

Women, Patriarchy, and Globalization in MENA: Evidence from Tunisia

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Abstract:

Is there public support for globalization in MENA countries, which need this integration into the global economy for their economic development? We examine public attitudes toward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Tunisia. Research on the region suggests that strong norms about patriarchy and support for Islamic values may undermine support for globalization. We use a survey experiment to see if such socio-cultural values do indeed affect attitudes toward globalization. We find that women respond to such socio-political cues more than men. And that women support globalization more when it is seen to benefit other women and especially when these women remain attached to traditional core Islamic values. We find strong support generally for globalization especially when it is seen as compatible with the maintenance of an Islamic identity.

Introduction:

As developing countries around the world democratize, an important issue involves their economic policy toward the global economy. Some research indicates that democratization in developing countries leads to greater openness to the world economy in terms of both trade and foreign investment (Milner and Kubota 2005, Pandya 2014). But this depends in part on the preferences of citizens toward the global economy. Substantial research has examined such public preferences in the developed world (Rogowski 1987, Magee, et al. 1989, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, a, Beaulieu 2002, Hiscox 2002, Fordham and McKeown 2003, Dutt and Mitra 2005, Mayda and Rodrik 2005), but much less exists looking at the developing countries (Baker 2005, Hicks, et al. 2014 on Central and Latin America are exceptions). Moreover, very little research has looked at the Middle East and public attitudes toward the global economy. In the wake of the Arab Spring movements, especially in Tunisia where democracy has advanced, research on such public attitudes is especially important. Here using a nationally representative survey conducted in 2015, we examine how the Tunisian public views the global economy. We join the debate over what factors structure attitudes toward globalization. Employing a survey experiment, we show that cultural influences on public attitudes are very important, but in surprising ways.

Economic crises in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been a primary cause of the recent political upheavals that unseated long standing governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. High unemployment, especially among the youth, rising inequality, and under-provision of public services have helped drive public discontent. Average unemployment in the MENA region is the highest in the world and has been for several decades (International Labor Organization 2013). Exacerbating this bleak economic predicament are the region's difficulties in competing internationally and globalizing successfully; the Arab world's share of world trade, for instance, has declined from 38 percent in the 1980s to 4 percent by 2012 (El-Erian, et al. 1996, Noland and Pack 2007). Three years after the Arab Spring, a majority of Tunisians still identified the economy, the financial crisis, and unemployment as the most important issues facing the country. Eighty-two percent described the economic situation as bad. These economic crises have also been associated with other serious problems, like the democratic deficit, youth alienation, terrorism, women's subjugation, war, and instability.

Scholars and policy makers believe that stable governments in this region—and certainly democratic ones—will not arise unless there is substantial economic progress (for example, see World Bank 2013).¹ This progress in turn depends on the extent that these countries can globalize, that is, integrate their national economies into the much larger global economy. As Marcus Noland and Howard Pack (2007, p. 3) point out in their influential political economic study of the MENA region, “it is almost impossible to imagine sustained generation of needed employment opportunities without successful globalization.” In the past, the MENA region has

¹ See also: Ianchovichina, et al. (2013).

been one of the least globalized (Noland and Pack 2007, Richards and Waterbury 2008). Changing this requires government action and economic reform in all of these countries. But it is not clear whether MENA publics, given existing economic structures and cultural orientations, will accept such reforms.

A large segment of the literature on the preferences toward globalization assumes that people will develop their globalization preferences according to the economic sector they are in or the skill level they possess. Economic models point to the net gains in income that globalization can create for certain groups depending upon their position in the economy. Political economy models then assume that economic winners from globalization will support it politically, while economic losers will oppose it. For example, studies show that skill levels of individuals and/or their sector of occupation have an important impact on their views toward globalization through their income channel (Rogowski 1987, Magee, et al. 1989, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, a, Beaulieu 2002, Hiscox 2002, Fordham and McKeown 2003, Dutt and Mitra 2005, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Milner and Kubota 2005, Dutt and Mitra 2006, Hanson, et al. 2007, Milner and Tingley 2011). The central hypothesis from economic models tends to be that in developing countries, unskilled labor should reap the greatest gains in income from opening to the world economy, while skilled labor and capital holders should lose. One would thus expect unskilled labor in these countries to be the mainstay of support for globalization. Some support for this conjecture has been found at the macro level (O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Milner and Kubota 2005, Dutt and Mitra 2006). But other studies have cast doubt on this finding, showing the majority of support from higher skilled workers (e.g., Baker 2005, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, Hicks, et al. 2014).

Juxtaposed to these economic considerations are non-economic models—primarily cultural, political and sociological—that also explain preferences toward globalization. Scholars have recently questioned the importance of the economic factors cited above and have begun looking at a series of non-economic variables (Citrin, et al. 1997, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Mansfield and Mutz 2009, Lü, et al. 2010, Blonigen 2011, Margalit 2012). These studies of public opinion often show that other influences which are more sociological and cultural in nature are important as well. These non-economic factors take a wide range of values. They include concerns about inequality, insecurity, nationalism, xenophobia, cosmopolitanism, gender, and isolationism.

Taken together, previous research illustrates that both economic and cultural factors matter for support for globalization. Yet, most of these studies have been based on observational data, and, it remains unclear whether respondents in surveys employ their “economic” vs. “cultural” lenses when responding to surveys gauging support for globalization. In fact, most observational studies suffer from this problem. Indeed, cultural and economic factors can be highly collinear in shaping these overall preferences.

We advance this debate by adopting a new empirical strategy to address this question. In our survey of the Tunisian public, we employ a novel experiment where we alter the identity of the beneficiary of globalization. By altering the beneficiary's identity, we are better able to trigger cultural cues that might influence support for globalization. Specifically, we look at whether two important cleavage markers in MENA—the gender and the religious appearance of the beneficiary—shape patterns of support for globalization. We expect the beneficiary's gender to have an important impact on attitudes toward globalization in the MENA context where gender relations are highly patriarchal. Given the economic structure of MENA economies, where unemployment is significant and men are more gainfully employed than women, will globalization receive less support if it is seen to benefit women? And will men and women equally share these assessments? Hence, we also examine whether the gender of the respondent itself shapes views of globalization and its impact. In addition, we examine whether Islamic identity of the beneficiary affects attitudes toward globalization. Given that the Islamic-secular divide has intensified in many MENA societies since the Arab Spring, will the Islamic appearance of different beneficiaries significantly influence patterns of support for FDI in Tunisia?

Islam & Gender in MENA Economies:

The literature on Middle East politics has tended to look at sociocultural preferences as impediments to political development (Huntington 1993, Fish 2002, Lewis 2002, Inglehart and Norris 2003). These scholars have argued that the culture of Islam has led societies to be less democratic, less tolerant and more inegalitarian towards women. The Global Gender Gap report for 2010 reports that the MENA region has the worst gender gap among all regions and has progressed the least in eradicating it over time (Hausmann, et al. 2010, p. 19). It shows that the MENA region has an especially large gap in terms of economic participation and opportunity as well as political empowerment (Hausmann, et al. 2010, pp. 22-23). Economists have shown that societies in which men make all family decisions—i.e., patriarchal ones—tend to have less female labor force participation (Doepke and Tertilt 2009).²

Clearly in the economic realm gendered disparities persist. Despite Tunisia's relatively progressive record on women, its economic activity ratio for men and women is quite dismal. In 2013, 70% of men, 15 years and older, worked compared to only 26% of women (International Labor Organization 2015). In our nationally representative survey from 2015, 56% of men were currently employed, while only 21% of women were. (About 96% of men were either employed currently, retired or unemployed and seeking work, while for women this was only 37%.) A look at the economic activity ratio rates (2011) from across the world illustrates that the Middle East and North Africa is the region where one sees the largest gap between men and women. In fact, even when you compare MENA to other low and middle income countries (see Figure 1), the

² Women tend to do better when they have more intra-familial bargaining power; see discussions of the importance of household bargaining for explaining family labor supply such as Burda, et al. (2007) and Knowles (2007).

gap remains significantly huge at 54%. No country in MENA demonstrates a gap lower than 40% (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: Male and Female Labor Force Participation 2011





Figure 2: Male and Female Labor Force Participation in MENA, by gender, 2007-2011



Source: World Bank Gender dataset based on ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market.

Some attribute these large gaps between men and women to the economic crises facing the region as a whole. Others blame MENA’s cultural norms and practices. Citizens of MENA, indeed in all Muslim countries, hold some of the most inegalitarian attitudes toward women in the world. MENA societies are more likely to believe that men make better political leaders; that university education is better for a boy than for a girl; and that when jobs are scarce, men should be entitled to the jobs that do exist. In fact, 62% of Muslim respondents in the sixth wave of the World Values Survey agreed with that latter statement compared to 27% in non-Muslim majority

countries (Figure 3A). We see this pattern in the Middle East and North Africa as well. In Figure 3B, 65% of respondents in the MENA agreed with the statement. These attitudes reinforce the belief that a women's place is in home and not in the labor force (Fish 2002, Inglehart and Norris 2003, Jamal and Langohr 2009).

Figure 3A: World Values Survey Sixth Wave (Muslim Majority vs Muslim Minority)





Figure 3B: World Values Survey Sixth Wave (By Region)




Additionally—while men and women are both overwhelmingly negative—data show men to be even less favorable towards women’s equality. In the previous question on male entitlement to jobs, WVS data reveal that 69% of male respondents, compared to 55% of female respondents, supported the statement that when jobs are scarce men should have more rights to these jobs. Clearly, majorities of both Muslim males and females support male superiority in the economic realm. However, men tend to support this position much more.

In our nationally representative survey of Tunisians, we see resistance to women’s empowerment.³ Tunisians, like many other populations of MENA, tend to harbor inegalitarian attitudes when it comes to women, especially on certain topics. In our survey we asked nine questions related to women’s role in society. While the exact questions are in our appendix (see Appendix 1B), the questions generally related to women’s ability to be political leaders, the access of women to university education and scarce jobs, support for equal pay and rights, their ability to travel alone and to receive an equal part of an inheritance, their role as housewives versus work outside the home, and whether they or their husband should provide financially. In figure 4, we show the overall responses of our findings. We also break this down by gender of respondent. Two points are clear. For most of these roles in society, there is more than majority support for women’s empowerment. In three areas, however, this is not the case. There is little support for women being able to inherit equally, largely due to Islamic tenets. There is much stronger support for women being housewives than working outside the home, and there is strong support for husbands providing the family finances. Second, in all cases it is apparent that Tunisian women are more in favor of their rights than men. Thus, while Tunisians may be more supportive of women’s rights in general, there remain important areas where norms are strongly against women playing an equal and active role in society.

³ Duflo (2012, p. 1053) defines women’s empowerment as “improving the ability of women to access the constituents of development—in particular health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation.”

Figure 4: Attitudes toward Women’s Empowerment



According to Val Moghadam, these inegalitarian norms reinforce “women’s subordinate position in the family” (Moghadam 2004, p. 137). Deniz Kandiyoti discusses this in great detail as she outlines the “patriarchal bargain” in classic patriarchal societies.⁴ She writes, “The patrilineage totally appropriates both women’s labor and progeny and renders their work and contribution to production invisible....They [women] forego economically advantageous options, such as trading...for alternatives that are perceived in keeping with their respectable and domestic roles” (Kandiyoti 1988, p. 280). These classic patriarchal societies stipulate that it’s fully the patriarch’s responsibility to provide for his family. Thus, men encourage women to stay at home. In return, women’s economic needs are taken care of by her male partner or male relatives. This is one of the central foundations of the patriarchal bargain. In fact, we find evidence of this bargain in our Tunisian survey. As shown in figure 4, when asked “Which of the following statements is closer to your view? Statement 1: It is the obligation of husbands to provide for the family and women can choose whether to work. Statement 2: It is the obligation of both men and women to work and equally provide for the family,” a full 64% of Tunisian males and 58% of Tunisian females supported the statement that it is the obligation of husbands to provide. Globalization if it provides more jobs for women thus might plausibly be seen as

⁴ Doepke and Tertilt (2009, p. 1544) define patriarchy: “Under patriarchy all family decisions are made solely by the husband, whereas under empowerment decisions are made jointly by husband and wife.”

undermining these patriarchal structures, and only beneficial if it creates opportunities for male employment. We expect this attitude to be even more powerful among men than women, as much survey data suggests.

In addition to patriarchy, another important cultural dimension that influences how people might view globalization is the culture of Islam. Muslims have been quite opposed to globalization if it is seen as undermining core Islamic values or beliefs (Zuhur 1992, Kepel 2002, Roy 2004, Masoud 2008, Brown 2012, Wickham 2015). Islamist mobilization against globalization--whether in Egypt in the 1980's, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan in the 1990's and more recently debates about whether Ennahda, Tunisia's Islamist party, would ban alcohol and bikinis from beaches--illustrate the ways in which Islamic convictions figure into conversations about globalization (BBC News 2011). The political party, Nida' Tunis, the secular response to the Islamic Ennahda, argued that such laws would injure Tunisia's economy by undermining its ability to attract investors.

In fact, our survey of Tunisians finds that citizens believe that many aspects of globalization contradict core Islamic values. A majority of 60% maintain that banks which charge interest contradict the teachings of Islam and should be banned; 55% believe that foreign companies that bring in impermissible goods like pork and alcohol should be banned from Tunisia; and 66% of Tunisians do not support allowing foreign investment if it brings in non-Islamic practices and products. Furthermore, our data from Tunisia indicates that women are more likely to hold these conservative Islamic values. While 57% of males believe banks charging interest should be banned, about 63% of females support the ban on banks. Another 63% of females believe that foreign firms that import impermissible things should be banned from the country, while only 47% of males share this opinion. Finally, while 37% of males agree with the statement that FDI should be encouraged even if it brings in non-Islamic practices and products, only 31% of females agree. We use responses to these questions to construct an index of an individual's degree of attachment to Islamic values. On average women hold more conservative viewpoints; and taken together, male and female commitments to core Islamic values could play a significant role in dampening support for globalization. (Guiso, et al. 2003, Voigt 2005, p. 66, Noland and Pack 2007).⁵

Theoretical Expectations about Globalization

Our theoretical expectations derive from thinking about a situation of strong patriarchy, as seems to exist in much of the MENA region. In the extreme, patriarchy implies that men make all the decisions for a household, with women having little to no role. As women's

⁵ Alongside these debates is the equally powerful argument that globalization might undermine Arab and Muslim autonomy and sovereignty. In the MENA context, studies have often looked at legacies of pan-Arabism, nationalism, Islamism, and socialism (Hourani 1991, Ayoubi 1995, Ibrahim 1995, Brownlee 2005, Jamal 2012, Korany 2012) as doctrines that oppose Western hegemony and economic capitalist dominance in the region (Ayoubi 1995, Dawisha 2005).

empowerment rises, intra-familial relations change and bargaining between men and women in household decision-making becomes the norm. At gender equality, husbands and wives have the same bargaining power. Having a job outside the home and earning a paycheck gives women much greater capacity to bargain at home. And hence giving jobs to women through FDI (or domestic firms) can mean a serious disruption to patriarchal relations.

Globalization, thus, has the potential of challenging patriarchal structures by creating more economic opportunities for females. In addition, globalization may bring pressure for change by linking countries with patriarchal norms to ones with stronger norms about women's empowerment; as Neumayer and de Soysa (2011) show, globalization can promote women's rights when these different types of countries trade with each other. Like trade, FDI can link countries with high standards to those that have lower standards, thereby triggering processes of diffusion from the high-standard to the low-standard countries. In these ways, globalization can also threaten an individual's Islamic identity, which relies upon the maintenance of core Islamic values.

In this paper we use a randomized survey experiment to examine the ways that the gender and Islamic appearance of the beneficiary influences support for globalization. Respondents in each treatment group are told that foreign direct investment has created tens of thousands of new jobs in Tunisia. However, each treatment group is given one of four pictures indicating the beneficiary of that investment. The pictures are of the identical call center and use the same people. The first picture shows a group of men in a call center, signaling that the direct beneficiaries of these new jobs are men. The second picture replaces the men with all women. We then include a third and fourth picture of the same men and women in Islamic dress, to gauge whether a cultural prime about the Islamic identity of the beneficiaries affects support for globalization. We anticipate that it should increase support for globalization, especially among those who are most religious.

We ask whether this subtle manipulation of the gender and Islamic identity of the beneficiary influences overall perceptions of globalization. Further, we investigate whether there are gendered differences as well. There are a number of reasons to believe that males and females might have different preferences for globalization. In a number of studies, mostly based on the developed world, scholars have noted gender differences in the levels of support for policies of protectionism or freer trade: women tend to be less favorable toward policies of liberalizing trade than men (e.g., Seligson 1999, O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001, Scheve and Slaughter 2001b, Graham and Pettinato 2002, Baker 2005, Mayda and Rodrik 2005, Baker 2009). There is no agreement, however, on what accounts for this. Some emphasize exposure to economic ideas (Burgoon and Hiscox 2004, Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006, Baker 2009), while others also mention more traditional economic factors, such as skill levels (Scheve and Slaughter 2001b) and specific sectoral employment (Mayda and Rodrik 2005) approaches. And others focus on education levels as indicators of human capital and mobility (Gabel 1998, Drope and Chowdhury 2014) and sociotropic concerns (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Nevertheless, this

literature suggests that we might find a cleavage around a respondent's gender identity in terms of their attitudes toward globalization.

In the context of MENA, one might expect, for example that women and men in the region who hold less patriarchal values will be more likely to support globalization if it empowers women. However, it also might be the case that women and men who are more patriarchal and socially conservative might oppose globalization if it benefits women. Furthermore, women in MENA might cling to a bifurcated gendered distribution of labor because it reinforces a notion of patriarchy that provides women with social protections. For example, Suad Joseph argues the Arab patriarchy is quite resilient because it manifests itself in several everyday domains including the social, political and economic. For many women, these patriarchal protections are essential. Compounding this dependency is the fact that the state offers very few social protections for women (Joseph 1996). Thus, women might remain attached to more patriarchal structures that do not encourage female labor participation (Joseph 1996, Moghadam 2005).

Our experiment will thus allow us to determine whether there is strong cultural resistance to women's entry into the labor force by both men and women. In line with the hypotheses below, we expect that those treated with these pictures will respond differently to our globalization questions (DVs). Again, this priming allows us to explore the causal aspects of how different cleavages might affect support or opposition to globalization. In order to see if these effects might have behavioral consequences, we also ask respondents to sign a petition that will be delivered to the appropriate government agency in support for greater foreign direct investment. We present evidence that men and women respond differently to such prompts depending on the identity of the beneficiaries of globalization. We investigate the mechanisms underlying this divergence in the second part of the paper.

Core Hypotheses:

H1: Patriarchy:

- In keeping with strong patriarchal values, men and women will be more opposed to globalization when women are identified as the beneficiaries of globalization. We expect this finding to be strongest among those who are least supportive of women's empowerment.
- Because men are less supportive of women's empowerment, we expect men to react more negatively to FDI when the beneficiary is female.

H2: Islamic Values:

- In keeping with maintaining core Islamic values, men and women will be supportive of globalization when the beneficiaries, whether men and women, wear Islamic dress. We expect this result to be strongest among those who are most attached to core Islamic values.
- Because women are more supportive of core Islamic values, they will be more supportive of globalization when the beneficiary identifies with those values, i.e., is wearing Islamic dress.

Survey Experiment:

Survey data are useful to create a full picture of what a nationally representative sample thinks about globalization. Unfortunately, it can rarely tell us anything causal about what induces such preferences. In order to obtain a causal understanding, we need to conduct experiments. In these, we seek to manipulate some feature of the independent variables discussed above and see if this changes preferences toward globalization. We thus “treat” a randomly drawn group with one manipulation of an independent variable and see if their responses to the globalization questions differ from those of the control group who were not “treated.”

Our experiment frames globalization in different ways to see what factors might shape attitudes toward globalization. In this experiment we tell each respondent that foreign direct investment has created many jobs. While we tell them this, a randomly selected group sees one of 4 pictures about the jobs created. Each picture has the same base setting: it features a call center⁶ staffed by young people, implying these are the fortunate ones getting the new jobs.⁷ Each picture then has one thing that varies from this baseline. One has all men in ordinary non-Islamic dress; one has all women in non-Islamic dress; one has all men in Islamic dress; and one has all women in Islamic dress.

It is interesting to note the publics’ preferences about globalization in general. Before our experiment, we asked our nationally representative sample of Tunisians what they thought of the globalization. Almost 80% of our sample thought that being connected to the global economy was good or very good for Tunisian society. In addition, 85% thought that Tunisia did not get enough FDI and they wanted more of it. Over 90% thought that opening Tunisia’s market to international trade was good or very good for the country’s economy. Interestingly, there was no difference between men and women in these preferences, except on the last question about trade where women were slightly more favorable to globalization.

⁶ One could potentially be concerned that women and men have difference assessments of call center work. We find little support for this. Around 45% of men and 46% of women view call center work very positively.

⁷ The pictures were taken in a call center in Tunisia during the summer of 2013. A production director and professional actors were hired for these pictures. This effort was led by Chantal Berman, phd candidate in the Department of Politics at Princeton University.

Experimental Design:

Our experiment frames the benefits of globalization as targeting either men or women. In this experiment each respondent is told that foreign direct investment has created many jobs. Then, a randomly selected group sees one of four pictures about the jobs created. We then ask them a series of questions about their views toward foreign investment.

Treatment 1: Secular Men as Beneficiaries

The investment of foreign firms in Tunisia has contributed to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the county, like the ones in the picture below. A number of foreign firms are planning to invest in Tunisia.



Treatment 2: Secular Women as Beneficiaries

The investment of foreign firms in Tunisia has contributed to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the county, like the ones in the picture below. A number of foreign firms are planning to invest in Tunisia.



Treatment 3: Traditionally Dressed Islamic Men as Beneficiaries

The investment of foreign firms in Tunisia has contributed to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the county, like the ones in the picture below. A number of foreign firms are planning to invest in Tunisia.



Treatment 4: Traditionally Dressed Islamic Women as Beneficiaries

The investment of foreign firms in Tunisia has contributed to the creation of tens of thousands of new jobs in the county, like the ones in the picture below. A number of foreign firms are planning to invest in Tunisia.



We then ask a series of questions about their attitudes toward Foreign Direct Investment. See the Appendix 1A for the list of questions (“Post-Experiment Dependent Variables”). Our experiment is across subjects, not within them. Hence we compare the attitudes of those shown one picture with those shown another. Because of randomization of the pictures, the differences in attitudes are “caused” by the pictures, not by other factors. The pictures prime the viewer to see different beneficiaries of the jobs brought by FDI to Tunisia. If the identity of the beneficiary in one picture leads the respondents who saw it to be more favorable to FDI than those who saw another picture, we claim that this cultural prime is causing attitudes toward globalization to improve. Our first interest is in whether being shown one of the pictures versus another leads to differences in respondents’ average preferences about DFI. Our second interest is in explaining any such differences that arise.

Tunisian Sample:

The survey represents an area probability sample design of adults 18 years and older in all twenty four Tunisian governorates. The survey was fielded between January 28th and April 6th, 2015 and was administered to N=2,496 respondents.⁸ It was conducted face-to face in Arabic through computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). It was based on a complex sample

⁸ Please note, each bin received 356 or 357 respondents. In addition to the control and four treatments we have in this paper, we also included two other bins for an additional experiment on political parties’ logos/flags. Respondents who did receive the political party treatments did not receive the gender treatments and vice versa.

design, which included stratification and clustering.⁹ Enumerators used handheld tablet computers to administer the survey.

Each sample was first stratified by governorate and interviews were distributed proportional to population size (PPS). At the second stage, delegations were selected followed by sectors at the third stage, both using PPS. At the fourth stage, blocks were randomly selected within each sector. Households were randomly selected within each block. Within each household, individuals were selected randomly using a Kish table informed by a gender quota. Each sample was weighted for probability of selection at the household level. Additionally, for both samples post-stratification weights were constructed based on the 2004 Census due to imbalances in age. Our randomization between treatments and control against a variety of covariates was successful. Please see Appendix.

Data, Tests and Findings:

For our dependent variables, we asked our respondents a series of questions about their preferences toward FDI. Immediately after telling them about FDI and showing them the picture, we asked if their government should encourage the foreign firms to invest, should not encourage but also not prevent the foreign firms to invest, or should not allow the foreign firms to invest. We also asked them whether FDI would have a (very or somewhat) positive or negative effect on first themselves and their family, then on the Tunisian economy overall, and finally on the firm where they worked. We also asked them a series of behavioral questions about signing a petition to the ministry dealing with FDI encouraging (or discouraging) FDI. We asked them to sign the petition as well. We then performed a principal components analysis to create a factor score combining answers to all these questions.

One issue was that all respondents who worked in the public sector were excluded from answering the question about how FDI would affect the firm they worked for. For that reason, the values for public sector workers on this question were missing. Excluding these, who are a very significant part of the sample, would have biased our results. So we handled this in two ways: first, we dropped the question about the effect on their firm from the principal components analysis. Second, we used the values from the principal components analysis for all the variables when we had observations; that is, for all employed respondents working in the private sector. And we combined them with the values of the principal components analysis dropping the firm question for those unemployed and in the public sector.

We also choose to deal with the behavioral questions in two ways. In our first dependent variable presented here, called *FDI_1*, we used a smaller amount of information from our survey. That is, we dropped the question about FDI and its effect on the respondent's firm so all respondents had the same questions, and we excluded the behavioral questions. For our second

⁹ It was led by Imen Mezlini of One to One.

dependent variable here, we used the maximum amount of information.¹⁰ We included all questions about FDI and an index containing information about all the behavioral questions.¹¹ This dependent variable is called *FDI_2*. The variables were then transformed to fit onto the 0-100 scale, where larger numbers signify more support for FDI.

Our survey contained a large number of questions about the demographics of the respondents and about their attitudes toward many other political and social topics. In particular, we asked a battery of questions about their religiosity, commitment to core Islamic values, and their attitudes toward women's equality (presented earlier). We combined questions about similar topics into principal components in order to generate a single (factor) score on each of these socio-cultural values. We use these to identify the sources of the differences we see in responses to the pictures.

Findings:

We focus on the two sets of pictures shown above. We first look at the combined impact of pictures with all women relative to picture with all men. Then we look at the combined impact of pictures with men and women dressed in accord with Islamic values and those dressed in a more secular fashion. We examine first the reactions of all respondents and then focus on the differences between how men and women in our sample react.

Table 1 shows the results of the combined impact of pictures with all women relative to pictures with all men. In table 1, we see that for several of the dependent variables respondents shown either of the two pictures with all women in them were on average slightly more supportive of globalization than those shown either picture with all men. But the next two parts of the table break this down by gender of the respondent. And now we see that it is the women that are driving this result. Men show no effect when seeing the different pictures. This is surprising in two ways. Previous studies and our expectations were that women would not be supportive of globalization if women rather than men were the beneficiaries. We also expected men to be even more discriminating against women. But here, we do not see men actively discriminating against women. They are simply no different in their attitudes toward them than toward men. We think this finding about women in MENA supporting globalization when women are the beneficiaries is novel and important.

¹⁰ These two dependent variables cover the extremes for calculating the different combinations of possible DVs. The appendix contains other versions of the DVs.

¹¹ The index was created by scoring 0 = Oppose, willing to sign, actually signs. 1= Oppose, willing to sign, refuses signing. 2= Oppose, unwilling to sign. 3= Support, unwilling to sign. 4= Support, willing to sign, refuses signing. 5= Support, willing to sign, actually signs.

Table 1: Difference in means for support for FDI. Any women vs. Any men.

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| All respondents | | |
| Any women | 82.7 | 78.5 |
| N | 687 | 657 |
| Any men | 81.2 | 77.0 |
| N | 682 | 658 |
| Difference | 1.46 | 1.56 |
| T-test | 1.74 | 1.70 |
| P-value | 0.081* | 0.090* |
| Female respondents | | |
| Any women | 83.6 | 79.3 |
| N | 325 | 304 |
| Any men | 81.6 | 77.3 |
| N | 342 | 324 |
| Difference | 2.00 | 1.96 |
| T-test | 1.72 | 1.54 |
| P-value | 0.086* | 0.123 |
| Male respondents | | |
| Any women | 81.8 | 77.9 |
| N | 362 | 353 |
| Any men | 80.8 | 76.6 |
| N | 340 | 334 |
| Difference | 1.03 | 1.26 |
| T-test | 0.85 | 0.95 |
| P-value | 0.396 | 0.344 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown any picture with all women were more supportive of FDI than those shown all men. The varying N are a result of respondents answering “I don’t know” or “Decline to answer” to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** p <0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.10.

In table 2 we look at the combined effect of pictures with men and women dressed in accord with Islamic values and those dressed in a more secular fashion. This mixes the pictures containing different genders, but it allows us to see if Islamic identity is affecting attitudes toward globalization. In this we see weaker evidence for an effect. For all respondents we find no significant differences. But again for women we do find them. For several of our dependent variables, women when shown pictures of men or women in Islamic dress gaining from FDI are more supportive of FDI than women seeing picture of more secularly dressed men and women. Men show no differences again. Since women in our sample tend to hold stronger Islamic core values this result may be less surprising. But men’s indifference to this aspect of their cultural identity may signal that they are motivated more by economic factors than sociocultural ones.

Table 2: Difference in means for support for FDI. Any Islamic dressed vs. Any non-Islamic dressed.

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| All respondents | | |
| Any Islamic dressed | 82.5 | 78.2 |
| N | 686 | 661 |
| Any non-Islamic dressed | 81.3 | 77.2 |
| N | 683 | 654 |
| Difference | 1.18 | 0.99 |
| T-test | 1.41 | 1.08 |
| P-value | 0.159 | 0.281 |
| Female respondents | | |
| Any Islamic dressed | 83.6 | 79.0 |
| N | 347 | 328 |
| Any non-Islamic dressed | 81.4 | 77.4 |
| N | 320 | 300 |
| Difference | 2.14 | 1.58 |
| T-test | 1.83 | 1.24 |
| P-value | 0.067* | 0.214 |
| Male respondents | | |
| Any Islamic dressed | 81.4 | 77.5 |
| N | 339 | 333 |
| Any non-Islamic dressed | 81.2 | 77.1 |
| N | 363 | 354 |
| Difference | 0.19 | 0.39 |
| T-test | 0.16 | 0.29 |
| P-value | 0.876 | 0.769 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown the Islamic dressed men or women were more supportive of FDI than those who received the non-Islamic dressed men or women treatment. The varying N are a result of respondents answering “I don’t know” or “Decline to answer” to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** p <0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.10.

The next sets of results come from comparing attitudes from the individual pictures. We compare first those with all women but one dressed in Islamic fashion and one more secular; and then those with men dressed in Islamic garb and women dressed the same. In table 3 we see the comparison between those seeing all women dressed in two distinct ways, one in accord with Islamic values and one more secular. The results here show that among all respondents pooled together there are no significant differences, but again for female respondents there are. Here on average they are much more supportive of globalization when the beneficiaries appear to be women maintaining core Islamic values. Furthermore, since about 70% of the women in our nationally representative survey wear the hijab, this reaction may be because they identify strongly with this expression of Islamic values. Men again are on average indifferent.

Table 3: Difference in means for support for FDI. Non-Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed women.

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|---------------------------|---------|---------|
| All respondents | | |
| Non-Islamic dressed women | 81.9 | 77.7 |
| N | 346 | 330 |
| Islamic dressed women | 83.4 | 79.4 |
| N | 341 | 327 |
| Difference | -1.46 | -1.72 |
| T-test | -1.28 | -1.32 |
| P-value | 0.202 | 0.187 |
| Female respondents | | |
| Non-Islamic dressed women | 81.9 | 77.1 |
| N | 155 | 146 |
| Islamic dressed women | 85.1 | 81.3 |
| N | 170 | 158 |
| Difference | -3.26 | -4.24 |
| T-test | -2.04 | -2.30 |
| P-value | 0.042** | 0.022** |
| Male respondents | | |
| Non-Islamic dressed women | 82.0 | 78.1 |
| N | 191 | 184 |
| Islamic dressed women | 81.7 | 77.6 |
| N | 171 | 169 |
| Difference | 0.32 | 0.56 |
| T-test | 0.20 | 0.31 |
| P-value | 0.843 | 0.756 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown the non-Islamic dressed women were more supportive of FDI than those who received the Islamic dressed women treatment. The varying N are a result of respondents answering "I don't know" or "Decline to answer" to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.10.

In table 4 we look at the comparison between those seeing a picture of men in Islamic dress and women in Islamic dress. Here we see some evidence that all respondents react more positively toward FDI when it benefits women in Islamic dress compared to men. And this is very strong among female respondents, and not evident among the men. In a surprising way, women seem to applaud globalization when it benefits other women who maintain core Islamic values.

Table 4: Difference in means for support for FDI. Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed men.

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|---------------------------|---------|---------|
| All respondents | | |
| Islamic dressed women | 83.4 | 79.4 |
| N | 341 | 327 |
| Islamic dressed men | 81.7 | 77.1 |
| N | 345 | 334 |
| Difference | 1.74 | 2.27 |
| T-test | 1.54 | 1.82 |
| P-value | 0.125 | 0.070* |
| Female respondents | | |
| Islamic dressed women | 85.1 | 81.3 |
| N | 170 | 158 |
| Islamic dressed men | 82.1 | 76.9 |
| N | 177 | 170 |
| Difference | 3.04 | 4.42 |
| T-test | 1.98 | 2.54 |
| P-value | 0.048** | 0.011** |
| Male respondents | | |
| Islamic dressed women | 81.7 | 77.6 |
| N | 171 | 169 |
| Islamic dressed men | 81.2 | 77.3 |
| N | 168 | 164 |
| Difference | 0.46 | 0.24 |
| T-test | 0.28 | 0.13 |
| P-value | 0.779 | 0.893 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown the Islamic dressed women were more supportive of FDI than those who received the Islamic dressed men treatment. The varying N are a result of respondents answering “I don’t know” or “Decline to answer” to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$.

In sum, we expected that on average globalization would receive more support when males were the beneficiary of globalization. Furthermore, we assumed that this result would be strongest among men. We don’t find this to be the case at all. There is no difference in support for globalization when the beneficiaries are male among male and female respondents. In fact, where we do see a difference, it is among the women, and it’s not in a patriarchal direction. What we find is that women on average are slightly more in favor of FDI (by three percentage points) when the beneficiary is female. With a great deal of certainty we can say that men and women

don't become more positive toward globalization if the beneficiary is male. Furthermore, it doesn't appear that support for FDI is penalized if the beneficiary is female. There doesn't appear to be support for our patriarchy hypotheses. If anything, among the women, there seems to be even more support for FDI if the beneficiary is female.

In our second hypothesis, we speculated that there would be greater support for globalization when the beneficiary wore Islamic dress. We hypothesized that this result would be particularly strong among those segments of the population who were more religiously conservative. In our sample, women held stronger religious values than men. Thus, our expectation is that women will be far more supportive of globalization when the beneficiary is wearing Islamic dress. Our tests of this hypothesis yield some confirmatory evidence for the female respondents in our sample. Among females we find that there appears to be more support for FDI, when the beneficiaries are dressed in Islamic clothing. We don't find this result for male respondents.

The results thus far seem to indicate that among men, the gender and dress of the beneficiary do not matter for their support for globalization. That is, male support for globalization remains constant regardless of the gender and dress of the beneficiary. For female respondents we see a different story emerging. We find that women are more likely to support FDI when the beneficiary is female and is dressed in accord with Islamic core values. Non-Islamic dressed women as beneficiaries dampen support for globalization by close to three percentage points among females. That this finding only applies to Islamic dressed beneficiaries who are female is quite telling. If Islamic conservatism was driving the result alone, we would expect to find a similar positive effect on support for FDI if the beneficiary was male. This is not the case. And it does appear that the women are more supportive of globalization when women are the beneficiaries. This leads us to ask what mechanisms are underlying these findings?

Identifying the Mechanism:

Our experimental findings indicate that women become more supportive of globalization when the beneficiary is female and wearing Islamic dress. Our hypotheses indicated that we would find more support for globalization when women benefited among segments of the population who were less patriarchal (i.e., among those who were more supportive of women's rights). Furthermore, we argued that support for globalization when the beneficiary identified as Islamic would resonate positively with our respondents who were most attached to core Islamic values.

Hence we test whether the causal effects we see in the experiment are produced within certain subgroups of the female population. In particular, our theory leads us to examine two sets of socio-cultural attitudes: support for women's empowerment and support for core Islamic values.

To create an index of attitudes toward women's empowerment, we use a number of the questions that we asked about women's role in society and presented in figure 4 above. We use six questions about women's ability to be political leaders, support for women's university education, ability for women to secure jobs when they are scarce jobs, women's rights to equal pay for equal work, women's ability to travel alone and support for equal rights for women. We combine these questions into a principal components index, called *women_pca*. We then invert the scale so that larger numbers imply greater support for women's empowerment.

Our second index looks at three different measures. The first captures attitudes toward core Islamic values. This index combines responses to questions about banning banks if they charge interest, banning foreign firms if they import goods that contravene Islamic values such as pork, and discouraging FDI if it contravenes Muslim values. We also invert this scale so that larger values indicate more attachment to core Islamic values; it is called *islam_pca*.

Our third measure consists of questions gauging religious practice. This index includes questions about self-reported religiosity, and whether the respondent prays, fasts, attends religious classes, and prays *fajr* (dawn prayers on time). This index is called *relig_pca*. Finally, we also look at another dimension of Islamic values: whether female respondents wear the hijab.¹²

In table 5, we show how different groups of women are being affected by the different identities of the beneficiaries of globalization. Here we look only at women and only at the two comparisons that produced the substantial effects noted above. We present results from both t-tests of the difference in means for the subgroups of women and the marginal effects for each difference after controlling for each individual's age, urban/rural location, education, and income.

Women's Empowerment

In the first comparison, we look at how women who are more and less supportive (relative to the mean) of women's empowerment react to the pictures of secular women versus women wearing Islamic dress. In table 5, we see that it is the group of women who are more supportive of women's rights who are responding to the difference in the identity of the beneficiaries of globalization. Those who are more supportive of women's rights are more likely to favor globalization when the women who benefit are identifying as Islamic. This finding is somewhat surprising, because conventional wisdom holds that supporters of women's equality and those who advocate Islam are at odds with one another. This doesn't appear to be the case. In fact, it appears that women who support women's empowerment are especially favorable toward globalization when the beneficiaries wear the hijab. We see this when the comparison is Islamically dressed males vs. females (3.2% and 4.9% for each of our two DVS: FDI1 and FDI2) and between Islamically and non-Islamically dressed females (4% for FDI2 and insignificant for

¹² See appendix for more details and question wordings.

FDI1). It may be that those who support women’s empowerment believe that globalization is the route to empowering Islamically observant women. That this result is more consistently observed in our comparison of males and females leads us to believe that the result is being driven by women who are more committed to egalitarianism. This is a much more expected finding than the one above. These are women who want their gender to play an equal role in society and to enjoy access to jobs that have often been denied to them. Globalization here connotes to them a situation where women gain, and thus they are more supportive.

Table 5: Marginal Effects from Switching for one Treatment to the other within a given sub-group while controlling for Age, Education, Income and Urban/Rural residence (Female respondents).

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|--|--|--------------|--|--------------|
| Non-Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed women | Less supportive of women’s rights | | More supportive of women’s rights | |
| Marginal effect | -4.43 | -4.85 | -2.76 | -4.23 |
| T-statistic | -1.51 | -1.48 | -1.49 | -1.94 |
| P-value | 0.131 | 0.14 | 0.136 | 0.053* |
| N | 302 | 283 | 302 | 283 |
| Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed men | | | | |
| Marginal effect | 1.40 | 3.42 | 3.20 | 4.93 |
| T-statistic | 0.49 | 1.07 | 1.65 | 2.31 |
| P-value | 0.621 | 0.288 | 0.099* | 0.022** |
| N | 317 | 300 | 317 | 300 |
| Non-Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed women | Doesn’t wear the hijab | | Wears the hijab | |
| Marginal effect | -1.40 | -2.10 | -3.41 | -4.74 |
| T-statistic | -0.44 | -0.61 | -1.70 | -2.03 |
| P-value | 0.659 | 0.545 | 0.09* | 0.043** |
| N | 305 | 285 | 305 | 285 |
| Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed men | | | | |
| Marginal effect | 3.08 | 3.78 | 2.12 | 4.27 |
| T-statistic | 1.04 | 1.13 | 1.07 | 1.93 |
| P-value | 0.301 | 0.26 | 0.284 | 0.055* |
| N | 327 | 309 | 327 | 309 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown the first named picture were more supportive of FDI than those who received the second named picture. The varying N are a result of respondents answering “I don’t know” or “Decline to answer” to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** p <0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.10.

| | FDI_1 | FDI_2 | FDI_1 | FDI_2 |
|--|---|--------------|---|--------------|
| Non-Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed women | Less conservative Islam interpretation | | More conservative Islam interpretation | |
| Marginal effect | -3.53 | -4.70 | -2.85 | -4.04 |
| T-statistic | -1.46 | -1.74 | -1.19 | -1.43 |
| P-value | 0.145 | 0.083* | 0.237 | 0.154 |
| N | 300 | 280 | 300 | 280 |
| Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed men | | | | |
| Marginal effect | 4.31 | 4.93 | 1.01 | 3.23 |
| T-statistic | 1.80 | 1.76 | 0.44 | 1.26 |
| P-value | 0.074* | 0.079* | 0.661 | 0.210 |
| N | 319 | 301 | 319 | 301 |
| Non-Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed women | Less religiously active | | More religiously active | |
| Marginal effect | -2.59 | -3.20 | -3.43 | -4.99 |
| T-statistic | -0.83 | -0.89 | -1.71 | -2.17 |
| P-value | 0.405 | 0.376 | 0.089* | 0.031** |
| N | 303 | 283 | 303 | 283 |
| Islamic dressed women vs. Islamic dressed men | | | | |
| Marginal effect | 3.62 | 6.15 | 2.01 | 3.60 |
| T-statistic | 1.14 | 1.71 | 1.08 | 1.73 |
| P-value | 0.257 | 0.089* | 0.280 | 0.084* |
| N | 322 | 304 | 322 | 304 |

Note: Positive differences mean that the respondents who were shown the first named picture were more supportive of FDI than those who received the second named picture. The varying N are a result of respondents answering “I don’t know” or “Decline to answer” to additional index components. Two tailed statistical significance: *** p <0.01; ** p<0.05; * p <0.10.

Islamic Values

The second factor we analyze in explaining our results from the experiment looks at women's attachment to Islamic values. As stated above, we look at three different dimensions: commitment to core Islamic values, religiosity, and whether the respondent wears the hijab. Our variable taps into views about maintaining Islamic values in an open, global economy. Those who prefer to ban transactions, or foreign entities that promote transactions, that violate Islamic norms are coded as more attached to these conservative values; those more willing to let these transactions happen are coded as less Islamic. Women in our survey are significantly more attached to conservative Islamic values than men. And women who have more support for women's empowerment are less likely to have strong attachments to these Islamic values ($r = -0.20$).

When we compare the treatment effects of Islamic dressed women against Islamic dressed men, we find evidence that women who are more supportive of women's rights are more likely to support globalization when it benefits the Islamic dressed women (3.2% for FDI1 and 4.9% for FDI2). It appears women who are committed to women's rights will prefer globalization if it benefits women. Further, women who are less committed to core Islamic values (4.9% for FDI2) and who are less religiously active (6.2%) share this opinion. They will favor globalization when it empowers women over men. Interestingly, women who are more religious also tend to favor globalization more when it benefits the Islamic dressed women over the Islamic dressed male (3.6% for FDI2). And we see this result among women who wear the hijab (4.3% for FDI2) as well. It appears that both groups of women: those committed to women's empowerment who are less religious as well as those less committed to women's empowerment but more religious favor globalization when it benefits Islamically dressed women over men. However, we find more consistent findings on both DVs among the female respondents who were less religious or more committed to women's rights.

When we compare response patterns on support for globalization among those who are treated with the Islamic dressed female picture against the non-Islamic dressed female picture, we find that women who are more supportive of women's rights (4.2% for FDI2) and less conservative on core Islamic values (4.7% on FDI2) support globalization more when it benefits the Islamically dressed women. We also find that women who wear the hijab (3.4% for FDI1 and 4.7% for FDI2) and those who are more religious (3.4% for FDI1 and 5% for FDI2) tend to favor globalization when it benefits the Islamically dressed women over the non-Islamic dressed women. As in the above comparison, it appears that both conservative and more liberal women are more likely to support globalization when it benefits Islamic dressed women over the non-Islamic dressed woman. However, for this set of comparison, we find more consistent treatment effects on both DVs among the female respondents who report greater religious practice or wear the hijab.

Taken together, these findings for our female respondents suggest that there are two sets of women in our sample. One segment of women is more supportive of women's empowerment and less attached to core Islamic values. They tend to favor globalization when women are beneficiaries when compared to men.

There is a second group of women who are more religious and tend to wear hijab ($r = -0.34$). It is perhaps notable that roughly 70% of our sample of women wear the hijab so it is not the case that most of these women are very secular. They are more supportive of globalization when it benefits Islamically dressed women. These women also will favor globalization when it benefits Islamic dressed women over men. So it appears that they are willing to support women beneficiaries so long as they conform to Islamic culture.

Discussion

What do our findings tell us about our hypotheses? We find little evidence that men react at all to these different beneficiaries of globalization. Primes cueing patriarchal values and Islamic ones do not seem to affect their support for globalization. One reason men may not react negatively to women getting jobs is because of the different preferences they may have toward their wives versus other women. The women they see in these pictures are not their wives, and they may always feel more positive toward rights for other women than their wives. As Doepke and Tertilt (2009, p. 1542) argue, "from a man's perspective, there is a trade-off between the rights of his own wife and the rights of other men's wives. Improvements in married women's economic rights increase women's bargaining power relative to their husbands' within the household. Because husbands have nothing to gain from an increase in their wives' bargaining power at their own expense. In this paper, we don't focus on men in this paper since we see few effects among them in these comparisons. But it is also telling that they are not discriminating against women in the workplace here, as we expected. And they do not seem as focused on maintaining core Islamic values in the face of globalization, as women do

What are women thinking when they see the different pictures? We also used focus groups to understand better what people were thinking when they saw the pictures. When looking at all of the pictures, our different focus groups—business people, public sector employees, young and older people, and workers—had similar reactions. When being shown the picture of women dressed in Islamic fashion, there were often positive reactions. Several noted that it was good to see women getting jobs and being employed. And some of them pointed out that it was good to see that Islamically dressed women who cared about Islamic values were able to get jobs and were not being discriminated against. Some said they thought the picture implied that employment was more important than religion. And they said that it was good to see religion being compatible with a modern economy. When seeing the picture of the traditionally dressed men, however, women reacted differently and more negatively. They often felt as if the workplace was then segregated and that there was no place for women. Further, some worried about the islamization of the workplace. All of these comments suggest that respondents were

understanding that the people in the picture were getting jobs from FDI and were noticing their different identities.

How important are gender, attitudes toward women, and Islamic values to Tunisians' preferences about globalization? The magnitude of our effects are modest at best. Yet, our priming was also quite subtle. The fact that we do see movement (3%-6%) when the beneficiaries are Islamic dressed women tells us that globalization is welcomed when it is seen as both conforming to Islamic tradition but also when it is seen as empowering women. This convergence of rather contradictory allegiances (Islamic conservatism and women's empowerment) shapes the results that we find in this manuscript. If anything these results tell us that among women (both conservative and liberal) there is a desire for greater access to the workforce.

Conclusion

To date, we know a limited amount about the economic preferences of ordinary citizens in MENA. This paper is one of the first to investigate the economic preferences of Tunisian citizens and provide a more complete and nuanced account of the factors that structure these preferences, while focusing on gender. It is important to highlight that understanding citizen preferences about policies linked to economic reform and globalization will help the MENA countries transition with greater accountability and hence greater stability. Ignoring or misunderstanding these preferences may lead to cycles of destructive instability and missed opportunities in the years to come.

Globalization is popular in Tunisia. A large majority support it whether in the form of trade or FDI. Interestingly, there is some evidence here that women support it more than men; this is distinct from what we know about women in developed Western countries. But what is also evident is that preferences about it are affected by non-economic factors. An individual's socio-cultural attitudes also seem to affect their views toward integration with the world economy. Our experiment allows us to demonstrate this effect more clearly than most research in the past. In the comparisons we examine here, we see these effects most strongly in women. They, especially those who view women's empowerment most positively, support globalization even more when it helps women. Alongside this group of women, is another that is more religious that supports globalization when it helps women who are Islamically dressed. This may represent an attempt by women to maintain Islamic values in the face of a Western-oriented globalization process. They would like jobs and work outside the home, as globalization may bring, but they also want to keep their core Islamic values intact.

How distinct is the Tunisian case? We think it is fairly representative of MENA countries. The Global Gender Gap Report of 2010 shows that among the MENA countries, Tunisia ranks only 4th in terms of closing the gap (Hausmann, et al. 2010, p. 21). While some attitudes about women in Tunisia may be more progressive than in other MENA countries, those about women working outside the home and about the primacy of men's role in providing for the family are very similar in Tunisia to other MENA countries. The fact that even here in Tunisia we find that women are responding more positively to globalization when they see the gains going to women who remain attached to core Islamic values suggests that this is likely to be the case in other more conservative Muslim countries as well.

The results of our research are mildly optimistic for reform in Tunisia. They suggest strong support among the public for globalization and for government policies that encourage it. This may be good news for women's empowerment as well since research shows that globalization can lead to improvements in women's rights especially in the economic realm (Neumayer and de Soysa 2011).¹³ Our results also imply that women may be the strongest supporters and that if the new jobs are spread among women and those with traditional Islamic values then foreign investment and trade may be accepted more readily. The maintenance of these core Islamic values in the face of globalization seems important, at least for women in Tunisia. And this may be a broader lesson for all of the MENA region.

¹³ There is also growing evidence that international migration of men and women can foster gains in women's economic and political empowerment in the exporting country through exposure to new ideas and foreign practices, see Hugo (2000) and Lodigiani and Salomone (2015).

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