate a male and female Infra-Marginal (IM) to receive the training with the only stipulation being they were in the 16 to 80 age range. Only households which expressed an interest in receiving some skills training were included in the evaluation sample.

The overall sample for the Baseline Household Skills Survey to evaluate the entire PEOP program consists of 860 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) designed to provide a tehsil-representative

sample in all four program districts. Within each PSU a representative was drawn from a village census conducted for us in early-2011 by the Punjab Bureau of Statistics. For the SFE evaluation we selected 72 PSUs (34 urban and 38 rural) randomly from the overall sample. The selected PSUs are geographically spread over all four program districts. Within these PSUs 1,399 households were surveyed during the baseline surveys and they make up the sample frame for this evaluation.

The SFE impact evaluation consisted of three different treatment arms and one control group:

- *T1: Both voucher.* Both IMs, male and female, were offered the training program within a single HH.
- *T2: Female voucher.* Only females received training within a single HH.
- *T3: Male Voucher.* Only males received training within a single HH.
- *C: Control group.* Controls were not offered training.

Treatment assignment followed a two-step strategy: one at across PSUs and other within PSUs at the household level:

- *Step 1: Assignment at the PSU level.* 13 PSUs were randomly assigned to be pure controls, consisting in 286 households.[9]
- *Step 2: Assignment at the household level.* For the remaining 59 PSUs, assignment to treatment—T1, T2, and T3—and control was done at the household level. 108 households received vouchers for one man and one woman, 386 households received a female voucher, 381 received a male voucher, and 524 received no offer. In all 983 individuals received treatment, but ten of them—5 female voucher and 5 male vouchers, respectively—were eventually discarded from the intervention because the baseline data on them was missing.

During and after collecting the baseline data, we tracked all the individuals that participated either as control or treatment in the SFE intervention four times, approximately every four months, from April 2012 to September 2013. For the individuals in control households we surveyed the original male and female IMs in every round. These short surveys captured data on key variables,

[9] All the results below are reported with PSU fixed-effects and so these households do not contribute to the estimate.

such as income, employment, health, and social and political behaviors. Starting in round 3 we asked the participants about their views and perceptions of the state's performance and accountability, political and civic participation, and turnout and political party preferences.[10]

3.3 Treatment

As noted above the evaluation used an Encouragement Design where a randomly selected group of individuals from the general population in Program districts were offered a voucher to enroll in a course of their choice. The specific treatment protocol was carried out in multiple steps to elicit each household's preferred candidate for training and their preferred training option before physically delivering the printed voucher to the nominated trainee and following up on their enrollment decision with the treatment household as well as the training provider. We worked closely with PSDF on providing information on courses and providers operating under the SFE scheme, guaranteeing admission to the voucher holders in their preferred courses, and addressing implementation issues as they arose.

The voucher disbursement treatment worked as follows:

- *Booklet Delivery.* Each individual in the treatment group was physically visited and provided information on applicable training courses and providers as well as the location, starting date and duration of each course. Since each course had its own educational requirement, eight booklets were designed and printed for this purpose containing course information for males and females of different educational backgrounds. During this visit, households and potential trainees were encouraged to enroll in the training by providing them with information on the value of skills training and the cost being borne by the government on each trainee. Although potential trainees from each household were identified in our baseline household survey, households were given the option to either confirm the original nomination or nominate another member of the household to receive the PSDF training voucher. The required voucher information for the nominated trainee was then recorded.

- *Call Back to Confirm Course Choice.* The nominated trainees from the treatment group were called 3-4 days after booklet delivery to confirm their decision to enroll in training and to get

[10] DfID and PSDF originally asked us not to measure political outcomes and later changed their position.

information on their choice of course.

- *Voucher Delivery.* Information from Call Back and Booklet Delivery steps was used to issue vouchers in the name of individuals in the treatment group with their confirmed course choice. These printed vouchers were physically delivered and this information was shared with PSDF and the relevant training providers in order to ensure that these individuals would be admitted in their chosen course. At this step, a baseline tracker was also conducted for individuals in the treatment and the control group. This tracker was our first post-treatment measurement of civic attitudes.

- *Enrollment Confirmation.* The enrollment of voucher holders in courses of their choice was confirmed by contacting voucher holders as well as training providers after the course had started.

3.4 Descriptives and Balance

The baseline household survey collected information on demographic characteristics, employment status, income and expenditures, skills, health, public and private services satisfaction, and attitudes towards civic life and community from all participants above 16 years old in both the treatment and control groups. Table 1 reports the basic descriptive statistics by gender from the baseline survey. Panel A shows the household level variables and Panel B reports individual outcomes. Monthly consumption numbers and earnings are reported in thousands of Pakistanis rupees.

As we see in Panel A, the average household size is 6.6 members and the average number of children between 5 and 16 years old is around 2 per household. In a scale from one to ten, financial satisfaction is bigger among women than men (5.6 and 6.2 for women and men, respectively). On average, monthly household consumption is very similar in the households of both male and female respondents and is estimated at around 16,800 rupees.

The average age for men and women before the training was around 30 years. About 51 percent of the sample is female. Men reported high levels of employment (75%) and very few men are looking for jobs. In comparison, women reported low levels of employment (34%) and most of them (60%) are looking for jobs. On an average week, men work about 46 hours and women around 21

hours, while the monthly earnings per month for men are about 3 times higher than women. These results highlight the intense gender discrimination in the labor market in southern Punjab. In terms of skills, women reported higher levels of soft skills: literacy, communication, and numeracy.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Our sample is well-balanced at baseline across treatment arms, as we see in table 2 for the household level and table 3 for the individual level. Both tables report means and differences clustering standard errors at the PSU level.

At the household level, we combined all the treatment arms into a combined treatment assignment without distinguishing between men and women. Column 1 and 2 reports the baseline means for the control group and the treatment group (combined), respectively, and column 3 report the estimated difference between treatment and control. Overall, the results from the baseline comparisons at the household levels do not present major differences.

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

At the individual level in table 3 we distinguish between men and women. Columns 1-3 and 7-9 columns reports the baseline means for those in control households, single voucher households, and dual-voucher households by gender. Columns 4-6 and 10-12 estimate the differences between these groups. Of the 96 difference in means tests estimated here, only 9 were significant at the 90 percent level, approximately what should occur by chance.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Overall the sample appears to be well-balanced on pre-treatment covariates.

4 Results

This section describes our results.

4.1 Expectations

Most respondents in our baseline survey had optimistic expectations about the benefits to acquiring skills. To benchmark expectations we asked potential trainees four questions in our baseline survey:

(1) what is your most valuable skill you have; (2) how much do you earn per month from that skill; (3) what skill would you like to acquire; and (4) how much do you think you could earn if you acquired that skill. In table 4 we use these to benchmark expectations for the five most-requested skills that were also in the SFE course offerings.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

As the table shows the realized wages for people who had tailoring, embroidery, farming, teaching, and masonry skills were generally below what respondents who wanted these skills thought they could make if they acquired them. Overall our respondents were quite optimistic about what they could learn from acquiring the most commonly-requested skills.

4.2 Uptake

As discussed above, voucher delivery was implemented so that uptake could be measured at each step of the process. Fully 53% of the treatment group refused to select a course on which they could use their voucher. Of those who did select a course, only 16% actually enrolled in a course. Finally, a large fraction of trainees dropped out of classes after initially registering for their selected course. Overall only 4.7% percent of the 973 individuals in the treatment group stayed enrolled in their chosen training course. Table 5 summarizes the drop off for men and women.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Post-intervention analysis showed that drop off was lower for those enrolled in courses which offered high stipends and for those living closer to their chosen training center (Cheema et al., 2012). In subsequent experiments we are evaluating how uptake can be increased by using higher stipends, placing training centers closer to potential students, and making efforts to alleviate social constraints. For purposes of this paper, the key point is that after receiving an offer of a relatively costly government program, very few people used it.

4.3 Voting and Civic Engagement

This section describes how our experiment impacted voting and civic engagement in our sample. Throughout we estimate equations of the form:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 T_i + \gamma_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{i,t}, \tag{1}$$

where $Y_{i,t}$ is the outcome of interest for individual i in tracker round t, T_i is an indicator for the individual being in the treatment group, γ_p is a PSU fixed-effect, δ_t is a survey-round fixed-effect which is included for outcomes tracked in multiple rounds (e.g. charitable giving), and ϵ_i, t is the period-specific error term. We calculate robust standard errors clustered at the PSU-level throughout. In this setting β_1 provides the difference in means between treatment and control. When comparing single- vs. dual-voucher treatment effects we replace $\beta_1 T_i$ with $\beta_1 T_{i,b} + \beta_2 T_{i,m}$ or $\beta_1 T_{i,b} + \beta_2 T_{i,f}$ so that β_1 gives us the difference in the mean between individuals in dual-voucher households and those in control and and β_2 provides the analogous difference for those in single voucher households to control. In all estimations we treat the male and female samples separately. Given the vast differences in gender roles in this region a pooled analysis makes little sense.

4.3.1 Turnout and Vote Choice

As we see in table 6, the voucher offer had little significant impact on turnout. In the tracker survey before the May 2013 election we asked respondents if they voted in the 2008 National Assembly election and if so for which party. One month after the May 2013 election we asked them if they voted in that National Assembly election and if so for which party. If respondents were reporting truthfully, then our measure of voting in the 2008 election should be uncorrelated with treatment. Men pass this placebo test, as we can see in column (1), but women fail it as we see in column (4).

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

Turning to party choice, we find some evidence of a swing to the ruling party in Punjab, the PML-N, within treated households. Both men and women fail the placebo test, as panel A columns (1) and (5) of table 7 show, with men more likely to report voting for PML-N in 2008 if they got the voucher offer and women being less likely to do so.

We therefore focus on the difference between households that received a single voucher and ones that received two vouchers. Within this sample we believe the reporting bias may be minimized and indeed, as panel B columns (1) and (5) show there is no significant difference in retrospective reporting of pre-treatment behavior between those who received different numbers of vouchers.[11] As columns (2)-(4) show, however, men are more likely to vote PML-N in 2013 if they live in a dual-voucher household than in a single-voucher one (col. 2), less likely to vote PPP (col. 3), and more likely to switch their vote to PML-N from PPP between the elections (col. 4). Columns (6)-(8) show the same pattern is true for women. The overall swing from the dual-voucher treatment relative to the single-voucher treatment is 10 percentage points for men and 13 percentage points for women, roughly half of the national-level swing against the PPP.[12]

INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Overall it does not appear the single-voucher offer carried much weight, but the dual-voucher offer seems to have been relatively powerful within the set of people offered a voucher. This may reflect some kind of threshold value required to move voting preferences. Our ongoing work on other elements of the PEOP which provide varying levels of value to citizens may allow us to assess this.

4.3.2 Faith in Government

Our tracker surveys included a number of measures that can be used to tap faith in government, including questions about:

- Whether people like themselves can influence government;
- If they think it represents the interests of people like themselves;
- Whether it is will help them in the next year;
- How much people feel they can trust various government services; and
- How likely they are to encounter corruption in those services.

[11] Formally we cannot reject the null that $\beta_1 = \beta_2$.

[12] For a thorough discussion of the election see Fair et al. (2013).

None of these were affected by the SFE voucher offer, as table 8 shows. We also constructed an additive index of these variables and it too was unaffected by the treatment.[13]

INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

4.3.3 Behavioral Measures of Civic Engagement

Turning to behavior measures of civic engagement, a somewhat different picture emerges. We constructed two measures of prosocial behavior that were measured in all four tracker waves. First, we built an additive index out of three yes/no questions:

- Are you a member of a non-governmental social welfare/civic organization (e.g. local NGO or a local business organization)?
- In the last 6 months have you helped your neighbors with harvesting, building, or home repairs without being paid to do so?
- In the last 6 months have you made a charitable gift (zakat, sadqa or other)?

Second, we asked them how much they had given in charity in total.

Men and women had starkly different responses to the voucher offer on these dimensions. As panel A columns (1)-(3) of table 9 show, men in the treatment group became more likely to engage in all three prosocial behaviors and gave more money to charity, roughly 50% more than man in the control group. Women moved in exactly the opposite direction, as columns (4)-(6) show. There were no significant differences between individuals in single- and dual-voucher households on this dimension.

INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

If men became more prosocial after the voucher offer and women less, we might expect that to be reflected in how much they used government services. As table 10 shows in panel A columns (1)-(5), men were indeed more likely to report using government services in the time since the last tracker by 7 percentage points on average across four services: police, courts, government health

[13] In this and all subsequent indices we report a simple additive index, but results are robust to using factor analysis or PCA.

services, and government sanitation services. Women, in contrast, were 5 percentage points less likely to use these services on average, as panel A, column (10) shows. Here again there is no evidence of a dosage effect between single- and dual-voucher households.

INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

5 Conclusion

We analyzed the impacts of a large-scale program offering training citizens did not want on their political behavior and civic engagement. Ours is the first field experiment to simultaneously: (a) measure the economic impacts to offering a VTP to the general population without extensive pre-screening; (b) assess the political impact of the VTP offer within this representative population; and (c) have an election shortly after treatment which allows us to measure political impacts relatively well.

We find modest evidence that good intentions might matter among. Both men and women living in households offered multiple vouchers for vocational training shifted their votes to the ruling party relative to those living in houses offered only a singly voucher. Men who received the offer of vocational training (most of whom did not use it) engaged in more prosocial behavior afterwards, and started using state services at higher rates. Women had the opposite reaction, seeming to become less engaged. Women in the treatment group also exhibited substantial evidence of disliking the ruling party, reporting they voted at lower rates in a pre-treatment election and that they voted for other parties if they did vote.

These gender specific results may reflect heterogeneity in the value of the courses offered. Our results make sense if men thought the menu of training offered reflected a good faith effort, but women found it to be inadequate and thus indicative of a government that did not value their welfare. In order to parse these possibilities our end line survey will assess whether these individuals recall the program and is of why they did not use it and what they felt they learned about their government from the offer.

Tables

Table 1. Basic Descriptive Statistics of Baseline Variables

	Men		Women	
	Mean	Std. dev	Mean	Std. dev
Panel A: Household Level				
Household size	6.70	(3.07)	6.60	(3.00)
No. of children between 5 & 16	2.08	(1.73)	2.09	(1.75)
Financial satisfaction	5.59	(2.28)	6.15	(2.29)
Poverty status	0.32	(0.46)	0.32	(0.46)
Monthly aggregate consumption	16.82	(12.39)	16.73	(13.32)
Consumption of meat	0.82	(0.95)	0.75	(0.86)
Consumption deciles	5.40	(2.93)	5.47	(2.95)
Log(consumption)	9.55	(0.58)	9.54	(0.60)
Monthly expenditure pc	2.71	(2.01)	2.91	(3.51)
Log (monthly expenditure pc)	7.73	(0.58)	7.76	(0.60)
Panel B: Individual Level				
Age	31.87	(14.10)	29.47	(11.97)
Employment	0.75	(0.43)	0.34	(0.47)
Unemployed (not looking for a job)	0.03	(0.18)	0.17	(0.37)
Unemployed (looking for a job)	0.10	(0.29)	0.43	(0.49)
Average hours worked (per week)	46.46	(25.39)	21.14	(24.18)
Monthly earnings (cash & in-kind)	7.09	(10.19)	2.75	(9.33)
Log(earnings)	7.31	(3.30)	3.53	(4.09)
K6 score	5.27	(5.67)	6.04	(6.16)
Literacy	1.96	(0.88)	2.25	(0.88)
Communication	1.77	(0.84)	2.01	(0.91)
Numeracy	1.82	(0.86)	2.12	(0.91)
Member of organization	0.95	(0.20)	0.99	(0.09)
Rule of law perception	0.18	(0.38)	0.13	(0.34)
Public clinics used (last 6 months)	0.85	(0.35)	0.84	(0.36)
Private clinics used (last 6 months)	0.87	(0.33)	0.85	(0.36)
Police courts used (last 6 months)	0.48	(0.49)	0.29	(0.45)
Max Observations	991		990	

Notes: The table reports means and standard deviations of the baseline survey combining treatment and control groups. The statistics relate to the group that was observed in both baseline and all tracker waves.

Table 2. Baseline Differences Between Treatment and Control Groups at the Household Level

	Control	Treatment (Combined)	Control-Treatment
Household size	6.703	6.588	.115
	(3.112)	(2.957)	(.2)
No. of children between 5 & 16	2.061	2.107	-.046
	(1.772)	(1.723)	(.112)
Financial satisfaction	5.902	5.857	.044
	(2.339)	(2.28)	(.169)
Poverty status	.334	.304	.029
	(.472)	(.46)	(.042)
Monthly aggregate consumption	16.261	17.382	-1.121
	(12.482)	(13.299)	(1.073)
Consumption of meat	.796	.829	-.033
	(.85)	(.871)	(.082)
Consumption deciles	5.299	5.596	-.297
	(2.905)	(2.98)	(.27)
Log(consumption)	9.521	9.574	-.053
	(.568)	(.62)	(.056)
Monthly expenditure pc	2.745	2.892	-.147
	(3.248)	(2.389)	(.217)
Log(monthly expenditure pc)	7.72	7.768	-.048
	(.567)	(.623)	(.054)

Notes: The table reports the difference in each variable between the treatment and control groups. Standard deviations in parenthesis in columns 1 and 2, and standard errors in parentheses in column 3. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Monthly aggregate consumption, consumption of meat, and monthly expenditure in thousands Rupees.

Table 3. Baseline Differences Between Treatment and Control Groups at the Individual Level

	Men						Women					
	Control	TS	TB	C-TS	C-TB	TS-TB	Control	TS	TB	C-TS	C-TB	TS-TB
Age	32.121	32.019	29.778	.102	2.344	-2.242	29.425	29.46	29.785	-.036	-.36	.325
	(15.06)	(13.53)	(9.898)	(1.106)	(1.655)	(1.633)	(12.953)	(10.948)	(10.128)	(.958)	(1.425)	(1.52)
Employed	.732	.767	.833	-.034	-.101*	.067	.316	.384	.312	-.068	.004	-.072
	(.443)	(.424)	(.375)	(.043)	(.061)	(.069)	(.465)	(.487)	(.466)	(.05)	(.073)	(.08)
Unemployed (not looking for a job)	.04	.033	.011	.007	.029	-.022	.182	.146	.161	.037	.021	.016
	(.196)	(.18)	(.105)	(.013)	(.021)	(.024)	(.386)	(.353)	(.37)	(.027)	(.05)	(.041)
Unemployed (looking for a job)	.076	.122	.1	-.046*	-.024	-.022	.434	.413	.516	.022	-.082	.103
	(.265)	(.328)	(.302)	(.023)	(.031)	(.044)	(.496)	(.493)	(.502)	(.046)	(.072)	(.079)
Average hours worked (per week)	52.875	56.105	56.395	-3.23	-3.519	.289	35.642	39.864	35.508	-4.223	.134	-4.356
	(21.013)	(21.584)	(21.672)	(2.39)	(3.135)	(3.416)	(17.108)	(22.317)	(18.112)	(3.004)	(4.151)	(4.694)
Monthly earnings (cash & in-kind)	6.369	6.373	7.459	-.003	-1.09	1.086	4.365	4.775	14.45	-.409	-10.085**	9.676***
	(11.557)	(9.364)	(11.282)	(1.367)	(2.275)	(1.32)	(14.485)	(8.536)	(40.162)	(1.296)	(3.859)	(3.603)
Log(earnings)	7.84	7.864	7.929	-.024	-.089	.065	7.14	7.312	7.936	-.173	-.797*	.624
	(2.328)	(2.309)	(2.273)	(.201)	(.298)	(.345)	(2.332)	(2.404)	(1.995)	(.305)	(.423)	(.602)
K6 score	5.826	6.728	6.963	-.902	-1.136	.234	8.045	8.223	8.383	-.177	-.337	.16
	(4.642)	(5.288)	(6.101)	(.586)	(.851)	(.868)	(5.69)	(6.11)	(6.457)	(.669)	(.955)	(1.06)
Literacy	1.922	2.037	1.863	-.115	.059	-.174	2.242	2.223	2.429	.019	-.187	.206
	(.879)	(.873)	(.924)	(.094)	(.139)	(.148)	(.887)	(.882)	(.84)	(.101)	(.137)	(.149)
Communication	1.722	1.866	1.663	-.144*	.059	-.203	2.015	1.952	2.179	.064	-.163	.227
	(.836)	(.854)	(.871)	(.085)	(.127)	(.134)	(.914)	(.912)	(.946)	(.094)	(.148)	(.145)
Numeracy	1.745	1.936	1.788	-.191**	-.043	-.149	2.112	2.084	2.286	.028	-.174	.201
	(.846)	(.883)	(.91)	(.092)	(.113)	(.15)	(.916)	(.922)	(.913)	(.103)	(.144)	(.138)
Member of organization	.951	.962	.948	-.011	.003	-.014	.998	.985	.988	.013**	.01	.004
	(.216)	(.191)	(.223)	(.019)	(.027)	(.03)	(.047)	(.124)	(.109)	(.007)	(.008)	(.015)
Rule of law perception	.196	.162	.156	.035	.04	-.006	.146	.13	.095	.016	.051	-.035
	(.398)	(.369)	(.365)	(.044)	(.061)	(.055)	(.353)	(.337)	(.295)	(.033)	(.049)	(.042)
Public clinics used (last 6 months)	.85	.828	.933	.022	-.083*	.105*	.841	.839	.807	.002	.034	-.032
	(.357)	(.378)	(.251)	(.032)	(.043)	(.057)	(.366)	(.368)	(.397)	(.04)	(.057)	(.058)
Private clinics used (last 6 months)	.883	.849	.893	.034	-.01	.045	.861	.814	.88	.047	-.018	.065
	(.322)	(.359)	(.311)	(.031)	(.046)	(.055)	(.346)	(.39)	(.328)	(.037)	(.048)	(.068)
Police courts used (last 6 months)	.46	.505	.453	-.045	.007	-.052	.268	.341	.241	-.072	.027	-.1
	(.499)	(.501)	(.501)	(.062)	(.083)	(.087)	(.444)	(.475)	(.43)	(.06)	(.077)	(.093)

Notes: The table reports the difference in each variable between the treatment and control groups. Monthly earnings are in thousands of Rupees. C stands for control; TS stands for treatment single; and TB stands for treatment both. Standard deviations in parenthesis in columns 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9 and clustered standard errors in parentheses in columns 4, 5, 6. 10, 11, and 12. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 4. Reported vs. Expected Earnings After Training Completion

Skills	Statistics	Men				Women			
		Reported	E(Min)	E(Mid)	E(Max)	Reported	E(Min)	E(Mid)	E(Max)
Tailoring	Mean	5,805	6,313	7,844	2,363	1,415	2,775	3,804	4,834
	Median	4,250	6,000	7,750	10,000	750	2,250	3,500	4,000
	10 %ile	1,167	3,000	5,500	7,000	167	1,000	1,500	2,000
	90 %ile	13,333	10,000	11,500	12,000	3,000	5,000	6,500	8,000
	Obs	55	24	24	24	232	359	359	359
Embroidery	Mean	3,656	3,500	4,500	5,500	1,289	3,037	3,938	4,838
	Median	2,833	3,500	4,500	5,500	750	2,000	3,390	4,000
	10 %ile	417	3,000	4,000	5,000	167	800	900	1,000
	90 %ile	8,333	4,000	5,000	6,000	3,000	7,000	7,500	10,000
	Obs	8	3	3	3	158	178	178	178
Farming	Mean	14,966	7,159	8,812	10,465	3,650	1,930	2,465	3,000
	Median	5,833	6,000	7,000	8,000	2,875	2,000	2,500	3,000
	10 %ile	2,500	2,000	3,500	5,000	867	500	750	1,000
	90 %ile	25,000	10,000	15,000	16,500	7,917	4,000	4,750	5,500
	Obs	646	441	441	441	20	14	14	14
Teaching	Mean	18,640	5,700	8,433	11,167	13,506	8,217	12,239	16,261
	Median	16,000	3,500	7,050	11,500	11,333	7,000	7,500	10,000
	10 %ile	3,000	1,200	3,500	4,000	1,750	2,000	3,000	4,000
	90 %ile	36,000	13,000	15,000	20,000	22,500	15,000	25,000	30,000
	Obs	31	19	19	19	30	15	15	15
Masonry	Mean	7,376	9,556	12,444	15,333	-	-	-	-
	Median	6,000	6,000	8,000	9,000	-	-	-	-
	10 %ile	2,500	5,000	5,500	6,000	-	-	-	-
	90 %ile	12,000	30,000	45,000	60,000	-	-	-	-
	Obs	89	9	9	9	-	-	-	-

Note: Results comes from baseline household survey. Total individuals in sample 12,526. Reported earnings by category are the participant's reported average monthly earnings, based on their current activities. Minimun and maximun expected earnings were asked to those participants that would like to learn a new skill. Mid expected earnings is the mid-point between maximun and minimun expected earnings. Missing values are due individuals that do not have the categorie's skills and do not want to learn these skills. Values rounded to the first digit.

Table 5. Uptake by Voucher Disbursement Stages

Stage	All		Male		Female	
	Total	% Drop	Total	% Drop	Total	% Drop
Offered training options	973		464		509	
Selected course	462	53	206	56	256	50
Enrolled	75	84	33	84	42	84
Stayed enrolled	46	39	16	52	30	29

Note: Voucher uptake for SFE evaluation.

Table 6. Turnout

Panel A: Combined Treatment Effect						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DV	Reports voting in 2008	Reports voting in 2013	Turnout shift (2008-2013)	Reports voting in 2008	Reports voting in 2013	Turnout shift (2008-2013)
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Women	Women	Women
treatment	0.05	0.04	-0.01	-0.20	-0.13	0.07
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]***	[0.04]***	[0.04]*
Constant	0.35	0.41	0.06	0.52	0.52	-0.00
	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]**	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]
Observations	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,075	1,075	1,075
R-squared	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.14
Panel B: Dual vs. Single Voucher Treatment						
Single	0.05	0.03	-0.02	-0.20	-0.14	0.06
	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.05]	[0.05]***	[0.04]***	[0.04]
SFE Both	0.03	0.08	0.05	-0.19	-0.08	0.11
	[0.05]	[0.06]	[0.07]	[0.05]***	[0.05]	[0.06]*
Constant	0.35	0.41	0.06	0.52	0.52	-0.00
	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]**	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]
Observations	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,075	1,075	1,075
R-squared	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.17	0.16	0.14
Diff. Both-Sing	-0.02	0.05	0.07	0.02	0.06	0.05
p-val	0.67	0.37	0.21	0.76	0.26	0.39

Note: All regressions include PSU fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 6:

Table 7. Party Choice

Panel A: Combined Treatment Effect								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
DV	Vote PMLN 2008	Vote PMLN 2013	Vote PPP 2013	Swing to PMLN (2008-2013)	Vote PMLN 2008	Vote PMLN 2013	Vote PPP 2013	Swing to PMLN (2008-2013)
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Men	Women	Women	Women	Women
treatment	0.05	0.04	0.02	-0.01	-0.11	-0.06	0.00	0.05
	[0.03]*	[0.04]	[0.01]**	[0.04]	[0.04]***	[0.04]	[0.01]	[0.04]
Constant	0.12	0.25	0.03	0.13	0.19	0.31	0.04	0.12
	[0.01]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]***
Observations	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
R-squared	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.22	0.18	0.15	0.16
Panel B: Dual vs. Single Voucher Treatment								
Single	0.04	0.01	0.03	-0.03	-0.10	-0.08	0.01	0.03
	[0.03]	[0.04]	[0.01]**	[0.05]	[0.04]***	[0.04]*	[0.01]	[0.04]
SFE Both	0.06	0.14	-0.00	0.07	-0.13	0.03	-0.03	0.16
	[0.04]*	[0.06]**	[0.01]	[0.06]	[0.04]***	[0.05]	[0.02]	[0.06]***
Constant	0.12	0.25	0.03	0.13	0.19	0.31	0.04	0.12
	[0.01]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]***
Observations	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,076	1,075	1,075	1,075	1,075
R-squared	0.22	0.17	0.16	0.13	0.22	0.18	0.15	0.17
Diff. Both-Sing	0.02	0.12	-0.03	0.10	-0.03	0.10	-0.04	0.13
p-val	0.57	0.02**	0.08*	0.06*	0.31	0.03**	0.05*	0.01**

Note: All regressions include PSU fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Figure 7:

Table 8. Faith in Government

Panel A: Combined Treatment Effect										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
DV	People like me can affect what government does (1-5)	Government represents people like me (1-5)	Government will help me in the next year (1-5)	Index of how much you trust government orgs	Index of how likely corruption is in government services	People like me can affect what government does (1-5)	Government represents people like me (1-5)	Government will help me in the next year (1-5)	Index of how much you trust government orgs	Index of how likely corruption is in government services
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Women	Women	Women	Women	Women
Treatment	0.06	0.10	0.03	0.01	-0.07	0.09	-0.12	-0.12	0.03	0.05
	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.09]	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.05]
Round 3	0.06	-0.08	-0.23	-0.07	-0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.02	-0.09	-0.10
	[0.14]	[0.10]	[0.12]*	[0.02]***	[0.07]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.15]	[0.03]***	[0.08]
Constant	2.53	2.18	2.95	0.46	3.38	2.45	2.24	2.92	0.46	3.35
	[0.09]***	[0.07]***	[0.08]***	[0.01]***	[0.05]***	[0.09]***	[0.08]***	[0.10]***	[0.02]***	[0.05]***
Observations	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,470	1,470	1,470	1,470	1,470
R-squared	0.096	0.153	0.113	0.250	0.235	0.106	0.141	0.097	0.237	0.199
Panel B: Dual vs. Single Voucher Treatment										
Single	0.03	0.05	0.04	0.01	-0.09	0.14	-0.15	-0.13	0.03	0.06
	[0.09]	[0.08]	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.07]	[0.10]	[0.09]*	[0.10]	[0.02]	[0.05]
SFE Both	0.14	0.25	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.09	-0.00	-0.07	0.03	0.02
	[0.14]	[0.12]**	[0.13]	[0.03]	[0.08]	[0.12]	[0.12]	[0.14]	[0.02]	[0.06]
Round 3	0.06	-0.08	-0.23	-0.07	-0.04	0.05	0.02	-0.02	-0.09	-0.10
	[0.14]	[0.10]	[0.12]*	[0.02]***	[0.07]	[0.14]	[0.12]	[0.15]	[0.03]***	[0.08]
Constant	2.53	2.18	2.95	0.46	3.38	2.45	2.24	2.92	0.46	3.35
	[0.09]***	[0.07]***	[0.08]***	[0.01]***	[0.05]***	[0.09]***	[0.08]***	[0.09]***	[0.02]***	[0.05]***
Observations	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,488	1,470	1,470	1,470	1,470	1,470
R-squared	0.096	0.155	0.113	0.251	0.235	0.109	0.143	0.097	0.237	0.199
Diff. Both-Single	0.111	0.196	-0.0364	-0.0102	0.0794	-0.228	0.145	0.0597	0.00241	-0.0420
p-val	0.387	0.0914	0.782	0.660	0.287	0.0382	0.139	0.599	0.911	0.549

Note: All regressions include PSU fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 9. Prosocial Behavior

Panel A: Combined Treatment Effect						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
DV	Prosocial Behaviors	Total Charitable Giving	Log(Charitable Giving +1)	Prosocial Behaviors	Total Charitable Giving	Log(Charitable Giving +1)
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Women	Women	Women
Treatment	0.02	549.76	0.30	-0.08	-461.56	-0.26
	[0.01]**	[266.10]**	[0.07]***	[0.01]***	[203.40]**	[0.08]***
Round 1	-0.02	476.06	0.48	-0.02	437.07	0.43
	[0.02]	[244.37]*	[0.10]***	[0.02]	[146.13]***	[0.09]***
Round 2	-0.05	402.50	0.24	-0.03	474.81	0.20
	[0.02]***	[190.96]**	[0.10]**	[0.02]*	[261.04]*	[0.10]*
Round 3	0.04	539.07	0.38	0.02	485.94	0.43
	[0.01]***	[332.29]	[0.13]***	[0.01]	[181.47]***	[0.11]***
Constant	0.26	967.72	6.28	0.32	1,282.56	6.52
	[0.01]***	[175.43]***	[0.08]***	[0.01]***	[127.52]***	[0.07]***
Observations	4,304	2,155	2,155	4,300	2,132	2,132
R-squared	0.078	0.073	0.166	0.095	0.066	0.164
Panel B: Dual vs. Single Voucher Treatment						
Single	0.02	465.59	0.32	-0.08	-458.21	-0.23
	[0.01]	[217.15]**	[0.07]***	[0.01]***	[201.24]**	[0.08]***
SFE Both	0.04	833.45	0.22	-0.08	-473.86	-0.35
	[0.02]**	[619.74]	[0.11]**	[0.02]***	[278.50]*	[0.10]***
Round 1	-0.02	472.97	0.48	-0.02	436.90	0.43
	[0.02]	[245.90]*	[0.10]***	[0.02]	[146.60]***	[0.09]***
Round 2	-0.05	404.19	0.24	-0.03	474.65	0.20
	[0.02]***	[191.54]**	[0.10]**	[0.02]*	[260.65]*	[0.10]*
Round 3	0.04	535.57	0.38	0.02	486.00	0.43
	[0.01]***	[333.89]	[0.13]***	[0.01]	[181.55]***	[0.11]***
Constant	0.26	972.49	6.28	0.32	1,282.54	6.52
	[0.01]***	[174.84]***	[0.08]***	[0.01]***	[127.53]***	[0.07]***
Observations	4,304	2,155	2,155	4,300	2,132	2,132
R-squared	0.078	0.074	0.167	0.095	0.066	0.165
Diff. Both-Single	0.0202	367.9	-0.0999	0.00660	-15.66	-0.124
p-val	0.326	0.504	0.340	0.659	0.939	0.133

Note: Prosocial index made up of 3 y/n questions: (1) Are you a member of a local community organization?; (2) Have you helped a neighbor without pay in the last 6 months?; and (3) Have you given to charity in the last 6 months? All regressions include PSU fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table 10. Use of Government Services

Panel A: Combined Treatment Effect										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
DV	Used police in the last 6 months	Used courts in the last 6 months	Used government health services in the last 6 months	Used government sanitation services in the last 6 months	Government service usage index	Used police in the last 6 months	Used courts in the last 6 months	Used government health services in the last 6 months	Used government sanitation services in the last 6 months	Government service usage index
Gender	Men	Men	Men	Men	Men	Women	Women	Women	Women	Women
Treatment	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05
	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.03]	[0.03]**	[0.01]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.02]**
Round 3	0.06	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.16	0.05	0.07
	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.03]***	[0.03]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]	[0.04]***	[0.03]*	[0.02]***
Constant	0.01	0.02	0.48	0.14	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.48	0.21	0.22
	[0.01]	[0.01]*	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.03]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***
Observations	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,980	1,980	1,980	1,980	1,980
R-squared	0.138	0.128	0.173	0.300	0.227	0.105	0.115	0.188	0.278	0.205
Panel B: Dual vs. Single Voucher Treatment										
Single	0.09	0.09	0.04	0.05	0.07	-0.06	-0.06	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05
	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.03]	[0.03]*	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.04]	[0.04]	[0.02]**
SFE Both	0.11	0.08	0.08	0.10	0.09	-0.06	-0.07	0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	[0.03]***	[0.03]***	[0.04]*	[0.04]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.05]	[0.04]	[0.02]*
Round 3	0.06	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.08	0.05	0.01	0.16	0.05	0.07
	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.03]***	[0.03]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.02]	[0.04]***	[0.03]*	[0.02]***
Constant	0.01	0.02	0.48	0.14	0.16	0.08	0.10	0.48	0.21	0.22
	[0.01]	[0.01]*	[0.02]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.01]***	[0.03]***	[0.02]***	[0.01]***
Observations	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,962	1,980	1,980	1,980	1,980	1,980
R-squared	0.138	0.128	0.173	0.301	0.228	0.105	0.116	0.189	0.278	0.206
Diff. Both-Single	0.0250	-0.0107	0.0418	0.0480	0.0260	-0.000295	-0.0145	0.0553	0.0163	0.0142
p-val	0.388	0.717	0.333	0.177	0.316	0.985	0.377	0.189	0.643	0.454

Note: Service usage is an additive index of the number of government services in the table used. All variables either (1/0) for yes/no on usage or scaled to be in [0,1]. All regressions include PSU fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by PSU in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

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